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ABSTRACT
Why have foreign counterinsurgency operations had such low success rates
since 1945? While operations of this type succeeded at the rate of 85.71% during the
period of 1816-1945, they declined by 56.30 percentage points to just 29.49% during
period of 1945-1997 (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144). This occurred even though foreign
powers were often fighting in the same territories where they had previously been
overwhelmingly victorious.
I argue that military defeats suffered by European states during the Second
World War convinced the peoples of the developing world that colonial control could be
successfully challenged. As guerrilla struggles emerged in post-war Asia and Africa,
colonial powers conducting counterinsurgency operations in those regions were
constrained by a revised international order in which the existing multi-polar world had
been replaced by a nuclear-armed, bi-polar East-West confrontation that offered the
possibility of real-time, system-wide deadly responses to provocations.

The United

Nations Charter also offered support for territorial self-determination in Articles 1, 55,
73, and 76 (United Nations Charter, 1945, Articles 1, 55, and 73); support that was
heightened by the growing number of former colonial states within the United Nations
membership. This broad political and military support for native rule legitimated the
existence and heightened the resolve of post-war nationalism (Westad, 1992), making
nationalistic insurgencies virtually impossible to truly defeat, regardless of the
counterinsurgency strategy employed.
To further evaluate these arguments, I developed hypotheses that advance the
propositions that (a) counterinsurgency campaigns facing significant United Nations
ii

opposition will fail more often than those which do not, (b) insurgencies which receive
broad support from great powers will be more likely to succeed than those which do not,
and (c) the employment of either of the two primary counterinsurgency strategies will
not be significant in success or failure of counterinsurgency efforts. Those hypotheses
were then tested by briefly comparing information across the 17 case studies contained
in the Correlates of War (COW) Extra-State Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 (see
Appendix I), and then evaluated in depth through four case studies drawn from that
dataset.

The results were compelling, and offer significant support for all three

hypotheses.

iii
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INTRODUCTION
Background
Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.3 million battle deaths occurred during the
course of 25 interstate wars around the globe. During that same period, however,
roughly 16.2 million people died during the course of approximately 127 civil wars (13 of
which were colonial conflicts); a death rate nearly five times that of the interstate wars
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 75-77). The causes of such vicious conflicts have been the
subject of extensive academic research during the past 60 years, as governments have
struggled to formulate appropriate responses to outbreaks of civil violence within their
own frontiers.
Prior to 1945, counterinsurgency operations conducted by either indigenous
governments or foreign intervening powers were nearly always successful in quelling
native insurrections. While indigenous governments have continued to find success in
these undertakings during the post-1945 time period, advanced industrial powers, be
they European, Eurasian, or American, have lost most of their campaigns, even when
the political stakes for losing were high (see Appendices I and II).

This is proven

beyond doubt through an examination of the COW Extra-State Dataset, which
determines the intervening power to have been successful in only five of the 17
campaigns conducted during that time period (or 29.41%), while the insurgency
achieved victory on twelve occasions (or 70.58%) (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144). What
factors have emerged to deny the world‟s most advanced countries the ability to assert
their political will while still allowing native governments – most of which exist in the
developing Third World – to crush their adversaries in the majority of cases?
1

It is not overstating the issue to write that Western governments have historically
misunderstood the basic, essential elements of counterinsurgency. While the United
Kingdom‟s Malayan campaign of 1948-1960 is now often cited as a model of
counterinsurgency strategy, it stumbled during its initial four years as the British Army
sought to fight Marxist insurgents much as it had fought conventional forces in Europe
less than three years earlier. During the 1946-1954 French campaign in Indochina,
French forces powers sought to utilize conventional warfare methods far more suitable
to countering the Soviets in Central Europe than to reducing a local insurgency in
Southeast Asia.

In 1960s Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, Commander,

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), tried to apply concepts he learned in
conventional warfare campaigns in the Second World War and Korea while essentially
ignoring

basic

theories

of

insurgency

development,

even

though

excellent

counterinsurgency documents such as The Small Wars Manual (1940) were widely
available at the time. This limited scope of military thought extended into the early
stages of United Kingdom‟s 1969-1997 campaign against the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (IRA).1 Although viable British counterinsurgency doctrine developed
in Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya, Borneo, and Aden had been widely published in such
documents as Keeping the Peace (1963) and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1969),
poor judgment by British authorities (such as granting unqualified support to a highlypartisan, Protestant-dominated police force, utilizing internment without trial, and
conducting large, brigade-sized cordon-and-search operations against residential
targets based on very limited intelligence) allowed a small-scale insurrection to develop
1

The Irish Republican Army is known in Irish Gaelic as Óglaigh na hÉireann.
2

into a full-blown insurgency that would last nearly 30 years (Kiszely, 2007: 6-7, 9-10).
Not for nothing did Howard write that “the complacent anti-intellectualism which has
long been a predominate tendency of a British Army . . . takes a perverse delight in
learning its lessons the hard way” (Clausewitz, 1984 [1832]: 38).
Military institutions themselves often possess internal prejudices that preclude
taking full advantage of the learning process.

Howard accuses the British Army of

relying up „a book‟ for advice on confronting insurgencies instead of conducting a
serious historical study of the true nature of past counterinsurgency campaigns. British
Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszely writes that the more rigid and proud the
organization, the less able it is to accommodate criticism, either internal (which it finds
threatening) or external (which it finds irrelevant).

He notes that since military

institutions are notoriously conservative organizations and are cautious about invoking
change, much of the advancement in military science comes from external intellectuals
with military experience rather than from active-duty military personnel, adding that
militaries around the world often confuse ongoing activity with actual progress, and
invariably train hard for the wrong purpose (Kiszely, 2007: 6-9).
Military institutions are also constrained from a serious study of insurgencies by
an official political reluctance to formally acknowledge burgeoning guerilla activities as
insurgencies; as organized popular movements. Instead, they prefer to portray such
activities as simple terrorism to be resolved by purely military responses (which often
simply intensify new-born insurgencies), blaming resulting counterinsurgency failures
upon political constraints regarding the use of firepower.

In such cases, military

counterinsurgency doctrine is either ignored completely or treated as a general template
3

to be unquestioningly followed, regardless of the sui generis circumstances of the
conflict at hand. To overcome these misunderstandings, Kiszely stresses that both
political and military commanders need to clearly understand the precise nature of the
conflict upon which they are embarking before ever considering military operations
(Kiszely, 2007: 7-10). Boot sums the issue up succinctly with the words, “small wars
cannot be fought by big war methods” (Boot, 2002: 285).
Placing a military unit into a counterinsurgency environment often clashes with
the basic „warrior ethos‟ structure of combat units, since achievable goals against a
conventional enemy are replaced with the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of
dealing with an unseen, misunderstood adversary against which realistic goals may be
difficult to determine. Successful counterinsurgency warfare requires the exercise of
both hard and soft power, emphasizing decidedly unwarrior-like qualities such as
emotional intelligence, empathy, subtlety, sophistication, nuance, and political
adroitness to distinguish between insurgents and members of the general population,
and elite military units trained solely for conventional warfighting (such as those found in
Russia and Israel) often fare poorly in such environments. Conversely, ill-funded and illtrained Third World military forces are also a poor fit for counterinsurgency campaigns,
since they often unwittingly strengthen the guerilla support base by looting and pillaging
in the name of combating terrorism and banditry (Keen 1998; Kiszely, 2007: 7-9).
Counterinsurgency campaigns that result in large-scale civilian casualties may
also serve to increase popular support of insurgencies. Preventing such casualties is a
difficult proposition for even advanced industrialized powers to resolve, and the United
States experience in Vietnam (Avant, 1994; Krepinevich, 1986), the Soviet experience
4

in Afghanistan, and the early British campaign in Northern Ireland (Kennedy-Pipe 1997)
serve as exemplars of failure on this account (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 80). Crawford
writes that, since guerillas characteristically mingle with the population, defeating a
guerilla movement strictly on military terms cannot occur unless counterinsurgency
forces are essentially willing to annihilate the population among which the guerillas are
nurtured. Such an apocalyptical strategy has historical precedents: German troops
crushed native insurgencies in Southwest Africa during the early 20th century only after
killing 50% of the Nama people and 80% of the Herero tribesmen (Crawford, 2003: 18).
While such virtually genocidal measures may successfully cow a population to
submission in the short term, failure to address the very real contest for public support
between insurgents and the government can doom long term counterinsurgency efforts
(Siqueira and Sandler, 2006: 879-880).
Kahl argues that the United States may be at a unique disadvantage in adjusting
to counterinsurgency operations.

First, its conventional, enemy-centered mindset

provides a poor transition to operations relating to stability and counterinsurgency.
Second, the emphasis upon the enemy as the focus of operational activity encourages
the view of all military-aged native men as potential threats, rather than as a population
with which to bond. Third, the inclination to use overwhelming force against enemy
combatants often leads to high collateral damage against the populations of occupied
countries. Fourth, the use of search-and-destroy methodology often alienates formerly
objective populations and may lead them to directly support insurgencies (Kahl, 2007:
43-45). I add a fifth notation here; that being a deep and troubling lack of understanding
on the part of American officials for indigenous nationalism that encourages the United
5

States to force developing countries into an American political mold without regard for
native history and culture (George, 1994: 94-100).
These issues have re-emerged during the current United States-led military
occupation of Iraq. As Iraqi society collapsed along tribal and family lines following the
March 2003 invasion, Sunni imams moved into the political power vacuum left from the
crushing of political and military elements of the Hussein regime, and mosques
emerged as the center of information, rumor, and resistance to the American presence
(West, 2006: 2-4). Within a month, an indigenous insurgency had taken shape that
soon graduated from individuals using small arms against American soldiers to heavy
infantry weapons being deployed by roughly 4,000-9,000 dedicated insurgents against
American combat units (White and Schmidmayr, 2003: 21-26). The American reaction,
which initially focused upon denying the very existence of the insurgency, 2 quickly
denounced the guerilla activity as a restoration movement for ousted Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, rather than a nationalist reaction to the fundamental problem of an
intrusive, foreign military occupation (Titorenko, 2004: 31-37; MacGregor, 2007: 11).3

th

2

When Major General Raymond Odierno, commander of the 4 Infantry Division (Mechanized), was
asked on June 18, 2003 if guerilla warfare was not, in fact, underway, he responded with verbiage
indicative of a military in denial. “This is not guerilla warfare; it is not close to guerilla warfare because it‟s
not coordinated,” he said. “They [the insurgents] do not have the will . . . I‟m not sure they really believe
in what they‟re doing.” He added that “when I talk about organized guerilla warfare, it‟s a very complex
organization that plans very complex guerilla operations” (Official Transcript, 2003).
3

The notion of a restoration movement for Saddam Hussein became difficult to sustain after the killing of
Hussein‟s sons during July 2003 and the capture of Hussein himself during December 2003 failed to
terminate the insurgency (Hashim, 2003; Titorenko, 2004: 31-37). Eisenstadt and White argue that the
insurgency is indeed the result of a potent Iraqi nationalism based upon political interpretation of Sunni
Islam and enhanced by a sense of religious/cultural entitlement shared among many Sunnis (Eisenstadt
and White, 2006: 33-34). Wide popular support among the Sunni population for the insurgency was
indicated by a poll jointly conducted by ABC News, the British Broadcasting Company, and Japan‟s NHK
during August 17-24, 2007 of 2,112 Iraqis (margin of error: +- 2.5%) which found 93% of Sunnis
supporting lethal insurgent attacks against American troops (Iraq: Where Things Stand, 2007: 24, 26).

6

With the insurgency thus dismissed as illegitimate, the United States military responded
to what was still a low-level guerilla movement with a coercive campaign of the costbenefit model that included dragnet-type sweeps of the Sunni Triangle resulting in the
detention of tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis (many of whom subsequently reported
rough and degrading treatment at the hands of American troops), air strikes involving
heavy bombers and attack aircraft dropping 500 pound bombs and satellite-guided
missiles, long-range artillery bombardments against often-congested areas, and food,
water, and electricity control among the population (Blanche, 2004: 10; Eisenstadt and
White, 2005: 3; In Their Own Words, 2006: 22).4 The perception of a brutal military
occupation was quickly reflected in a Pew Global Attitudes Project study (issued on
June 3, 2003) that found over 90% of Jordanian, Moroccan, Palestinian, and Turkish
respondents, 80% of Indonesian and Pakistani respondents, and 70% of Brazilians,
French, Russians, and South Koreans stating that the United States “didn‟t try very
hard” to avoid Iraqi civilian casualties (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003: 24-25); a
perception that may have been compounded by the widely-publicized abuse of Iraqi
detainees by American troops at Abu Ghraib Prison (Kahl, 2007: 7).5
How did the United States government miscalculate the outcome of its March
2003 invasion of Iraq so badly? A significant body of evidence exists that the Bush
4

During late July 2004, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, then commanding general for United States
forces in Iraq, announced that “I don‟t think we will put much energy into trying the old saying, „win hearts
and minds;‟” adding that he didn‟t view that concept as representing “one of the metrics of success”
(Christenson, 2004: 1; Krepinevich, 2005: 101). Lynn also questioned the validity of the social welfare
approach, writing that policies calling for “winning hearts and minds” were misleading since “acts of
kindness are not a particularly good fit for vigilant armed warriors,” and “winning people over to new
beliefs is at best a long process and a notably difficult task for outside forces” (Lynn, 2005: 24).
5

Perhaps not surprisingly, a movie entitled Valley of the Wolves that depicted American atrocities in Iraq
(including the massacre of guests at a wedding party and the fire-bombing of a mosque during evening
prayer) opened in Turkish theaters during early 2006 to record audiences (Kahl, 2007: 7).
7

Administration completely underestimated the costs of establishing and maintaining a
viable, pro-American regime in Baghdad (Dalder and Lindsay, 2003; Johnson, 2004;
Record and Terrill, 2004, Sullivan, 2007: 518). An 2007 evaluation conducted by the
RAND Corporation determined that the necessary organization, training, equipment,
and cultural sensitization required for counterinsurgency warfare was “unfortunately
lacking” in the American forces who initially confronted the Iraqi insurgency (Hosmer,
2007: 143), and United States efforts to link the insurgency to regional terrorism or the
revival of a global Islamic khalifate prevented American officials from properly
evaluating the devastating impact of the occupation upon the indigenous population
(Davis and Perry, 2007: 1-2). It also appears that 1950s-era theories of modernization
(which had previously guided much of the doctrine involved in pacifying 1960s South
Vietnam) had driven much of the planning and implementation for the occupation of
Iraq, under the questionable concept that Iraqi culture would be malleable to the point
that issues of ethnicity, religion, and a past history of authoritarian rule would matter
very little in the new, pro-American Iraqi state that was to be created under United
States supervision (Latham, 2006: 39). Dr. Noah Feldman, assigned to work as a
constitutional advisor for the American occupation authority in Iraq, writes that his
colleagues were reading books relating to the American occupation and reconstruction
of post-Second World War Germany and Japan rather than conducting any serious
research on the Middle East in general or Iraq in specific, under the apparent belief that
American-style nation-building would be globally transportable (Feldman, 2004:

1).

The British experience in 1920s Iraq, in which the physical presence of British troops
served to unite the disparate tribal nature of the country into a more unified nationalist
8

resistance movement, was apparently overlooked entirely (Hudson, 1977: 269-270),
with the idea that the employment of overwhelming American military force through
„shock and awe‟ would paralyze the Iraqi population into unquestioning compliance
(Ullman and Wade, 1996:

Chapter 15).

President George W. Bush subsequently

sought to downplay adverse Iraqi reactions to the occupation by noting that the United
States itself had endured “years of chaos” during the American Revolution and the
failures of the Articles of Confederation (Stevenson, 2005:

A12); again viewing a

distinctly Iraqi resistance movement through an American prism of questionable
relevance.
Meanwhile, the United Nations as a whole has also declined to offer any realistic
critique of the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, implicitly granting to the
United States a free hand in determining its policies there. Prior to the March 2003
invasion, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan advised American officials that
an American attack against Iraq without Security Council endorsement “would not be in
conformity with the [UN] Charter” (Jervis, 2003: 375), and further clarified that position
on September 8, 2004 by stating that, “from the Charter point of view, it was illegal”
(Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, 2003: 1). The United Nations itself has been far more
circumspect regarding its commentary on the invasion and occupation of Iraq, however,
with most Security Council resolutions simply affirming the „sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iraq‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #1472, #1483, #1490,
#1500, #1511, #1546, #1557, #1619, #1637, #1700, #1723, #1770, and #1790, 20032008), occasionally stating that the situation there „constituted a threat to international
peace and security‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #1483, #1511, #1518,
9

#1637, 2003, 2005), and occasionally calling for international action to deprive the
„terrorists‟ of arms and sanctuary (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #1511,
#1546, #1637, #1723, and #1790, 2003-2006). About the strongest rebuke to be found
for the United States among these resolutions has been the occasional reminder that
„the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly‟ (United Nations Security
Council Resolutions #1483 and #1511, 2003), verbiage „looking forward to the end of
the occupation‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolution #1546, 2004), and
statements „recognizing the importance of consent of the sovereign government of Iraq
for the presence of the multinational force‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolutions
#1723 and #1790, 2006-2008). The silence of the General Assembly has been even
more surprising.

During 2003-2008, that body issued only two resolutions, both of

which related strictly to funding issues involving the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #58/304 and
#60/274, 2004, 2006); a benign performance indeed given the Assembly‟s past record
of activism in such issues as African decolonization and the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.
Great power opposition to the conflict in Iraq has also been relatively benign,
consisting of little more than a grudging intolerance of a fait accompli brought about by
an American military force operating in a unipolar world. Within hours of the onset of
the invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin rebuked the American military action with
statesman-like verbiage. “If we allow fist law [to] replace international law under which
the strongest is always right, can do everything it wants and does not limit itself when
selecting the means and methods then the basic principles [of] international law – the
10

sovereignty of states – will be doubted. In this world nobody, not a single country will
feel safe. The vast sea of instability that has emerged today will expand and cause
negative

developments

in

many

other

regions

(http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/psmes/2003/03/40900.shtml).

of

the

world”

At the same time,

however, Lukin notes that Russian officials “avoided Cold War parlance and the danger
of becoming the most radical critic of the United States” while making inroads with „Old
Europe‟ and strengthening Russia‟s position in the Arab world (Lukin, 2003: 12). He
adds that China and Russia, both of whom objected to the invasion, understood the
need to maintain good relations with the United States, and simply seek to join with likeminded governments such as those of France and Germany to seek to limit American
unilateralism (Lukin, 2003:

16-17, 21).

Further great power opposition was likely

moderated by the Bush Administration‟s strategy of the „Coalition of the Willing‟; a
grouping of 49 states that, through various means, offered support for the United States
invasion and occupation of Iraq. While only two of those countries – Japan and the
United Kingdom – could truly be considered great powers, the American strategy did
tend to dilute both great power and United Nations opposition to the military campaign
and grant to the United States extensive flexibility in conducting subsequent
counterinsurgency operations (Who are the Current Coalition Members?, 2003: 1).
With the passage of the years, this lack of any viable international opposition led
the Bush administration to pursue the idea that complete victory over the Iraqi
insurgency was achievable once appropriate counterinsurgency techniques were
developed. By mid-2007, those techniques were stressing the social welfare approach
detailed within Counterinsurgency (Field Manual 3-24), a sea change from the cost11

benefit approach utilized during the first four years of the conflict (Kahl, 2006: 73-76).
While

the

new manual

comprised

a

fairly exhaustive

analysis

of

modern

counterinsurgency doctrine (including the key point that “eventually all foreign armies
are seen as interlopers or occupiers” (Counterinsurgency, 2006: 1-26), I argue that
some of its basic tenets are spurious in nature, including the idea that an affected
population will have greater faith in the vitality of its own government once it is clearly
understood that a long-term commitment by American military forces is in place
(Counterinsurgency, 2006:

1-24).

I believe that quite the opposite is true; that a

nationalistic population will always seek to remove the foreign occupier no matter how
kind or coercive he may be, and that a declaration of a long-term foreign presence will
simply serve to shatter the credibility of the indigenous government and heighten
support for the insurgency.6

In short, foreign counterinsurgency forces eventually

become the focus of the entire insurgent effort, rather than the remedy for guerilla
violence.7

6

Research conducted by Dominguez also tends to question the claim that long-term staying power on the
part of occupying forces inevitably wears out insurgencies. He notes that colonial conflicts have, in fact,
often been won by states willing to offer flexible political alternatives. Whereas long-term French and
Portuguese efforts to indefinitely continue metropolitan provincial status for Algeria and Portuguese Africa
eventually ultimately failed, British plans for eventual independence for their restive colonial territories
may have allowed them not only to persevere in both Kenya and Malaya, but to maintain a modicum of
influence there after their withdrawal (Dominguez, 1986: 808).
7

Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel during the
Presidential administration of Ronald Reagan, notes that many Iraqis view the presence of American
troops as “an occupying force reminiscent of colonial times, not an army that liberated an oppressed
people,” and may tend to support virtually any grouping that seeks their expulsion (Korb and Boorstin,
2005: 5). Khalidi appears to agree, noting that most native Iraqis simply do not wish to be governed by
foreigners; especially when those foreigners are non-Muslims (Khalidi, 2004: 55). Many Muslims also
believe that Twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, in occultation for over 1,100 years and eventually to
return to convert the world to Islam, is planning to conduct that return in Samarrah, Iraq, and that the
United States occupation of the country is actually a cover to prevent al-Mahdi‟s reappearance (Davis,
2007: 33-34). Clearly, the perception of a foreign occupation force designed to pre-empt Islamic
eschatology could provide a strong nationalistic/religious motivation for long-term insurgency.
12

It is surprising that we did not learn this lesson 35 years ago in Vietnam, after
spending nearly ten years and tremendous amounts of blood and treasure in a vain
attempt to remake the Vietnamese in our own image, only to find that the Vietnamese
already possessed a strong nationalist identity of their own that precluded foreign
domination. The stirring words of North Vietnamese negotiator Lê Đức Thọ to National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger at a meeting in Paris, France on February 21, 1970
are worth repeating here. “If our generation cannot win, then our sons and nephews will
continue. We will sacrifice everything, but we will not again have slavery. This is our
iron will. We have been fighting for twenty-five years, the French and you. You wanted
to quench our spirit with bombs and shells.

But they cannot force us to submit”

(Berman, 2007: 59).8
Outline of the Dissertation
The difficulties inherent in conducting successful counterinsurgency campaigns
are explored in depth within the course of this dissertation. Chapter One encompasses
the literature review, which covers a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency issues
including the challenges of counterinsurgency, the impact of foreign control or influence,
enabling measures for insurgencies confronting foreign control, and the impact of great
power/United Nations/political bloc intervention. In Chapter Two, theoretical bases of
insurgency development will be evaluated along with counterinsurgency strategies
8

A classic case study in individual Vietnamese nationalism can be found in Phạm Xuân Ẩn, a member of
a prominent South Vietnamese family who attended Orange Coast College in California during 1957-1959
and went on to become a respected and highly sought-after reporter for Time Magazine during the 1960s.
Following the April 1975 fall of Saigon, Ẩn was revealed to have been a long-term North Vietnamese
intelligence officer who had used his journalist position as cover for espionage activities directed against
the South Vietnamese government and its American allies (Berman, 2007: 83-209). “As much as I love
the United States, it had no right here,” he said during and interview conducted in 2005. “The Americans
had to be driven out of Vietnam one way or another. We must sort this place out ourselves” (Berman,
2007: 253).
13

relating to both social welfare/hearts and minds programs and repressive, cost-benefit
measures; counterinsurgency programs designed to fulfill those strategies will also be
examined. An examination of the COW Database through its Intra-State and ExtraState Datasets will also be conducted to provide background for the stated argument
regarding why foreign counterinsurgency campaigns fail, and a series of hypotheses will
be developed in an effort to further examine this basic research question. Chapter
Three provides a brief summary of evidence across the 17 insurgencies contained
within the COW Extra-State Dataset that may impact the hypotheses. Chapter Four
provides an in-depth assessment of four empirical case studies selected on a basis
designed to test those hypotheses.

Finally, in Chapter Five, the results will be

evaluated to produce a summary of what has been learned and offer suggestions on
how this research may be extended in the future.
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CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW
A.

Introduction
Commanders of conventional military units are often amazed at the ability of

small groups of disaffected natives to create wide-ranging national movements that are
eventually able to confront and potentially defeat foreign armies (Herbst, 2004: 361). In
many cases, neither side is able to bring the conflict to a decisive outcome, and an
equilibrium may eventually be reached with guerillas controlling the rural areas and
counterinsurgency troops ensconced in the cities (as in the case of late 1970s
Rhodesia), or counterinsurgents controlling the daytime while ceding the night to the
insurgency (as in 1960s South Vietnam) (Herbst, 2004: 363-364: Preston, 2004: 68).
In other cases, governments have attempted to co-opt secessionism and insurgency by
entering into power-sharing arrangements, empowering local languages, or granting
heightened autonomy to restive provinces (Rudolph and Thompson, 1985: 296, 301)
Local insurgencies in the developing world have not always been such a
troublesome issue for Western governments to resolve. During the 19 th century through
the early part of the 20th century, European armies were able to decisively enforce their
will against the undisciplined guerillas they intermittently encountered despite the
unquestioned motivation and courage displayed by the latter (Mack, 1975: 176). The
dynamics of international affairs were altered radically in the post-1945 era, however,
with a burgeoning, Third World nationalism being dramatically magnified through the
focus of the newly-formed United Nations that did not accept the legitimacy of nonindigenous rule (United Nations Charter, 1945; United Nations General Assembly

Resolution #1514, 1960), and courted by a new bi-polar competition for influence
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between the United States and the Soviet Union that required the perceived interests of
the two new superpowers to be taken into account everywhere ( Hurley, 1945;

Tonnesson, 1985: 11; Saperstein, 1991: 195; Westad, 1992: 455-462). Indigenous
guerillas had always held the advantage of being able to operate on their own
territory with either the active or passive support of a local population (Maxwell, 1976:
250-260; Mandelbaum, 1991/1992: 165-167-169, 173-174; Hammes, Thomas, 2006:
20), but they now found their footing confronting foreign powers shocked by the level of
suffering that Third World nationalist insurgencies were willing to endure to expel a
foreign presence, hobbled by unrelenting international pressure to withdraw their forces
from the developing world, and increasingly unable to maintain the support of domestic
electorates for long, drawn-out, stalemated campaigns (Rosen, 1972: 169; Mack, 1975:
177; Mueller, 1980; Shafer, 1988, 58-60, 64, 77; Edelstein, 2004: 58; Claessen, 2007:
98-99; Sullivan, 2007: 498). As a result, Western governments were finding themselves
defeated by insurgent forces from Southeast Asia to North Africa during the latter half of
the 20th century, and, by 1960, even the United Kingdom – the former bastion of
European colonial domination - was making it clear that imperial pretensions were no
longer viable in either Africa or Asia (Hourani, 1991: 354-355, 364, 368; Westad, 1992:
455-462).
In this dissertation I seek to evaluate the elements that make indigenous
insurgencies so difficult for foreign powers to defeat in the post-Second World War era.
I argue that imperial, intervening armies trained for conventional warfare are ultimately
unable to decisively defeat a vaguely defined indigenous adversary that refuses to
accept the presence of foreign military forces, regardless of the ability of those forces to
16

inflict pain and suffering.

In this chapter I first review the basic challenges of

counterinsurgency for modern armies. Next, the impact of foreign control or influence
upon population alienation and insurgency formation is evaluated.

Then, the

motivations for insurgencies confronting foreign occupation are detailed. Lastly, the
impact of great power/United Nations/political bloc intervention upon counterinsurgency
efforts is examined. By analyzing each link in the chain of insurgency deployment,
heightened insight may be gained into the nature of the driving force within these
guerilla movements that allows them to withstand the extreme levels of punishment
delivered against them by counterinsurgent forces.
B.

The Challenges of Counterinsurgency
While

established

militaries

possess

superior

weaponry,

technology,

administration, and personnel training, serious advantages traditionally lie with the
insurgents during the course of counterinsurgency campaigns. First, insurgencies may
extend for decades; outlasting the resources and political ability of counterinsurgency
forces to continue the conflict. The Palestinians have directly challenged Israeli control
of Judea/Samaria for over 40 years, the Vietnamese fought both French and American
forces for 30 years, and the Chinese Communists fought Chinese Nationalist forces for
27 years.

Even in Malaya, where the British successfully defeated ethnic Chinese

guerillas, the insurgency ground on for 12 years before it finally collapsed. Second, the
extreme technological advantages possessed by the government or intervening foreign
power may have little impact against entrenched insurgencies. Quite the reverse; the
historical example is that the side with the simplest technology proves victorious. Third,
while the government and/or foreign intervention forces must govern and provide
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effective security, the insurgency has only to propose the possibility of a better
alternative, while taking active measures to defeat the existing regime‟s ability to
operate (Hammes, 2006: 18-19).9 Fourth, a lack of unity within insurgencies is not
necessarily a strategic vulnerability for them. Such a lack of centralized control may
actually complicate counterinsurgency efforts, since little discernable pattern in guerilla
activity can ever be detected (Hammes, Thomas, 2006:

20).

Fifth, democratic

governments can face an additional disadvantage in combating insurgencies given their
need to maintain electorate support, since public dissatisfaction with seemingly
unending conflicts can be co-opted by opposition parties advocating military
disengagement (Claessen, 2007: 98-99).10 Sixth, conflicts of this type can fracture
society itself, both within the country threatened by the insurgency and within the third
power (if one is present) conducting counterinsurgency operations, and lead to strong
political pressure to resolve the conflict. Military forces involved in the conflict, along
with colonizers residing in the affected area (be they Israelis in Gaza, French in Algeria,
or British in Kenya), experience a very different war from that perceived by the
population as a whole, and as enthusiasm for the conflict recedes among the general
population, it typically heightens for both military and the colonizers; the former believing
they will be blamed for losing the war, and the latter seeing a direct existential threat to
their livelihood.

Such societal cleavages may eventually result in attempted coups

As Henry Kissinger observed in 1969, “the guerilla wins if he does not lose” (Kissinger, 1969: 214).
Conversely, the intervening state or the regime in power loses if it does not win.
9

10

Arreguin-Toft writes that democracies cannot initiate conflicts without politically justifying them to their
electorates, and notes that “one can hardly think of an example of a democratic state launching a small
war it didn‟t claim . . . was of vital importance to its survival; albeit via domino logic” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005:
16). Once that validating claim is placed into effect, insurgents can inflict a political penalty against the
government by prolonging the conflict and questioning the true nature of the government‟s motivation
(Claessen, 2007: 99).
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d‟état by elements of society seeking to either maintain the status quo or terminate the
debilitating conflict once and for all.11 Seventh, military intervention by a foreign power
often unwittingly serves to bring temporary unity to an otherwise politically fractured
insurgency. Insurgents in 1968-2008 Palestine, 1980s (and 2001-2008) Afghanistan,
1994-2008 Chechnya, and 2003-2008 Iraq have typically been united by little more than
the undying belief that the outsider had to go (Maxwell, 1976: 250-260; Mandelbaum,
1991/1992: 165-167-169, 173-174; Claessen, 2007: 98-102).
Gurr writes that the onset of rebellion is determined by motivation, opportunity,
and identity (Gurr, 1970). Insurgent motivation may be positive, such as a desire for
wealth, or negative, as in a grievance against the existing authorities or peer groups
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Ellingsen terms this latter motivation frustration (Ellingsen,
2000: 229), and Lynn argues that grievances against the ruling regime, rather than

11

During May 1958, fears on the part of Algerian colons and French Army troops that the French
government would consider granting independence to Algeria led to an unsuccessful move by members
of both groups to overthrow the French government, seize political power, and maintain French
sovereignty in the North African territory (Claessen, 2007: 98-101). During April 1974, the Portuguese
Movimento das Forças Armadas, exhausted by 13 years of colonial wars in Angola, Cape Verde,
Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe, launched a successful coup d‟état
against the existing government in Lisbon that ended the country‟s historic military involvement in Africa
and brought an end to the Portuguese colonial empire (Maxwell, 1976: 250-260). During November
1995, a Jewish extremist, opposed to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin‟s moves toward a two-state
solution in Israeli/Palestine, assassinated the Prime Minister and seriously undercut negotiations between
the Israelis and the Palestinians (Jager, 2008).
The perception that the government has engaged in a military misadventure may also impact the political
future of the executive in other ways. President Lyndon Johnson‟s March 31, 1968 surprise withdrawal
from the 1968 Presidential race came about during the course of the National Liberation Front (NLF)‟s Tet
offensive in South Vietnam (Claessen, 2007: 101-102). Efforts by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to reduce repressive political measures and establish among
nine of the existing 15 Soviet republics a „union treaty‟ that would have greatly reduced the central power
of the Soviet government led an unsuccessful coup d‟état against him on August 19, 1991 by an eightman junta representing the Communist Party, the Komitat Gosudar‟stvenei Bezopasnosti (KGB), and the
Soviet military. The crushing of that coup three days later led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
political independence of its constituent republics, and the end of Gorbachev‟s very position as head of
state (Mandelbaum, 1991/1992: 165-167-169, 173-174).
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issues of religious or ethnic diversity, typically supply the most compelling arguments for
insurgent legitimacy (Lynn, 2005: 22).12 Opportunity for viable insurgency movements
comes into play through such elements as the availability of forest or mountain cover,
the number of international frontiers, and available finances such as lootable resources
(Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 1999; Buhuag, Gates and Lujala, 2002; Lujala,
Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005: 539-541). International frontiers may play an especially
important role, in that artificial demarcations which separate ethno-regional tribal groups
also tend to encourage foreign intervention into civil disturbances (Reed, 1998);
intervention which may or may not serve the interests of the insurgents (Azam, 2002:
133). A common identity is also essential for insurgency formation, since individual
guerillas will not act together unless they are able to view themselves as possessing a
common background or destiny. Group cohesion is also vital if the insurgency is to
prevent itself from splintering (Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005: 539-541), and
significant confrontation along ethnic, religious, political, and ideological lines may lead

12

An examination of peer group rivalry also provides a surprising element of insurgent/loyalist motivation
that cuts across cultures on a global basis. Shy‟s in-depth study of Bergen County, New Jersey during
the American Revolution discovered that bloody battles between rebels and loyalists were in fact based
upon pre-war animosities among ethnic groups, churches, political rivals, and contentious neighbors
(Shy, 1976: 206). Lear‟s studies of the Japanese-occupied Philippines found that guerilla recruiting on
Leyte concentrated on individuals who had failed to win the previous municipal elections; the winners
having already been drafted into Japanese service (Lear, 1961). During the same period in China, clan
rivalries rather than political ideologies often determined whether rural peasants sided with Communists
or Nationalists (Kalyvas, 2003: 478). Much of the motivation for the massacres that took place in
Indonesia during 1965-1966 – ostensibly focused around the Communist/anti-Communist schism – can
be traced to pre-existing communal conflicts: among Muslims and Javanese transmigrant settlers in
Southern Sumatra, Muslims and Protestants in Timor, Balinese and Chinese in Lombok, local Muslims in
Central and East Java, various patronage groups in Bali, and followers of local cults in other areas (Cribb,
1990). Similar local political factors came into play during the Nicaraguan civil war of the 1980s, in which
virtually every rural encounter between the Sandinistas and the Contras embodied local clan politics
(Berman, 1996: 65). Even more long-term political cleavages came into play during the Liberian civil war
of the 1990s, when feuds dating back sixty years were reopened and local vendettas among families
settled by force of arms (Ellis, 1995: 128-129).
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to the untimely collapse of a burgeoning insurgent movement (Kalyvas, 2003: 477481).
Fearon and Laitin argue that state weakness marked by poverty, social
instability, and a large, primarily rural population offer the best conditions for the
transformation of initial rebellion into operational insurgent activity (Fearon and Laitin,
2003: 81, 88). Countries with limited state capacities also invite insurgent activity, and
underdeveloped African countries, plagued by authoritarian leadership, weak national
infrastructures relating to bridges, rail lines, power stations, and oil pipelines, and a lack
of military heritage, are especially at risk in this area (Herbst, 2004: 359, 361, 363).
While Skocpol‟s theory of the maladaptive state focuses upon the role of state capacity
in civil war duration and outcome (Skocpol, 1979), insurgent ethnicity/nationality, the
viability of existing national political parties, and the general perception of a
government‟s legitimacy can also play a role in insurgency formation and survival
(Weitz, 1986/Collier and Hoeffler, 1999).13
Even in favorable circumstances, insurgencies generally start out with very small
numbers of followers. The Eritrean Liberation Front was initiated in Eritrea during 1961
with eleven people, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) began in Dar
as Salaam, Tanganyika in 1962 with 250, the National Resistance Movement in Uganda
started in 1979 with 27, the National Patriotic Front of Charles Taylor crossed into
13

While the presence of inclusionary democratic institutions may afford an outlet for minority views and
provide a means for peaceful resolution of ethnicity-based conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999; Collier
and Hoeffler, 2002a; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989; Gurr, 2000), a
significant body of scholarly research indicates that countries with a midlevel democracy are more likely to
suffer civil conflict than are strongly repressive regimes, suggesting that a certain level of political freedom
may be necessary to initiate anti-regime activities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Hegre,
Ellingsen, Gleditsch, and Gates, 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002: 44-45). Further research
by Fearon indicates that democracy has no impact whatsoever upon civil war duration (Fearon, 2004).
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Liberia in 1989 with approximately 100, and the Revolutionary United Front began in
Uganda in 1991 with 35.

Not surprisingly, it is at this early, vulnerable stage that

insurgencies are most easily defeated (Herbst, 2004:

361).14

Facing established

governments with standing armed forces, insurgent survival depends entirely upon the
lack of government intelligence information regarding their whereabouts. Insurgents
must also rely upon local knowledge of social interactions to allow them to threaten
retribution against informants. For this reason, insurgencies are more likely to form in
rural areas where local knowledge is more absolute than in urban areas where
informant anonymity is more easily achieved (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 79-81). Even
so, basic survival is the greatest challenge for insurgencies in their early phases; even
more important than attacking regime assets. Major Kenneth Ruhinda, a guerilla fighter
in the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1980s Uganda, confirmed this notion in an
interview conducted in 1993. After stating the effectiveness of sniper attacks against
isolated government troops, he added that care must be taken not overly endanger
one‟s own life. “Just kill one,” Major Ruhinda said. “So that your job is to reduce the
numbers of the enemy but to preserve yourself” (Schubert, 2006: 93).
During this early period of initial survival, guerilla leaders face the task of quickly
recruiting a viable following, and they typically accomplish this on the basic of multiple
incentives, including status, honor, and reputation (Wood, 2003), the affirmation of
14

The initial onset of an insurgency may actually have little impact upon a well-penetrated state, since an
effective bureaucracy and a competent military provide the ability to adequately police rural areas,
provide required social services, control national territory, and secure national frontiers (Balch-Lindsay
and Enterline, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Goodwin and Skocpol,1989, Knack, 2001; Schock, 1996).
Even if emerging insurgencies manage to build support and challenge government forces, the
combination of these elements may reduce the possibility of direct insurgent victory, and provide greater
opportunities for negotiated settlements (De Rouen and Sobek, 2004: 306-307).
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collective identity/activation of tight social networks (Taylor, 1988), the resolution of
social and political grievances (Moore, 1966; Paige, 1975; Scott, 1976), and financial
rewarding through the looting of natural resources (Keen, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler,
2000; Ross, 2004a, 2004b).15 Insurgencies based upon ethnic issues differ strongly
from those based upon non-ethnic issues, since potential guerillas in those situations
make choices based upon ethnic affinities rather than material rewards (Sambanis,
2001; Weinstein, 2005: 600). Insurgencies based upon ideology, meanwhile, rely upon
non-pecuniary rewards of „fighting the good fight‟ and advancing ideological metrics.
Individuals with sadistic tendencies may also be recruited through the functional reward
of gaining license to commit acts of extreme violence (Mueller, 2001; Gates, 2002: 114115). The use of „child soldiers‟ also reflects a certain logic not always apparent to the
Western mind, since many children, faced with poverty, boredom, or no family to bond
with, join insurgencies voluntarily; once in, they are less likely to question orders from
adults, have no wife or family to return to, are too young to truly understand fear, and
thus make dedicated soldiers indeed (Kalashnikov Kids, 1999; Gates, 2002: 128).
To reduce the influx of low-commitment personnel, insurgent groups must utilize
proper methodology in evaluating potential recruits.

Three principal methods have

emerged to accomplish this feat: community linkage, vouching, and costly induction.
Guerilla organizers possessing extensive personal linkage throughout their communities
may be able to collect information regarding potential recruits through knowledgeable
societal leaders.

These relationships can lead to a fairly reliable means of

15

Financial rewarding is enhanced when a low per capita income is in place, since gaining recruits is less
challenging when economic alternatives are limited. Insurgencies are also enhanced by the presence of
high-value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, diamonds, etc. that can be easily transported and
sold to finance guerilla campaigns (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 79-81).
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authenticating the honesty and commitment of prospective personnel, and assure that
no government informers are being dangled before the insurgency. Vouching is even
more stringent, and refers to existing guerillas providing supporting information
regarding the qualifications of potential applicants. Should the new recruits fail to live
up to expectations, the reputations of both the recruits and their contacts within the
insurgency will bear the costs of those failures. Costly induction involves such practices
as sustained study of ideology and political messages of the insurgency group
(confirmed by examination), or a required period of apprenticeship in which recruits
actively participate in attacks without the use of weaponry. While the time element of
the former practice serves to screen out low-commitment, disinterested individuals, the
level of physical risk involved in the latter provides a strong inducement for such
individuals to seek opportunistic gain elsewhere (Weinstein, 2005:

606-607). Once

recruited on the basis of a rewards system, guerillas must be placed under discipline to
prevent defection. While such discipline will likely include a benefit stream to reward
compliance, a system of punishments for poor performance will make defection costly,
given that those measures may eventually involve extremely harsh sanctions with
permanent ramifications. Punishment in insurgent groups is, by the very nature of their
ongoing activity, harsh and sometimes ruthless, and often includes execution for failing
to sound the alarm against a deserting companion (Gates, 2002: 116).
Modern civil wars taking place in poor countries rarely involve direct
confrontations between government troops and guerilla units in any case.

More

commonly, both forces move into illicit business dealings and organized crime as
opportunities arise (Carins, 1997:

5), since most rural guerilla warfare involves a
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mixture of both political and criminal activity (Lichback, 1994: 398). A strong resource
base may thus tend to serve as a double-edged sword to an insurgency in the initial
recruitment stage, with low-commitment personnel enlisting in order to simply exploit
financial resources (Weinstein, 2005:

603-605).

Many such recruits will possess

criminal backgrounds and seek to use guerilla activity as a natural cover for simple
banditry; crowding out more committed personnel in the process, and tainting the
international image of the insurgency with their activities (Kalyvas, 2003:

476).16

Conversely, resource-restrained groups that make financial rewards contingent upon
overthrowing the existing regime are more likely to attract high-commitment personnel
willing to serve for the long run.

Serving for promises of future payment requires

extensive credibility on the part of insurgent leadership, however, along with a
reasonable probability of a rebel victory: not an easy argument for a newly-initiated
guerilla movement to make.

Evaluating academic achievement may also play an

important part in determining quality recruits.

Research conducted by Krueger and

Maleckova during 2003 suggests that high levels of education may be indicative of more
sincere commitment to the long-term goals of the insurgency (Krueger and Maleckova,
2003; Weinstein, 2005: 603-605, 607).
Numerous factors may impact the viability of an indigenous insurgency; among
them geography, the perception of foreign control, and the existence of viable political
parties to serve as an outlet for popular frustration. Fidel Castro‟s anti-government
insurgency of 1950s Cuba benefited by its principal area of operations being in the
16

Kalyvas estimates that nearly half of the 300,000 anti-Japanese resistance fighters in 1930s Manchuria
had criminal backgrounds, and the 1920s-1940s Chinese Civil War itself was often fought by diverse
coalitions of bandits and local militias in which the cause of Communism (or nationalism) was little more
than a flag of convenience for criminal enterprises (Kalyvas, 2003: 476).
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remote Sierra Maestra region; an area far from Cuban military basing, and whose
inhabitants were dissatisfied with the existing government of Fulgencio Batista. That
fortunate combination allowed Castro‟s forces to build strength among a supportive
population before attempting to challenge the army itself.

In contrast, the base of

operations for the Bolivian insurgency of the 1960s was so remote from the country‟s
urban centers that guerilla activity had little impact upon political events, even though
substantial opposition existed in the cities to the military government of Rene Barrientos
Ortuno (Weitz, 1986:

399, 403-404).17

The appearance of substantial foreign

involvement can also undermine insurgencies. When a three-ton arms cache from
Cuba was seized by Venezuelan authorities during November 1963, President Romula
Betancourt claimed his country was the target of hostile foreign subversion, and the
Organization of American States supported the allegation. The public image of the
insurgency in Bolivia of the same period also suffered from the perception of foreign
control, especially after the arrival of Ernesto “Che” Guevara.18 Countries lacking viable
political parties may also leave disaffected citizens little choice but to support the

17

Some geographical factors appear to impact conflict outcomes across the board. Civil conflicts taking
place within states possessing multiple frontiers are more likely to be won by insurgents, since such
states are typically large and difficult to adequately police, and neighboring states are often more likely to
wittingly or unwittingly grant safe havens to insurgents than to intervene on the side of the embattled
government due to the difficulty of establishing collective action polices. Insurgents are also more likely
to preserve some measure of autonomy in mountainous states, given the difficulties governments incur in
moving and re-supplying large armies through isolated, unfriendly terrain. Meanwhile, conflicts taking
place within highly forested states are likely to become stalemated, while insurgents appear to have a
somewhat lower probability of winning conflicts based upon ethnicity, religion, or identity, especially in
extremely heterogeneous states, and are also at a disadvantage when conflicts are predicated over
exploitable resources (Regan, 1996; De Rouen and Sobek, 2004: 311, 314).
18

Following the first successful ambush conducted by the guerillas, a government communiqué declared
that “the national territory has been invaded by an armed group of diverse nationalities, the majority
adhering to the Castro-Communist line” (Weitz, 1986: 408), and entries in Guevara‟s diary indicate that
the significant number of non-Bolivians involved in the insurgency indeed concerned him regarding the
movement‟s long-term viability (Weitz, 1986: 408).
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insurgency. In 1950s Cuba, established political parties were often leaderless and/or
disorganized, an unstructured situation which allowed Fidel Castro‟s guerillas to march
into a political vacuum. In 1970s Nicaragua, the family of Anastasio Somoza Debayle
directly controlled the Liberal Party, while candidates from the opposing Conservative
Party were often bought off by government-sponsored electoral pacts that guaranteed
the party a fixed number of legislative seats. With neither party able to present a
credible alternative to continued rule by the Somoza family, those who sought political
change began to see the Sandinista insurgents as a logical alternative. In comparison,
the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia of the 1960s successfully mobilized their
parties‟ mass organizations to limit the appeal of the insurgents (Weitz, 1986: 408,
411).
Mason and Fett argue that extended conflict duration may well serve the
interests of the insurgency more than those of the government, as they tend to offset
the imbalance between government and insurgent capabilities.

As the insurgency

moves into a long-term phase of operations, the accumulated costs for the government
and tend to undermine its level of popular support and its ability to wage war (Mason
and Fett, 1996:

552).19

Historical predicators for long-term conflict have been

determined by Fearon to include ethnic diversity, low per-capita income (which tends to
19

The advent of the Internet, cellular telephones, and telefacsimile machines have also made it far more
difficult for besieged governments to isolate insurgent grievances and goals from the population at large.
The Palestinians, during the First Intifada, successfully utilized informational technology to portray Israeli
authorities as oppressive occupiers in Gaza and Judea/Samaria, and strongly impacted both liberal and
secular elements of Israeli society. The result of those activities was a political rift within the conservative
Likud Party over appropriate counterinsurgency tactics to be utilized, and the subsequent election of a
Labour government that went on to conduct the Oslo negotiations. Mexico‟s Ejército Zapatista de
Liberación Nacional (EZLN) insurgents, otherwise known as the Zapatistas, have also exploited such
technologies to spread their populist message and constrain the actions of the Mexican government
19
(Claessen, 2007: 98-100).
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favor contraband financing), and violence within the context of secessionist and
autonomy-seeking movements (Fearon, 2004:

286-288).

Societies that have

experienced one civil war are also more likely to experience further such conflicts (with
Burundi, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka serving as examples) than
societies with no prior history of civil violence, with fully 36% of civil wars occurring
globally during 1945 – 1996 (22 out of 58) being followed by an additional conflict within
the same time period (Walter, 2004: 371). Given that, at the height of global civil
conflict during the early 1990s less than half that number (just under 18%) of states
were experiencing civil wars, the idea that over one third of countries still recovering
from civil strife would be again convulsed in armed violence is shocking indeed (Hegre,
2004: 244).
The tipping point at which an insurgency may achieve victory occurs when
significant numbers of government troops join the rebellion; indeed, no mass rebellion
can succeed without defection of at least some of the regime‟s armed forces (Russell,
1974; Herbst, 2000). While ideological-based guerilla groups have an advantage in
inducing such defection, the phenomenon is least likely to occur within ethnically
homogeneous groups; be they government security forces or insurgent groups (Gates,
2002: 122). By that point, the civilian population itself will have paid the greatest price
for the contest between guerillas and counterinsurgent forces, with a widely-quoted
estimate reflecting 84% of casualties in such conflicts being non-combatants (Cairns,
1997: 17).20 Examples abound of this phenomena, especially in Africa: Angola, 1975-

20

The Economist claims an even higher figure of 90% non-combatant casualties in modern civil conflicts
(The Global Menace of Local Strife, 2003: 23).
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1991, resulted in an estimated 21,000 military deaths and 320,000 civilian deaths;
Burundi, 1972, 20,000 compared to 80,000; Mozambique, 1975-1992, 11,000 compared
to 110,000; Rwanda, 1956-1965, 3,000 compared to 102,000; Sudan, 1983-1990,
10,000 compared to 500,000; and Uganda, 1981-1989, 6,000 compared to 100,000.
Exceptions exist to this rule, of course.

In Nigeria‟s Biafran conflict of 1967-1970,

1,000,000 soldiers died along with 1,000,000 civilians. Likewise, in Somalia‟s decadelong conflict of 1980-1990, 5,000 soldiers died along with 5,000 civilians (Azam, 2002:
132).21
Fearon, in evaluating 128 civil wars occurring during 1945-2004, identified
several classes of civil wars whose basic structure tends to determine how long the
conflict will last. In general, the median for such conflicts was 6 years and the mean,
8.8 years.

Conflicts arising from attempted coups d‟état and popular revolutions

(Argentina, 1955; Costa Rica, 1948; Bolivia, 1952; Dominican Republic, 1965; Iraq,
1959; Paraguay, 1947; and North Yemen, 1948) were typically quite brief in duration,
however, with a median of 2.1 years and a mean of three years. Anti-colonial conflicts
lasted somewhat longer, with a median of 4.7 years and a mean of 7.3 years.
Primordial „Sons of the Soil‟ conflicts, centering upon peripheral peoples who take up
arms against migrants (who often are being resettled in response to government
development projects), are most often found in Asia (Bangladesh‟s Chakmas, China‟s
21

These figures, staggering as they are, do not include the millions of mutilated children, raped women,
destroyed homes, stolen property, damaged crops, and millions of displaced refugees that accompany
these fratricidal conflicts (Azam, 2002: 132). Nor do they include the vast amounts of badly-needed
capital required to continue these seemingly-unending wars. A report commissioned by the charitable
organization Oxfam, International concluded, during the fall of 2007, that African conflicts consume at
least 15% of the gross national product for African states in general (Hillier, 2007: 7-9). Evidence also
exists that suggests the AIDS crisis in Africa has been heightened by prolonged civil war across the
continent; further misery for peoples already numbed by decades of seemingly unending violence
(Smallman-Raynor and Cliff, 1991: 78).
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Uighurs, India‟s northeastern tribal peoples, Indonesia‟s Acehnese and West Papuans,
Myanmar‟s Karens, Pakistan‟s Mohajirs, Papua New Guinea‟s Bougainvilleans, the
Philippines‟ Moros, and Sri Lanka‟s Tamils), although examples exist in Africa (Chadian
rebels, Ethiopia‟s Eritreans and Ogaden Somalis, Mali‟s Tuaregs, and Sudan‟s southern
Christians/Animists), also. Conflicts of this type can be extremely extended, with a
median of 23.2 years and a mean of 33.7 years. Finally, contraband-financed conflicts
(diamonds in Angola, cocaine in Columbia, opium in Myanmar, and diamonds in Sierra
Leone) tend to survive the longest, with a median of 28.1 years and a mean of 38.2
years (Fearon, 2004: 276-277, 280-284).
Research conducted by de Rouen and Sobek found that one of the most
important predicators of civil conflict outcomes was the intervention of the United
Nations or other interested third-parties. Such high-level intervention is most likely to
occur during the course of protracted conflicts, and tends to increase the probability of
both truce and treaty. Walter, speaking of the credibility-commitment theory of civil war
resolution, argues that proffered agreements by warring parties to disarm only become
believable when outside enforces enter the fray to enforce them. Under these thirdparty guarantees, cheating by either side becomes much more costly, while promises to
cooperate gain heightened validity.

To be truly credible, however, third-party

guarantees must ensure that the outside power is, in some manner, operating in its own
self-interest, is willing to use a defined level of force, and has the ability to establish
long-term resolve (Walter, 1997: 336, 340-341). Laitin, using the case of Cyprus as an
example, writes that civil conflicts can be moderated when the international community
is willing to commit long-term policing forces to grant credibility to agreements reached
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among warring parties. While these international security arrangements may eventually
devolve into de-facto international mandates, such outcomes might still be preferable to
unending civil conflict (Laitin: 1999: 172-173).22
How successful are insurgencies? An evaluation of conflict data stored within
the COW database indicates that indigenous government troops were successful in 140
out of the 213 intra-state wars fought during the period of 1816-1997, for a success rate
of 75.16% (Sarkees, 2000:

123-144).23

The historical record for states fighting

insurgencies in territories outside of their own metropolitan areas has historically been
even higher, with the intervening power achieving success in 83 out of 108 extra-state
wars fought during the same time, for a success rate of 80.58%.

Determining when a

counterinsurgency campaign has actually achieved success is not easy, however, since
confidence-building metrics utilized in conventional wars such as the attainment of
geographical objectives and the destruction of enemy governments are not applicable
when the enemy can simultaneously be everywhere and nowhere. As a result, the most
commonly-used point of measurement is that of enemy body-counts. Utilized to a fault
during the Vietnam conflict where military briefing officers tended to significantly
overestimate enemy casualties as a measure of mission accomplishment, reporting of
body-counts began to be used by American commanders in Iraq during May 2004, and
has since been utilized there extensively (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006:

831-833).

22

Laitin also argues that the unwillingness of the United States in the post-Cold War era to continue to
prop up authoritarian regimes as bulwarks against Soviet/Russian expansionism meant that those
regimes could be more successful challenged (Laitin, 1999: 156-157).
23

Research conducted by Weede and Muller during 1998 into mass rebellions against indigenous central
governments since 1900 suggests that government troops had been even more capable, successfully
crushing their irregular adversaries nearly 86% of the time (Weede and Muller, 1998: 49-51).
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Lacking more empirical measures, even obvious failures in counterinsurgency
campaigns may be politically recast by opportunistic politicians to claim victory in the
face of defeat. As late as 2005, Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973,
was claiming that although Vietnam had been forcibly unified in 1975 under Communist
rule, American counterinsurgency efforts there had in fact been successful since the
Soviet Union and the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) had been forced to focus
exclusively upon South Vietnam, and prevented from encroaching further in Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India (Laird, 2005: 33-37).
During the post-Second World War period, both foreign powers and national
governments attempted a multitude of non-military strategies to moderate secessionism
and insurgency, few of which exhibited complete success. France has, of late, sought
to address secessionism in such regions as Alsace, Brittany, and Corsica by making
concessions of a limited power-sharing nature, while the governments of Canada and
the United Kingdom have moved to empower local languages (French in Quebec and
Welsh Gaelic in Wales) in an effort to defuse language-based secessionism (Rudolph
and Thompson, 1985: 296, 301).24 States with limited capacity (as is the case in much
of Africa) facing determined insurgencies often reach a sort of equilibrium, in which the
guerillas control much of the countryside and the government controls the urban
population centers.

The military policy of Rhodesia during the final years of its

existence centered upon protecting „vital asset ground‟ without which the state could not
adequately function, and implicitly ceding significant portions of the countryside to the
24

Language-empowerment policies of this type may backfire, however, by unwittingly stimulating further
secessionism (Rudolph and Thompson, 1985: 296, 301).
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ZANU insurgency; a questionable strategy which disallowed any realistic possibility of a
government victory (Herbst, 2004: 363-364; Preston, 2004: 68).25
The prospect of unending violence and state instability has also led governments
plagued with secessionist provinces to consider cutting their losses and conducting a
physical territorial partition in order to end unwinnable conflicts and bring a measure of
peace to the resulting rump state. A sharp debate exists, however, between those
scholars who favor partition to solve ethnic conflict (e.g. Mearsheimer & Van Evera,
1995; Kaufmann, 1996, 1998) and those who do not (e.g. Hachey, 1972; Fraser, 1984;
Horowitz, 1985; de Silva & May, 1991; Brown, 1993; McGarry & O‟Leary, 1993; Posen,
1993; Kumar, 1997; Rothchild, 1997; Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2004). Not all voters
who support secessionist candidates actually support political secession in any case;
many simply view strong showings by such candidates as being necessary for attracting
financial subsidies and policies of accommodation from the central government.
Indeed, Rawkins echoes Max Weber in writing that nationalist demands can often be
met through a combination of “temporary accommodation of material and ideal
interests” and “coercion and compliance relations” (Rawkins, 1978:

521).

Even if

territorial partition is conducted, it is far from being a complete panacea for ethnic
violence, since conflict may re-ignite when a remnant of the partitioned grouping
25

The acceptance of operational equilibriums between government forces and insurgencies often leads
to volatile political environments that are difficult to reverse. During the early 1980s, NRA insurgents
established bases and training camps in Uganda‟s Luwero Triangle, forcing government forces of the
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) to avoid the area out of fear of confrontation. The central
government finally challenged the equilibrium at the end of 1982 with a brutal, massive counterinsurgency
campaign that alienated important elements of the population, and forced the NRA to withdraw to the
country‟s northern areas. There, the NRA began recruiting local residents (who found UNLA forces more
threatening than the guerillas) and building its strength to the point that it was able, by 1985, to engage
the UNLA on conventional terms, and, by January 1986, to successfully take the capital of Kampala and
place NRA leader Yoweri Museveni in power as President; a position he continues to hold to this day
(Schubert, 2006: 96, 100-101).
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remains behind in the rump, original state, such as Roman Catholics in Northern
Ireland, Croatians in Bosnia, or Kosovar Albanians in Serbia‟s Presevo Valley.

In

addition, mistreatment of rump state nationals in the newly partitioned territory may
invite intervention by the rump state to protect its ethnic kin, as has occasionally been
threatened by Russian officials regarding ethnic Russians in former Soviet states (Tir,
2005: 55).
C.

The Impact of Foreign Control or Influence
For centuries, great powers successfully projected military force abroad to

acquire/defend territory, protect and/or expand material or ideological interests, and to
thwart the ambitions of rival powers (Van Wingen and Tillema, 1980: 291-292). During
the late 19th century, European powers involved in such military campaigns seemingly
had little difficulty in defeating either regular or insurgent forces in the Third World, and
often held little but contempt for the latter. Prince von Schwarzenberg, commander of
the allied forces during the Napoleonic campaigns, dismissed the issue of irregular
insurgents by threatening any civilians found carrying weaponry with exile to Siberia (or
death, had they actually killed anyone), and ordering the destruction of entire towns in
which the alarm bell had been tolled (Roling, 1976: 150). With the colonial allocation of
the continent of Africa finalized among the European powers by the turn of the 20 th
century, localized such conflicts abounded between native guerillas and European
colonial forces, to the extreme detriment of the former in spite of their motivation and
courage.

In analyzing the 1898 British campaign at Omdurman, Sudan (under the

leadership of General Sir Herbert Kitchener) which shattered the Mahdi „army‟ of
Abd‟ullah al-Taashi, Katzenbach noted somewhat sardonically that native insurgents
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“saw fit do die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain” (Mack, 1975: 176). The
native revolt against German rule in Tanganyika in 1905-1906 was savagely crushed by
German colonial forces at a cost of 75,000 African natives, with a further 200,000
Africans dying during scorched-earth tactics as the counterinsurgency campaign
concluded in 1907 (Zimmerman, 2006: 428, 441-442).
The ability of foreign powers to decisively crush native insurgencies began to
falter, however, with the intransigence of Boer guerillas during the Second Boer War of
1899-1902 (which British forces nonetheless won), and became even less predictable
with the Irish Rebellion of 1916-1921 (in which British forces accepted political defeat)
(Mack, 1975: 176). In the latter case, civil war erupted in the Saorstát Éireann/Irish
Free State created in the wake of British military withdrawal between pro-treatyite and
rejectionist elements of Sinn Féin; a conflict in which the hard-core IRA insurgents who
had successfully driven the British from the territory were decisively defeated by their
former Irish allies (Regan, 2007: 208). Boyd, writing in 1922, notes that while much of
the Irish public supported IRA guerilla tactics against British troops, those same tactics
were deemed to be illegitimate when deployed against an indigenous Irish Army (Boyd,
1922: 89). Nationalist motivation was similarly denied insurgents during the 1946-1954
Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines when American forces stationed in the country
were forbidden by the United States government to intervene in the conflict, leaving the
indigenous Filipino army on its own to conduct counterinsurgency operations against a
tenacious adversary (Lansdale, 1961: 3; Lapus, 1961: 18-20). Perhaps as a result, the
Hukbalahap insurgency was essentially over by 1953, whereas native insurgencies
continued against the British in nearby Malaya until 1960 (where final defeat of the
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insurgency followed British political withdrawal) (Rahman, 1965: 659-661), and against
the French and the Americans nearby Vietnam for the next twenty years (where both
metropolitan powers eventually accepted defeat) (Gavin, 1968: 49-49; Karnow, 1983:
29, 36, 685).
Indeed, the antipathy that many indigenous populations have to the perception of
alien control of their destinies is difficult to overestimate, even when the outsiders are of
the same region and culture. Such unyielding antipathy may even extend to insurgents
who are not directly of local stock. Peasants living in Guatemala‟s Zacapa region,
Peru‟s Convencion Valley, and Bolivia‟s southeastern territories have demonstrated
open hostility toward local guerilla groups composed of individuals not from that
immediate area. Guevara noted a similar phenomenon during his operations in South
American of the 1960s when peasants whom he found to be antipathetic toward his
goals of national liberation eventually betrayed him to Bolivian authorities. For reasons
such as this, Latin American guerillas of the era shifted their recruitment focus from the
countryside to the urban areas in an effort to find a populace more interested in
revolutionary change (Bender, 1972: 357).
This level of local antipathy appears to grow when the differences between local
residents and outsiders are clearly apparent, as when they are from foreign cultures and
societies. Arendt writes that insurgencies often form within occupied countries through
restorative movements designed to restore lost liberties and privileges taken from
indigenous peoples by external forces (Arendt, 1958:

34-40).

Even when foreign

occupations are ostensibly conducted in an effort to provide assistance to a suffering
native population, they have long served to provide the motivation for armed resistance
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on a nationalistic or religious basis. The Roman occupation of Palestine during 63
BC/BCE to 330 AD/CE, viewed by many in Rome as providing both security and
advanced Roman culture to the inhabitants of the area, eventually led to vicious Jewish
revolts against alien rule during 66-73 AD/CE and 132-135 AD/CE (Rapoport, 1984:
659-660).26 More recently, the 1799 French intervention into Italian politics designed to
emancipate the population from the quasi-feudal control of the Roman Catholic Church
quickly led to a massacre of French-backed Italian politicians by the very peasants the
intervention was supposed to uplift. Similar efforts by King Joseph of Spain during 1808
to implement an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and abolish feudal
privileges held by the aristocracy and the Roman Catholic Church led to a ferocious
insurgency against his government by guerillas who viewed the king - a brother of
French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte - as little more than a French lackey (Luttwak,
2005: 27). The British government espoused similarly high motives during 1879 when
it established, with the French, a system of „dual control‟ over Egypt in an effort to bring
that country into financial competence. Within three years, a native insurrection erupted
against foreign control that was only brought under control by the landing of British
troops; the subsequent 72-year British presence left behind radicalized elements of
Egyptian society upon its departure in 1954 that continue to this day to oppose
Westernized, secular practices (Carman, 1921: 51-52; Edelstein, 2004: 26, 77). The
United States openly proclaimed idealist motives during the late 1890s when it
encouraged an anti-Spanish insurrection in the Philippines, and eventually dispatched
26

The quest for Jewish national independence continued into our own time; ironically enough, against the
very British authorities who had taken control of Palestine during 1917-1918 with the stated mission of
establishing a national homeland for the Jewish people (Segev, 1999: 43-50, 59, 92).
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American troops to defeat the Spanish colonial authorities there.

After the United

States annexed the territory, however, a violent indigenous insurgency erupted against
American rule that lasted for 14 years and required 120,000 American troops to quell –
at the cost of the lives of more than 4,000 soldiers and over 200,000 Filipinos. Under
the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States again dispatched troops
abroad, this time to neighboring Mexico during April 1914 ostensibly to restore
democracy to the country after General Victoriano Huerta deposed the elected
government of President Francisco Madero. Faced with foreign occupation, however,
Mexican politicians rallied around General Huerta‟s government, and the Mexican
newspaper El Imparcial called upon the population to use all available measures to
drive the American troops from Mexican soil, even at the cost of their very lives (Judis,
2004: 50-54). 27
Even fairly benign military occupations can prove problematic for the affected
civilian populations. Jurat Sir John Leale, a resident of the British Channel Islands
during the German occupation of 1940 – 1945, noted that while no atrocities were
committed by German troops during that period, the very presence of the occupying
force was “a constant reminder of the hideous thing that has happened to you” (Leal,
1946: 215). Roberts writes that the most widespread French reaction to the German
military occupation of the Second World War was humiliation and denial; anger only
27

A more realist explanation for the invasion is related to national honor and concerns regarding German
incursion. Just twelve days before the American operation, two American sailors were arrested in
Tampico, Mexico by Huerta‟s forces, causing embarrassment to the Wilson Administration. The United
States Consulate in Vera Cruz also received reports stating that a German warship would be landing a
shipment of arms to Huerta‟s troops later that month, and American authorities were determined to
prevent outside military interference in the Western Hemisphere. Although Huerta never officially
recognized the American military occupation, he was compelled to resign his office three months later
and take refuge in Spain (Yockelson, 1997: 214-216).
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developed afterwards.

He argues that the many varied resistance movements

throughout Occupied Europe were not “the product of an intellectual revolt against Nazi
metaphysics and Nazi sociology,” but the result of “the intense disgust which overcomes
the ordinary citizen when he sees foreign soldiers strolling about his streets as
conquerors, secure in their conquest” (Roberts, 1945: 1-3).28 Nor is military occupation
always pleasant for the occupying powers.

A 1940 German report, published two

months into the occupation of France, noted that the “exemplary, amiable and helpful
behavior of the German soldiers towards the population has aroused little sympathy.”
The unblinking, silent hostility was so prevalent in Paris that the city was christened
“Stadt Ohne Blick” („the city without regard‟) by German forces stationed there who
found themselves forcefully ignored by the angry, humiliated Parisians (Jackson, 2001:
285).
Western military occupation of Islamic countries can be even more problematic,
especially when that occupation is viewed as overwhelmingly Jewish or Christian.
Nationalist leaders often point to Sura 5.51 of the Qu‟ran as religious authority to
oppose such an occupation: “Do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends; they
are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a friend, then surely
he is one of them; surely Allah does not guide the unjust people” (Sura 5.51, The Holy
Qu‟ran). Following the initial American attacks against Taliban Afghanistan of October

28

Some Frenchmen would subsequently recall that lesson when they faced insurgencies against French
colonial authority during the post-war years. An unnamed French officer serving in 1959 Algeria referred
to the motivation of the Việt Minh during the previous war in Indochina as being one of resistance to
foreign domination, rather than simply serving on behalf of international Communism. “The Việt Minh who
rose – and with what courage! – to assault our positions at Điện Biên Phủ was not thinking of the triumph
of international Communism,” he wrote, “but of „kicking the foreigner out of the place where I belong‟”
(Guerre Revolutionnaire, Guerre Phychologique, ou Guerre „Tout Court,‟ 1959: 99).
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2001, al-Qa‟eda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith invoked the concept of infidels
sullying Islamic territory in general with the words, “the Arabian Peninsula is being
defiled by the feet of those who came to occupy these lands, usurp these holy places,
and plunder its resources” (Davis, 2007: 15).29
In formulating counterinsurgency campaigns, the industrialized world may be at a
disadvantage in placing its reliance upon Western concepts of rationality; concepts that
might indicate that weak, Third World adversaries will always be overcome by strong,
advanced industrial states (Sullivan, 2007: 498). Western political systems are far
more oriented toward rationalism (a highly subjective term) and measurable
performance factors than are those of the Third World, and viewing the developing
world

through

this

mindset

may

lead

to

spurious

conclusions

regarding

counterinsurgency efforts, especially those predicated upon use of economic factors
and instruments of coercion to gain a desired response (Razi, 1990: 73-74). Third
World societies often exhibit a higher level of tolerance for costs than do those in
advanced, liberal countries, and this heightened ability to endure suffering may tend to
offset the military strength of occupying powers as foreign military conflicts stretch into
periods of years (Mueller, 1980; Sullivan, 2007: 498). During an evaluation of failed
counterinsurgency campaigns, Mack noted that, in every case, insurgent success was
predicated upon “the progressive attrition of their opponents‟ political capability to wage
war” (Mack, 1975: 177). Rosen agreed, writing that a weak actor may compensate for
a stronger opponent by displaying “a greater willingness to be harmed” (Rosen, 1972:
The desire to cleanse one‟s country from foreign influence may also possess a certain amount of
legitimacy under international law. Lackey, an academic specialist on the subject of just cause, writes
that, in the quest to “throw the foreigners out of Vietnam, the North Vietnamese fought with just cause”
(Lackey, 1989: 51).
29
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169). Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird credits the ability of both the Việt Cộng
and the North Vietnamese government to withstand the American military onslaught on
the high priority they placed on expelling foreign troops from Vietnamese soil. “Victory
meant everything to North Vietnam,” Laird wrote, “and nothing to the Average
American” (Laird, 2005: 35).30
Research conducted during 2004 by Edelstein into foreign military occupations of
the period of 1815-2003 regarding their achievement of structured goals showed a
stunted success rate of 29.16%, a mixed success/failure rate of 16.66%, and a failure
rate of 54.16%;31 a stalwart reminder of the difficulties involved in conducting successful
occupations of foreign countries (Edelstein, 2004:

59-75, 84-88).

Foreign military

occupations can be successful, of course, with the two model cases being the postwar
United States occupations of Germany and Japan. Little indigenous resistance was
apparent in either case against occupation troops, and, over sixty years later, American
forces still remain in both countries without insurgent activity coalescing against them.
Edelstein, in evaluating those occupations, argues that several factors served to
promote the physical presence of American troops. First, much of the national territory
30

Nor must mass popular support exist for an insurgency to achieve victory. Edelstein notes that even a
small, nationalistic minority population may offer enough resistance to successfully frustrate an occupying
power and raise the costs for counterinsurgency operations to an unacceptable level (Edelstein, 2004:
58). Unless the application of military force has the ability to raise the costs for resistance beyond what
insurgents (and the civilian population) are willing to pay, counterinsurgency operations are doomed to fail
(Sullivan, 2007: 504). Schelling‟s writings on the value of military hard power may be prescient here. In
Arms and Influence, published in 1966 during the early days of the Vietnam conflict, Schelling argues that
a warring country with overwhelming military power may be able to punish its adversaries with the robust
exercise of blunt military force to the point that no negotiations with them are necessary (Schelling, 1966:
th
1-35). While those concepts demonstrated merit during the conventional conflicts of the 20 century,
several of the victors of the Second World War subsequently lost counterinsurgency campaigns against
irregular forces in the Third World even though their ability to deploy massive amounts of military power
remained unquestioned.
31

Foreign occupations of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo, given their ongoing nature, were not
rated during the course of this evaluation.
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of both Germany and Japan had been devastated by war, and occupation forces were
welcomed by crushed populations who were simply seeking survival strategies.
Second, programs designed to eliminate the influence of the pre-occupation regime –
be it National Socialists in Germany, or militarists in Japan – successfully served to
pave the way for a new view of political interaction.

Third, popular support was

enhanced by co-opting some existing national institutions. For this reason, Emperor
Shōwa Tennō (known in the West as Hirohito), was permitted to retain his position as
Head of State even after the Japanese surrender.

Fourth, Soviet expansion was

perceived in both countries as a common threat that necessitated the continuing
presence of American troops for national defense. Fifth, occupation forces adopted
forms of indirect rule through the appointment or popular election of qualified,
indigenous politicians.32

Sixth, the occupations were „multilateralized‟ by including

troops from other foreign powers to reduce the perception of a national agenda on the
part of the United States, and grant wider legitimacy to the occupation itself. Seventh,
credible moves toward national independence and withdrawal of the foreign military
occupation were openly discussed, conditioned on the continuing cooperation of the
population with occupation authorities (Edelstein, 2004: 59-75, 84-88).33
Empirical evidence also suggests that civil conflicts in which foreign intervention
has taken place also tend to last longer than those which remain purely domestic
(Regan, 2002:

57, 72).

This is reflected by concepts embodied in the external

32

Efforts of this type may backfire, however, if those politicians as viewed as little more than lackeys or
stooges of the occupation authorities.
Feldman‟s previously-mentioned experience with the American occupation authority in Iraq reminds us,
however, that concepts involved with post-war occupations of Germany and Japan are not necessarily
valid when extrapolated to the developing world due to cultural differences (Feldman, 2004: 1).
33
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enemy/internal cohesion thesis of Coser and Simmel, which is broadly reflective of the
major successful insurgency campaigns of the 20th century. The first concept is that an
external threat is a necessary if not sufficient condition for the emergence of an
insurgency.

Occupation by a foreign army can be viewed as a major external threat,

not only to one‟s life, but to one‟s very cultural and religious identity, and the historical
experience demonstrates that people are willing to take up arms against such a clearly
defined existential threat. The second concept (which is closely related to the first) is
that repression engaged in by occupation forces enhances, and may even create,
nationalist unity from an otherwise fragmented population. Whatever internally divisive
issues exist, the ancient concept of „my enemy‟s enemy is my friend‟ remains eternally
valid. The third concept is that occupation and repression by the occupying power will
likely produce nationalist unity as long as a general consensus exists that the group as
a whole is at risk, not just a specific part of it; if elements of society believe they can
prosper by actively collaborating with the occupying power, unity is threatened and civil
war may loom as a distinct possibility. The fourth concept is that resistance becomes
more tenable when insurgents truly believe they will ultimately be victorious; likewise,
surrender no longer becomes an option when capture by occupation authorities is likely
to result in torture and/or death (it is notable that resistance movements against German
forces in occupied Europe were often led by Communists, since they were well aware
that surrender meant a sure, painful death). The fifth concept is that while occupation
may be worse for some elements of society than for others (and nationalist unity is thus
not unshakable), cohesion will be reinforced when collaboration is proscribed and
sanctioned both socially and through insurgent activities (Mack, 1975: 182-183).
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The lesson of recent history is harsh indeed regarding this final point, as
evidenced by the social consequences of being labeled a collaborator in 1944 France
(Mack, 1975: 182-183). While about 2,400 such individuals were killed by the Maquis
prior to the August 1944 Liberation, approximately 9,000 were executed immediately
afterwards during the course of l'epuration sauvage, most of whom never received
benefit of a trial. Other estimates, by pro-collaborationist sources, claim a much darker
figure of 100,000 dead (Burrin, 1996:

453; Jackson, 2001:

578).

Under the

subsequent Law on National Indignity, enacted upon December 26, 1944, collaboration
was viewed as a type of low-grade treason, and tens of thousands of French citizens
were arrested and tried under those legal concepts. Roughly 95,000 of those were
eventually found guilty of acts of collaboration, and condemned to dégradation
nationale, losing their basic political and civil rights (Elster, 2006:

326, 333). The

following judicial purge passed sentences upon 124,613 additional French men and
women, with approximately 50,000 of those submitted to dégradation nationale, over
40,000 imprisoned, and nearly 13,000 sentenced to death (Burrin, 1996: 453; Jackson,
2001:

577-580).

Vigilante-style purges of collaborators continued well through the

middle of 1945, with many of those executed accused of having been anti-resistance
police officials. The sexual aspect of collaboration was also addressed, with between
10,000 and 30,000 French women accused of „horizontal collaboration‟ having their
heads shaved and their bodies painted with swastikas; some of these woman were
subsequently executed. Extra-legal purges of this type were far from being isolated
incidents, and were generally supported by entire communities of angry French citizenry
(Jackson, 2001: 584).
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Late converts to insurgency may also find themselves under close ideological
scrutiny. Resistance attorneys in post-Second World War Denmark refused to consent
to absolution for Danes who had only joined the resistance movement following the
August 29, 1943 German assumption of direct control over the country, terming them to
be among “the largest and most dangerous group of traitors” who were simply astute
enough to “leave the sinking ship on August 29” (Elster, 2006: 332). In a similar vein,
Nino notes the „hypocrisy‟ of Argentines who only became advocates of punitive
measures against the 1976-1983 military junta after it was overthrown in 1983. In postMussolini Italy, judges who had served under the former government were nonetheless
responsible for levying death sentences against some 100 anti-resistance informers,
leading to charges against themselves of opportunism. Following French Libération of
August 1944, French citizens who suddenly professed loyalty to the resistance were
scathingly dubbed „Septembrists‟ by their neighbors, just as Algerians who joined the
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) following the Evian Agreement of March 1962 were
termed „Marchians‟ by theirs (Elster, 2006: 332-333). Interestingly enough, many of the
latter were among the most vindictive in the liquidation of the Harki supporters of the
former colonial regime (Hamoumou, 1993: 250; Meliani, 1993: 57).
While direct foreign occupation can clearly inspire resistance movements,
indigenous governments perceived as being propped up by foreign interests may also
find little ease with their disaffected populaces.

Huth argues that such local

governments often find it difficult to mobilize popular support, and require the military
forces of the occupying power to remain in-country to protect them from their own
populations (Huth, 2000: 101-102). In furtherance of the point, DeFronzo notes that
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revolutions in 1959 Cuba, 1979 Nicaragua, and 1979 Iran were all, in part, reactions to
great power intervention (DeFronzo, 1991: 3), and Razi writes that Islamic movements
and political leaders who seek to end both direct and indirect foreign control over
traditional Islamic states and return to an earlier idealized set of attitudes and institutes
have long garnered wide emotional support in North Africa and the Middle East (Razi,
1990: 76).34 The international terrorist organization of al-Qa‟eda, although clearly not
definable as an insurgent group, bases its anti-Western activities on the perception that
repressive Arab regimes are maintained in power by American support, and views the
post-1991 American military presence in Sa‟udi Arabia as representing a defilement of
holy Muslim land (Overview of the Enemy, 2004).
For native governments unduly relying upon great power support, withdrawal of
that support can, ironically enough, be fatal in itself. DeFronzo writes that the Batista
regime collapsed in 1959 Cuba only after the United States terminated military aid, the
administration of Shah Moḥammad Rezā Pahlavī began to totter after the United States
insisted he relax restrictions on political expression during 1977, and Anastasio Somoza
lost his grip on power in Nicaragua in 1979 after the United States withdrew its political
and military support from his dictatorial government (Defronzo, 1991: 170, 203, 269).
In addition, the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989 Central Europe – with the
exception of Poland – all occurred only after the Soviet Union withdrew promises of
political and military support (Opp, Voss, and Gern, 1993; Opp, 1994; Weede and
Muller, 1998: 55).
Former Syrian President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, a member of the minority Shia‟ Alawite sect, successfully
governed the Sunni-majority Syrian state by encouraging the perception of himself as the only Arab
leader capable of standing up to both Israel and the United States and resurrecting some measure of
national dignity, not just for the Syrians, but for the Arab people in general (Razi, 1990: 83).
34
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D.

Motivations for Insurgencies Confronting Foreign Occupation
The academic literature regarding irregular conflict has shown insurgencies

against foreign control to be motivated by one or more of several social/political issues,
including local alignment with international philosophies, the impact of modernization
upon developing countries, the presence of exploitable resources, perceptions of
regime illegitimacy (involving issues of regime disregard for human rights and basic
notions of inequality), and nationalist and/or secessionist strivings.

Each of these

motivations may be exacerbated by the physical presence of foreign occupation troops.
The unexpected onset of active insurgent operations in many countries has
historically been linked to external philosophies; “insidious elements” fanning the flames
of rebellion “in almost all developing nations throughout the world” as stated by a 1966
International Police Academy training manual issued by the Agency for International
Development (The Police and Internal Security, 1966: I-4, L-1). During the Cold War,
that external philosophy was typically labeled as „International Communism,‟ and the
threat implied by that concept tended to obviate the importance of local social concerns
on the part of the affected population (Shafer, 1988: 59-60). In more recent times, a
similar concept has coalesced with rebuilding of an international Islamic khalifate taking
the place of international Communism as the hidden hand behind insurgencies across
the Muslim world. Within that khalifate, writes Gordon, “Sharia rule will be established,
Israel will be destroyed, oil prices will skyrocket, and the United States will recoil in
humiliation and possibly even collapse” (Gordon, 2007:

58).

Gordon concedes,

however, that the inflammatory rhetoric of such former Bush Administration officials as
David Frum and Richard Perle (who argue that the only possible outcomes in the
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General War on Terrorism are either victory or holocaust (Frum and Perle, 2003) may
lead the United States into a series of wars, abuses, and over-reactions that are more
likely to perpetuate terrorism than defeat it (Gordon, 2007: 58-60). Such interventionist
policies by foreign powers may also inadvertently trigger the very Islamic restoration
movements those powers sought to prevent (Dekmejian 1980, 1985; Lewis 1985).
Many theorists place the blame for insurgent activities on the impact of
modernization upon developing countries (Kecskemeti, 1967:

13; The Police and

Internal Security, 1966: I-4, L-1). Henderson and Singer write that “tensions related to
the challenges of state-building and nation-building comprise the „taproot of insurgency‟
in post-colonial states” (Henderson and Singer (2000: 278). This may occur as a
lessening of distance between social classes leads to political instability (Durkheim,
1951; Brinto, 1965; Johnson, 1982; Razi, 1990: 89). Rapid economic growth has been
said to destabilize traditional rural social systems (Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1976), while
frustrations may arise from the failure of economic modernization to bring about
unrealistic expectations on the part of the population (Gurr, 1970; Fearon and Laitin,
2003: 78).35 Islamic countries may be even more prone to instability as a result of
modernization, given that Islam established both a religious faith and an idealized state.
Muslims who view Mohammad‟s 624 CE/AD city-state of Medina as the exemplar of
religious purity may feel an obligation to revolt against an existing regime perceived to
be corrupted by Western philosophies, materialism, and secularism. This feeling of
obligation may be increased by the perception of direct or indirect alien rule, and lead to
35

Fearon and Laitin qualify these conjectures, however, by noting that their research failed to find any
strong evidence of causality between the onset of modernization and an increase in ethnic strife (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003: 82).
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a violent restoration movement designed to return to an earlier idealized set of attitudes
free of foreign influence (Dekmejian, 1980, 1985; Lewis, 1985). This was clearly the
case in Iranian society prior to the Islamic revolution (Razi, 1990: 76-77).
An abundance of extractable resources may unwittingly stimulate insurgency,
given that such abundance is positively associated with low economic growth, rentseeking, government corruption, and a deterioration of government institutions.
According to the Scarce Resource Wars Hypothesis, peoples and/or states will engage
in conflict to secure resources necessary for their existence, with the bitterest fighting
reserved for the scarcest resources (Brown, 1977; Bennett, 1991; Renner, 1996;
Suliman, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Conversely, advocates of the Abundant

Resources Hypothesis argue that the revenues available from such resources represent
a powerful goal for both centralized and local control, increasing the risk of greed-driven
conflicts while providing funding for both government and insurgent weaponry (Le Billon,
1997; Keen, 1998; Collier, 2000; Fairhead, 2000; Le Billon, 2001b: 564-565). The
viability of such resources can also provide opportunity in available funding for guerilla
recruiting and provisioning, and serve to strengthen group identities (Lujala, Gleditsch,
and Gilmore, 2005: 540).36 Since local control of such resources would strongly benefit
a more tightly-defined population, nationalist movements are generally led by those
individuals and groupings whose personal and collective destinies are linked to the
36

Much of Nigerian oil reserves lie in the eastern part of the country dominated by the Igbo tribe, and a
rapid growth in the value of crude oil that took place during the 1960s, coupled with efforts by the central
government to limit Igbo control over the resource, led to a bitter, and ultimately unsuccessful,
secessionist war on the part of the Igbos to establish the independent state of Biafra (Nafziger and
Richter, 1976: 103-104). Such a phenomenon is not limited to the Third World; Scottish nationalism was
th
stimulated during the latter part of the 20 century with the discovery of North Sea oil (Lujala, Gleditsch,
and Gilmore, 2005: 540).
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complete removal of alien political and economic domination (Nafziger and Richter,
1976: 93).
Perceptions of illegitimate rule, especially when indigenous rulers are widely
viewed as lackeys for foreign powers, can also trigger insurgent movements. Razi
defines legitimacy as “the extent to which the relevant portion of the population
perceives that the regime is behaving” (Razi, 1987: 461-462), and writes that when the
“articulate members” of a population are generally satisfied with their government‟s
approach to issues of identity, participation, distribution, equality, and sovereignty within
the context of their own culture (which may not necessarily correspond to Western
norms), “there is no crisis of legitimacy” (Razi, 1990:

70). Indeed, the general

perception of a government‟s legitimacy has been argued to have direct significance to
political stability, especially within the Third World (Binder, 1962, 1971; Pye, 1971;
Hudson, 1977; Bendix, 1978; McLellan, 1983), and that perception can serve to either
inspire or doom an insurgency (Razi, 1990:

71).37

While external actors may

successfully question legitimacy, Latham writes that only indigenous actors can provide
it (Latham, 2006: 40), and research conducted by Weede and Muller during 1998 found
that regimes dependent upon great power support tend to lose popular legitimacy
(Weede and Muller, 1998: 54). The government of 1960s South Vietnam was viewed
by many Vietnamese as being corrupt and overly reliant upon the United States to the
point that even segments of the population who were hostile to the Communists lost
interest in supporting it, especially those who envisioned a united Vietnamese state

Guevara once presciently noted that, “where a government . . . maintains at least an appearance of
constitutional legality, the guerilla outbreak cannot be promoted” (Guevara, 1969: 2).
37
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encompassing both northern and southern political entities (Berger, 2003:

440).

Weede and Muller write that the Chinese capitulation to Japanese aggression during
the 1930s was perceived by some Chinese as collaboration, and undermined the
patriotic credentials of the Chinese Nationalist regime (Weede and Muller, 1998: 5455). During the 1990s, the FLN government of Algeria found itself contending with
insurgents who claimed to be fighting an illegitimate regime of hizb fransa; the Party of
France; a stunning irony given that the FLN had fought a vicious, eight year conflict
during 1954-1962 against French colonial control of Algeria (McDougall, 2005: 127).
Ethnic nationalism can be even more potent than the mere perception of foreign
control, since it embodies the feelings and behaviors of a grouping of people within
existing states that view themselves as having a unique, terminal identity and loyalty
and who seek a distinct, independent, indigenous statehood for that grouping. While
modern nationalism is traced to the Europe of the eighteenth century, it bloomed in the
European colonial territories during the post-Second World War era; perhaps unwitting
transferred to the Third World through the aegis of European imperialism itself (Razi,
1990: 81-83). Within those territories, the primary goal of modern nationalism was to
terminate foreign domination and install indigenous rulers to lead social and economic
advancement. In the Middle East, the relationship between religion and nationalism
was and remains curvilinear and complex: while Islam has been of a major contributing
factor in the development of Arab, Iranian, Turkish, and Palestinian identity, religious
differences in multi-confessional states like Lebanon have drastically hindered the
emergence of truly nationalist identities (Binder 1966; Azar and Marlin 1987). Since
many of the boundaries in the region were arbitrarily drawn by European interests, and
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local rulers such as Nuri al-Said of Iraq, Shah Moḥammad Rezā Pahlavī of Iran, and the
various sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf often viewed as little more than proxies for
continued Western rule, nationalist strivings in the Middle East also reflect significant
crises of dignity, self-worth, honor, and self-esteem (Razi, 1990: 81-83).
Theories of ethnic nationalism are often classified as either primordialism or
constructivism, with compelling arguments to be made for both. Primordialist theory
views ethnic identity as a compilation of unique features relating to culture, tradition,
history, physical traits, language, and religion formed around extended family
relationships, with unique, unchangeable features that are consistently distributed and
provide a subjectively-held sense of personal identity within a larger community. Such
identify formation may take centuries to coalesce, and results in long-term, enduring
boundaries around specific groups within society that are resistant to political change
and can be „reawakened‟ after long periods of dormancy (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972;
Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1986; Ignatieff, 1993; Moynihan, 1994; Huntington, 1996; Nasr,
2000:

171-172; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hale, 2004:

459-460).38

In contrast,

constructivist theory views modernization and strong state policies essentially forming
38

Primordialism may be present when regional nationalism is linked to a common minority language, as is
the case in Quebec, Wales, the French provinces of Brittany, Alsace, Corsica, and Occitania, Iranian
Azerbaijan, and Moldovan Transdniestria; all of which have a minority language spoken by an element of
the population (Laitin, 2001: 841-842; Orson, 2002: 64-65, 76, 79; LaPonce, 2004: 19; Safran, 2004: 23; Dragojevic, 2005: 61, 63-64; Sorens, 2005: 307, 309). Primordialism may also be found when
secessionism is fueled by the concept (or mythology) of a deeply-shared history (Muir, 1917: 48-49;
Coakley, 2004: 534, 546-548), and appears to reside within certain distinct areas; notably within the
developing world where political parties in the pluralist societies of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean tend to
be organized along ethnic lines (Horowitz, 1985; Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31-32). Primordial religious
issues may explain ethnic conflict and secessionism/irredentism in areas such as Northern Ireland, Sri
Lanka, and Cyprus (Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31-32, 43-44; Fox, 2003: 104, 106; Orjuela, 2003: 195-196;
Richmond, 2004: 193; Sorens, 2005: 308 footnote). Primordialism‟s detractors, which include such
eminent scholars as Ajami, Walt, Barber, and Fox, often concentrate on Huntington‟s thesis of primordial
civilizations in which civilizations, not states, are the primary actors in international relations (Barber,
1997: 67-70; Walt, 1997: 187; Fox, 2002: 422-434; Ajami, 2003: 3, 5-6, 7-9).
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ethnic-based groups where no real group consciousness previously existed.

Some

constructivist scholars contend that such identities are never really permanent and may
be altered under certain circumstances through „identity-switching‟ (with individuals
assuming differing identities in varying social situations), while others claim that
„identity-switching‟ is simply a matter of emphasizing different facets of one‟s personality
in response to specific situational changes (Hale, 2004: 460-463, 480). Constructivist
scholars also argue that two causal factors of economic competition and political
opportunity often lead to ethnic mobilization along opportunistic lines when economic
opportunities in a time of scarcity are granted on the basis of identity (Nasr, 2000: 171172).39
The perception of alien rule can also arise in societies in which a country‟s social
structure is characterized by the subordination of certain ethnic groups to others. In
these situations, ethnic identity is often reinforced and ethnic solidarity intensified
among both the ruling class and the subordinates (Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001:
475-476).

Long-term resentment by the underclasses against the existing class

structure may lead to ethno-communal protests and movements of political separatism,
as evidenced by the secessionist strivings of India‟s Naga tribesmen, Indonesia‟s

39

Constructivism may be present in such varied areas as Angola‟s Cabinda enclave, Congo/Brazzaville‟s
Katanga province, Indonesian Aceh and West Papua, Papua New Guinea‟s Bougainville province,
Moroccan Western Sahara, Nigerian Biafra, and Southern Sudan, since all those insurgencies have taken
place in regions wishing to locally retain the revenue from abundant natural resources (Ross, 2004b:
343-344). Constructivism may also explain the impact of geographical non-contiguity upon successful
secessionist movements in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and Iceland and secessionist strivings in Angola‟s
39
oil-rich Cabinda province and the Danish Faroe Islands, since geographical separation may lead a
region to rely more upon its own resources rather than those of the central government (Ross, 2004b:
343; Sorens, 2005: 305, 319, 324). Scholars such as Brass, Gurr, and Hodsbawm also claim a
constructivist, not a primordialist, explanation for secessionist issues relating to minority languages,
arguing that economic competition is actually at the root of significant language-based conflict (Coakley,
2004: 544; Safran, 2004: 2-3; Sorens, 2005: 321-322).
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Acehnese, Angola‟s Ovimbundu peoples, Myanmar‟s Karen tribesmen, the Basques of
Spain and France, the Kurds of Southwest Asia, and the Saharan peoples represented
by the POLISARIO Front in northwest Africa (Dominguez, 1986:

807-808).

Azam

argues that ethnicity-related conflicts are most prevalent in Africa, however, and are
exacerbated as ethno-linguistic fractionalization decreases and countries are divided
between only two or three major ethnic groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Azam, 2002:
133; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).40 Hechter‟s theory of „internal colonialism‟ may be
relevant here, as it determines secessionism to be the result of exploitive, central
government–provincial periphery relationships that rely upon culturally-based divisions
of labor to withhold choice positions in the economic, social, and political hierarchy for
members of the core community, leaving provincials in a quasi-colonial status (Hechter,
1975: 20-22). The theory has clear limitations, however, and offers little explanatory
value for highly-developed, economically-privileged territories such as the Basque
regions of Spain which nonetheless maintain long-term secessionist movements
(Zariski, 1989: 256-257; Sorens, 2005: 320).
An extreme version of minority subjugation to alien control took place during the
National Socialist (Nazi) German military occupation of Poland and Byelorussia during
40

Ethnic diversity does not necessary lead to instability, however. Fearon and Laitin argue that even
though insurgents may mobilize in poor countries along ethnic lines, civil conflicts in the post-Second
World War period have “structural roots” as a result of an international system “dominated by fragile
states with limited administrative control of their peripheries” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 88). This is borne
out in ethnically diverse Latin America, where few of the many insurgencies that have wracked the
continent since 1945 have been linked to ethno-communal grievances. While this does not mean that
racial and ethnic discrimination does not exist in those regions, it may indicate that adequate procedures
for ethnic subordination and incorporation have been successfully implemented. As a result, Latin
American insurgencies tend to threaten the political regime in power rather than the basic integrity of the
state (Dominguez, 1986: 808-809). In addition, criminal activity may occasionally masquerade as ethnic
conflict, with an alliance of „dropouts‟ from differing social groups driving violence in 1990s Sierra Leone
(Abd‟ullah and Muana, 1998), and antagonisms among such groups as the „Cobras, „Ninjas,‟, and
„Scorpios‟ leading to widespread social unrest in Congo-Brazzaville (Azam, 2002: 135).
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1939-1945 in which Jewish people resident in those countries were imprisoned and
ultimately murdered during the course of the Holocaust. While many Jews believed that
by entering ghettos and abiding by the racial policies of the Nazi occupiers they could
survive the occupation, others soon began to understand that Germany‟s „Final
Solution‟ of its perceived „Jewish problem‟ meant the ultimate destruction of European
Jewry.

This latter viewpoint motivated Aron, Asael, Tuvia, and Zisel Bielski, four

brothers of a Byelorussian Jewish family, to organize an insurgent group known as the
„Bielski Otrijad‟ during early 1942 that loosely cooperated with other Soviet partisan
groups against both the German occupiers and their Polish and Byelorussian
collaborators. Led by Tuvia Bielski, the organization reached a peak of roughly 1,200
members, most of whom were women and children, with no more than 150 men serving
as armed guerillas at any one time. Since Tuvia‟s personal agenda concentrated upon
surviving the war and rescuing fellow Jews, armed actions against German troops and
indigenous collaborators became strictly secondary, although the Bielski practice of
killing entire families of Byelorussians and Poles known to be assisting German
authorities in the identification and extermination of Jews would be difficult to defend
had not the existential crisis of the Holocaust been ongoing. In addition, the Bielski
Otrijad supported itself in the manner of most other insurgent groups through taking
weapons, ammunition, and food, often by force, from the indigenous population. Even
so, it would be difficult to fault the Bielski brothers from organizing the otrijad given that
compliance with the governing authorities would have led to their own deaths; indeed,
both of Tuvia‟s parents, two of his brothers, his ex-wife, and his (then) current wife went
to their deaths at the hands of German authorities and their local collaborators during
55

the course of the bitter conflict (Tec, 1993: 27, 30-39, 48-49, 65, 73, 77-79, 92-93, 204205).41
Western powers battling indigenous insurgent forces in the Third World have
long appeared to misunderstand the dynamics of nationalism, and sought to
delegitimize local insurgencies as the puppets of foreign powers or international
philosophies. During the 1950s and 1960s, Máo Zédōng‟s theories of revolution were
viewed as the controlling force behind many Third World insurgencies, with guerillas
from Southeast Asia to North Africa derided as either “the duped and bamboozled” or
criminals covering their activities with the fig leaf of social reform, rather than credible
political contenders to existing governing elites (Shafer, 1988:

58-60, 64, 77).

Soustelle, writing in 1950 about the conflict in French Indochina, argued that the battle
was not between French forces and nationalist insurgents, but the result of Soviet
efforts at to dominate Asia through the use of proxy guerilla organizations, adding that if
the French were defeated in Indochina, Communist insurgents would soon take power
in both Malaya and the Philippines (Soustelle, 1950:

65-66).

French newspapers

exposing allegations of official torture during the Algerian conflict were quickly
dismissed as tools of Communist propaganda; other newspapers, in their reluctance to
appear unpatriotic, unwittingly misled the public regarding the actual nature of Algerian
nationalism as they simplistically portrayed FLN insurgents as mere outlaws (Harrison,
41

I conducted personal research with Dr. Zane Bell, first cousin, once removed to Tuvia Bielski (when
Bell‟s father emigrated from Byelorussia to the United States during 1923, immigration officials at Ellis
Island changed his surname from Bielski to Bell), during the preparation of this dissertation. Bell stated
that his uncle Yudl, who also served with the Bielski Otrijad, admitted that most of the Bielski guerillas had
little or no military training and often either fired their weapons blindly or simply ran away from encounters
with German troops. This seeming lack of military discipline may have tended to fortify Tuvia‟s emphasis
on rescuing Jews from extermination rather than actively engaging German forces, and served to account
for the organization‟s extremely low attrition rate of only five percent; far below the often-quoted 40%
attrition rate for Soviet partisan groups at large (Tec, 1993: 204-205, 208-209).
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1964: 283). In Vietnam of the 1960s, NLF guerillas were typically viewed by the United
States government as simply representing a mindless proxy army for North Vietnam
and the forces of international Communism Beijing (Thee, 1976:

119, 121), 42 and

President Lyndon Johnson dismissed the reality of Vietnamese nationalism when he
stated during April 1965 that “the deepening shadow of Communist China” was the real
American adversary in Vietnam (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965,
Undated: 730).43 In a like manner, Iraqi nationalist outrage against United States-led
military occupation is currently being explained as either Iranian meddling or efforts by
international terrorists to re-establish the old Islamic Khalifate (Davis and Perry, 2007:
1-2; McCain, 2007: 20); self-serving explanations that seek to hide the fact that the
Iraqi insurgency is driven by nationalist feeling dedicated to ridding the country of
foreign occupiers (In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, 2006: 11-12).
Failure to recognize the nature of such nationalism can rebound against occupation
authorities long after the conflict has ended, as frustrated nationalists seek to cleanse
local culture entirely of all foreign accretions, leaving intact only elements considered to
be entirely indigenous (Schroder and Harvey, 1963; Terhune, 1965: 278, 285).44
Fall, while acknowledging the American view that the Việt Cộng represented a “contrived political
mechanism with no indigenous roots,” wrote (perhaps, somewhat tongue-in-cheek) that, having already
suffered an estimated 282,000 casualties by 1966, the NLF insurgents “fight rather well for what must be
a vast mass of remote-controlled and force-drafted recruits” (Fall, 1966: 14).
42

43

This line of thinking unwittingly led the Chinese government to become even more supportive of the
NLF resistance (Thee, 1976: 124-125). Ironically enough, nationalist agendas on the part of both
Vietnam and China led to military clashes between the two Communist powers during the late 1970s and
early 1980s; shattering the argument that Vietnam was simply a proxy for the expansion of Chinese
Communism (Gordon, 1986: 66-67).
44

During the Irish Civil War, some Irish nationalists called for setting the clocks back 25 minutes to avoid
being on „English Time‟ (Canby, 1919: 36), and the 1922 Constitution of the Irish Free State specified
Gaeilge as the national language, despite the fact that only about 10% of the Irish population spoke
Gaeilge easily while well over 99% were well-versed in English (Gwynn, 1924: 195).
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E.

The Impact of Great Power/United Nations/Political Bloc Intervention
Foreign colonial control of large areas of Asia and Africa, accepted internationally

as legitimate during the early part of the 20th century, came under assault in the post1945 world as revised concepts of international law were being espoused by the newlyformed United Nations.45

When the United Nations Charter entered into force on

October 24, 1945, it did so with a written call for self-determination in Articles 1, 55, 73,
and 76 (United Nations Charter, 1945); a call which resounded throughout the
developing world.46 These concepts were heightened dramatically with the passage of
United Nations General Assembly Resolution #1514, adopted on December 14, 1960,
that proclaimed “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism
in all its forms and manifestations,” and declaring colonialism to constitute both “a

denial of fundamental human rights” and an “impediment to the promotion of world
peace and co-operation.” The resolution also called for the cessation of “all armed
action or repressive measures . . . directed against dependent peoples” and for the
“transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories . . . without any conditions or
reservations . . . in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and
freedom” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #1514, 1960). Through the
strength of this resolution, the international community condemned the retention of

45

Verdross, an authority on international law, subsequently characterized the United Nations Charter as
assuming “the character of basic law for the whole international community” (Verdross, 1954: 347-348).
Article 73 specifically referred to colonial possessions as “territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government” and reminded the administering powers that “the interests of
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount,” while Article 76 referred to the administration of former
Japanese and Italian colonies under international trusteeship as being designed for “their progressive
development towards self-government or independence” (United Nations Charter, 1945).
46
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colonial territories under international law, and related foreign counterinsurgency
operations to the realm of human rights violations.
In addition, the pre-war multi-polar balance of power centered in Europe that
accepted the legitimacy of colonial empires had been replaced by a nuclear-armed, bipolar arrangement that offered the possibility of real-time, system-wide deadly
responses to provocations, with the United States and the Soviet Union competing for
dominance throughout not only Europe but within the developing world itself
(Saperstein, 1991: 195; Westad, 1992: 455-462). This competition began before the
Second World War had even ended, with concerns about Soviet Communist
encroachment leading American officials to question the viability and basic legitimacy of
European colonial control over vast regions of Asia and Africa in the post-war world. As
early as March 1945, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was stating his opposition to
the return of French colonial rule to Indochina and calling for an international trusteeship
to replace the French presence following the war‟s conclusion. While this position was
temporarily shelved in the wake of a hurriedly-arranged meeting between the president
and Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur resistance leader Charles de Gaulle, it took Harry

Truman‟s ascension to the presidency following President Roosevelt‟s death in April
1945 to finally remove the spectre of American opposition to continuing French
authority in Indochina (Tonnesson, 1985:
47

11). 47

At the same time, American

While President Truman was more supportive of French interests in Indochina than had been his
predecessor, concerns that a ruinous war in the territory might turn the population of metropolitan France
toward Communism led his administration to threaten to take the matter to the United Nations unless
French officials began offering more generous terms to Hồ Chí Minh. This threat was never carried out
due to fears of further destabilizing the French position in Southeast Asia, and French counterinsurgency
measures continued unhindered by United Nations‟ oversight (Tonnesson, 1985: 17-18).
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suggestions to British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill that the British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong be transferred to Chinese sovereignty in order to bolster the
nationalist credentials of the Kuomintang Party government led Sir Winston to angrily
reply, “Hong Kong will be eliminated from the British Empire over my dead body”
(Hurley, 1945).
During the post-war period, both the Soviet Union and the United States
supported a United Nations Security Council seizure of the Dutch counterinsurgency
campaigns in the Netherlands East Indies which, by 1949, had eviscerated the Dutch
political position there (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1947-1949).48
Both super-powers also competed to woo the Jewish people through timely recognition
of the State of Israel: four days after the United States granted de-facto recognition of
the Jewish state at 6:11 PM on May 14, 1948 (eleven minutes after Israel‟s midnight
declaration, Israel-time) (Ross, 1948:

1), the Soviet Union trumped the American

initiative with de-jure recognition on May 18, 1948 (Sovetsko-Izrail‟skie Otnosheniia:
Sbornik Dokumentov, 1948 Mai 1949, 2000: 304). During October 1956, both superpowers implicitly cooperated to bring unrelenting political and economic pressure
against the British and French governments to force them to abandon military
operations against Egypt; operations widely viewed as colonial-style politics (Aldrich,
1967:

547, 552).

Both super-powers subsequently sought to establish their own

48

Following continuing counterinsurgency operations conducted during January 1949 by a desperate
Dutch government in the face of Security Council objections, the United States government cancelled all
financial aid designed to assist Dutch efforts in the Netherlands East Indies. Pressure also mounted in
Congress for the further cancellation of all Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands, itself; aid that had thus
far transferred $1,000,000,000 into the ravaged, post-war Netherlands economy. Given that the
Netherlands government had already spent nearly $500,000,000 on its military campaigns in the East
Indies, such a devastating financial scenario served to make a continuation of its „police actions‟ there
both politically and financially untenable (Collins, 1950: 173-176; Friend, 2003: 37-38).
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presence in the developing world following the withdrawal of the former colonial powers
(Miller, 1970; Kramer, Helmut and Bauer, Helfried, 1972), and both superpowers –
along with the United Nations – selectively supported both nationalist insurgencies as
well as state actors fighting those insurgencies.

British Prime Minister Harold

MacMillan‟s historic „Winds of Change‟ speech delivered in Cape Town, South Africa
during February 1960 made it clear that even the United Kingdom itself, which, prior to
1947, had controlled a quarter of the world through various flexible forms of
metropolitan control, was no longer able to support continuing colonial control of the
developing world and could not longer be counted upon as a political ally by the
remaining colonial powers (Myers, 2000: 556, 563-564).49
This bi-polar political and military competition legitimated the existence and
heightened the resolve of post-Second World War nationalism (Westad, 1992); a
resolve which continues today to make insurgencies built upon nationalism virtually
impossible to defeat. Westad, in analyzing insurgencies during the period of 19451992, writes that the post-war bi-polar international system directly impacted the
chances for insurgent success; in many cases, enhancing the potential for the onset of
insurgency by making it impossible for established regimes to mobilize international
support (Westad, 1992: 455-462). Hourani agrees, noting that France and the United
Kingdom, weakened by six years of global conflict, soon realized that the perceived

49

th

“In the 20 century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes that gave birth to the nation
states have been repeated all over the world . . Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia . .
Today the same thing is happening in Africa, and the most striking of all the impressions I have formed
since I left London a month ago is the strength of this African national consciousness. In different places
it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this
continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must
all accept is as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it” (Myers, 2000: 564-565).
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interests of the Soviet Union and the United States to be taken into account
everywhere, with European reliance upon American financial aid giving the United
States a unique ability to wield great pressure upon European policies. Hourani adds
that nationalist expectations in the developing world were heightened by American
strategic interest in colonial territories, and determined that co-optation of that interest
might grant to them important external sympathies for their anti-colonial campaigns
(Hourani, 1991: 354-355, 364, 368).
F.

Summary
Nearly 64 years after the Second World War came to an end, it still remains

unclear whether Western militaries understand what they are up against when
attempting to reduce indigenous insurgencies in foreign countries.

It has been

demonstrated in campaigns conducted across the developing world that the heavy
deployment of military hard power that has previously decimated conventional
opponents will not always bring about decisive victories against shadowy, locallysupported guerillas who are united in the determination that the outsider must go
(Maxwell, 1976: 250-260; Mandelbaum, 1991/1992: 165-167-169, 173-174; Claessen,
2007: 98-102). The outcomes of nearly all such insurgencies are essentially Pyrrhic in
any case, since the civilian population inevitably pays the greatest price in blood and
treasure (Cairns, 1997: 17; The Global Menace of Local Strife, 2003: 23); a price that
is again paid by indigenous collaborators once foreign powers withdraw their forces
(Mack, 1975: 182-183; Burrin, 1996: 453; Jackson, 2001: 578; Elster, 2006: 326,
333).
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Ethnic nationalism appears to provide a powerful motivation for indigenous
peoples to expel elements of foreign control from their midst, be they Acehnese,
Algerian, Corsican, Irish, Iraqi, Palestinian, or Vietnamese.

While constructivist

nationalism may offer opportunities for co-optation by foreign powers (480; Nasr, 2000:
171-172; Hale, 2004: 460-463), primordial nationalists often seem to be unshakable in
their determination for indigenous rule at virtually any cost (Rabushka and Shepsle,
1972; Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1986; Ignatieff, 1993; Moynihan, 1994; Huntington, 1996;
Nasr, 2000: 171-172; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hale, 2004: 459-460). As conflicts
extend into years and even decades, domestic exhaustion within occupying powers and
impatience throughout the international community can often force foreign occupation
authorities to relinquish any realistic thoughts of victory and seek to effect little more
than face-saving withdrawals from bitter, unwinnable campaigns.
In the next chapter, we will discuss theories of insurgency that seek to define the
vague, flexible nature of insurgent activity and its conflict-winning energy and
motivation. We will also discuss the two primary strategies of counterinsurgency, and
the impact they have had against these devolved guerilla movements over the past six
decades. The record of counterinsurgency campaigns in the post-Second World War
period will come under evaluation as it is compared with the outcomes of pre-1945
campaigns.

Finally, we will offer some hypotheses regarding the key factors of

counterinsurgent failure and the actual, uncertain nature of victory for a foreign power.
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CHAPTER II: INSURGENCY THEORY AND COUNTERINSURGENT STRATEGY
A.

Introduction
Over the past one hundred years, a number of political scholars have developed

basic theories of insurgency, including Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence, Major General
Orde Wingate, William E. D. Allen, Máo Zédōng, Hồ Chí Minh, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and
Josip Broz Tito. Lawrence‟s tactics were based upon the concepts of operating within
essentially passively-supportive populations and maintaining cohesion within insurgent
groups; he also identified an insurgency‟s lack of regimented substance as its strongest
asset, since it could not be easily defined and destroyed (Lawrence, 1935: 153-154;
Garnett, ed., 1951: 99; Johnson, 1962a: 649; Desai and Eckstein, 1990: 443, 461).
Wingate followed Lawrence‟s thoughts on passive support, stressing that a population
well-penetrated by guerillas would deny occupation forces the ability to isolate the
insurgency (Sykes, 1959: 324). Máo emphasized a more active form of support, writing
that only close cooperation between insurgents and the population would succeed in
wearing down occupation forces during extended campaigns (Johnson, 1962a: 655;
Suyin, 1972:

394-395; Mack, 1975:

177).

Hồ further developed Máo‟s ideas,

determining the active support of the peasantry to be particularly vital in dislodging
foreign occupiers (Duiker, 2000:

132, 137, 181), while Giáp included within this

evolving theoretical framework the necessity of creating a „psychological base‟ (whether
nationalism or Communism) that could bond the indigenous peoples together with the
goals of the insurgency (MacDonald, 1993: 82-83, 99-100). In contrast, Allen found
favorable geography to be the most important element in constructing a viable
insurgency (Allen, 1943: 19), while Tito dismissed geography and downplayed bonding
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with the population in favor of studious political work and the steadfast nature of the
fighting leadership (Dedijer, 1951: 341-342).
A number of powerful industrialized states sought to crush such insurgencies
during the post-1945 period, and it was widely understood that no insurgency could be
truly defeated without separating the guerillas from their popular recruiting/support pool.
To accomplish that goal, two major counterinsurgency strategies were developed and
placed into practice: the social welfare approach which attempts to draw the affected
population away from the insurgency by providing it with heightened social programs,
and the cost-benefit approach which uses broad measures of coercion to frighten
affected elements of the population from serving as an insurgent recruitment/support
pool (Leites and Wolf, 1966: 19, 155-156, 158, 228; Shultz, 1978a: 109-110; Shafer,
1988: 73). During the course of my review, I found both strategies to be essentially
ineffective when the occupying powers involved were confronted with robust
international hostility.
I argue that heightened levels of United Nations and great power condemnation
of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns conducted during the period following the
Second World War period led to the subsequent collapse of those campaigns. I further
contend

that

neither

the

social

welfare

nor

the

cost-benefit

approach

to

counterinsurgency has been significant in the outcomes of those campaigns. To test
these arguments, I have developed three hypotheses that investigate four separate
case studies representing various levels of United Nations/great power opposition along
with both counterinsurgency strategies.
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B.

Theories of Asymmetrical Warfare
Insurgencies are often linked with political revolution, although the two concepts

may be quite distinct. While banditry, labor strife, lynchings, and political rioting for
racial/anti-foreign issues have not been historically uncommon in the United States,
they were more representative of a people somewhat prone to violence than examples
of true revolutionary activity. Zagorin notes that revolutionary movements are more
commonly discussed within theories of modernization (Zagorin, 1973:

46), 50 and

Huntington defines a revolution as a “rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in
the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure,
leadership, government, activity, and policies” (Huntington, 1968:

264).

Johnson‟s

typology of revolutions bases revolutionary events upon four basic criteria:
revolutionary targets (government, regime, society), identity of revolutionaries (elites,
masses, or both), ultimate goals (reformist, nation-building, eschatological, etc.), and
nature of activity (spontaneous or calculated).

From those criteria, he defines

revolutionary activities as being (1) jacquerie; spontaneous peasant outbreaks that
appeal to traditional authorities for redress of grievances, (2) millenarian; a search for a
totally new order to be effected by supernatural forces, (3) anarchistic; a reaction
against change or modernization, seeking to reinstitute an idealized former order, (4)
Jacobin-Communist (which is also the rarest), (5) conspiratorial coups d‟état; an attempt
by a small elite to introduce social change by violence, and (6) militarized mass
50

During the early 1960s, General Maxwell Taylor warned that “symptoms of subversive insurgency . . .
are found in virtually every developing country in the world” (Kecskemeti, 1967: 13). An International
Police Academy training manual issued by the Agency for International Development during 1966 claimed
that “the seeds of potential unrest are sown whenever an undeveloped society comes into contact with a
more highly developed country,” further noting that “the strategy of subversive aggression is based on
transforming passive unrest into active insurgency” (The Police and Internal Security, 1966: I-4, L-1).
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insurrection; a 20th century creation

further defined as a people‟s war or guerrilla

insurgency led by a dedicated elite inspired by nationalistic or social ideologies
(Johnson, 1964). While this typology is fairly extensive, it does not cover all types of
revolutions but simply provides a format for the basic nature of a given revolutionary
event (Zagorin, 1973: 51).
Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz, the master conflict theoretician of the 19th
century, wrote that a successful insurgency required five distinct characteristics: (1) the
war must be carried out in the country‟s interior, (2) the war cannot hinge on any one
single battle, (3) the threat of war must be extended over a considerable area, (4) the
countryside must be irregular and essentially inaccessible, and (5) the insurgency must
have popular support. Key among those elements was the necessity of support, or at
least acceptance, of the insurgency from the population at large (Clausewitz, 1984
[1832]: Chapter 26). Insurgency theorists such as Lawrence, Wingate, Allen, Tito,
Máo, Hồ, and Giáp continued to build upon these strategies during the first half of the
20th century, with devastating effects for occupation forces. The writings and recorded
thoughts of theorists such as these can offer insight into successful insurgent strategies.
Lawrence, the British liaison officer (and noted Arabist) who successfully led
Arab guerillas to defeat Turkish occupation forces in Arabia during the First World War,
wrote that a viable rebellion could be conducted with two percent of the population
active and ninety-eight percent passively sympathetic (Desai and Eckstein, 1990: 443,
461).51 Lawrence viewed his Arab guerilla force‟s lack of definable substance as being

51

Scholars such as Cross and Laqueur agree that the general population need only be passive in order
to provide sufficient viability for insurgency (Cross, 1964: 35; Laqueur, 1998: 401).
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its greatest virtue; while “armies were like plants,” he wrote, “we might be a vapour,
blowing where we listed” (Garnett, ed., 1951: 99). He also understood the importance
of cohesion and unity within insurgent groups, but was forced by the fragmented nature
of the tribal peoples of the Arabian Peninsula to build his Arab irregular force around
Faisal bin Al Hussein Bin Ali El-Hashemi, the third son of Sayyid Hussein bin Ali, Sharif
of Mecca; a limited but effective platform on which to construct an Arab nationalism
defined primarily by its centuries-old hated of Turkish occupation (Johnson, 1962a:
649).52
Wingate, the British officer credited with initiating tactics for the Jewish Haganah
in its „Gideon Force‟ operations in the British Mandate of Palestine during the 1930s
(tactics that continue to be followed and evaluated by Tzva HaHagana LeYisra‟el53 to
this day), subsequently led Ethiopian irregular forces to defeat Italian authority in
Ethiopia during 1941. Wingate closely followed Lawrence‟s emphasis upon popular
support, placing it above all else when conducting guerilla activities against regular
armed forces. In his personal evaluation of Gideon Force, Wingate wrote that “given

52

Any realistic structure of extra-tribal loyalty and identity remained elusive and, on one occasion, a
member of the Howaytat murdered a member of another tribe. An „eye for an eye‟ was called for, but if a
member of the offended tribe carried out the punishment, any semblance of unity would be lost. To
mitigate the crisis, Lawrence himself shot the man, and insurgent unity, such as it was, lived on for
another day (Lawrence, 1935: 153-154). Lawrence was far more than simply a local guerilla leader,
however, and a reading of his letters confirms the value of British recognition of the Arab Rebellion in
general and British military support to its endeavors in specific. In a letter written to General Sir Gilbert
Clayton, head of British Intelligence in Egypt, on October 24, 1917, Lawrence requests machine guns
from the Indian Army and reminds Sir Gilbert that he is expecting a shipment of armored cars to be
delivered on the HMS Hardinge; he also speaks of coordinating the activities of his Arab irregulars with
British forces in the region (Brown, 1988: 118, 127, 131-132). Given that at the onset of the First World
War, the Ottoman Turks had held much of Arabia for nearly 400 years and had recently strengthened
their hold on the area with the construction of the Hejaz Railway, it is questionable how effective the
fragmented Arab insurgency would have been had not the British government determined to support it
(Kinross, 1977: 229-230, 566-567)
53

The Hebrew translation of Israel Defense Forces.
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the population favourable to penetration, a thousand resolute and well-armed men can
paralyze . . . the operations of a hundred thousand” (Sykes, 1959: 324).
Máo, the classic Asian insurgency theorist who led Chinese Communist guerillas
against both Nationalist Chinese government forces and Japanese occupation troops
during 1927 – 1949, based his guerilla strategy on a somewhat egalitarian perception of
unity between the Chinese people and the insurgency. Phrases such as “trust in the
masses; rely on the masses,” and “the masses are the real heroes” that so punctuated
his writings are indicative of this concept (Oksenberg, 1977: 84). Of his „seven steps‟
for guerilla warfare,‟ arousing and organizing the people and achieving internal
unification were among the most prominent (MacDonald, 1993: 81). Indeed, a reading
of Máo‟s 1927 Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan might
lead one to conclude that political power might be attainable simply through widespread
peasant uprisings. Not surprisingly, the „Chinese Way‟ - positing a leading role for the
peasantry through the creation of rural military bases supported by the population - has,
since 1949, served as the exemplar adapted by many insurgency movements as the
basis for resistance (Oksenberg, 1977: 119, 139).54
Hồ, the ardent Vietnamese revolutionary who inspired guerilla operations against
the foreign occupations of Japan, France, and the United States (and eventually served
as the first President of the Democratic Republic of Việt Nam), clearly understood the
54

Máo‟s classic insurgency theory utilizes an analogy of a native population forming a „sea‟ in which both
insurgent „fish‟ and occupation force „fishermen‟ operate; while the insurgent „fish‟ survive and prosper as
long as they remain in the „deep water‟ of strong popular support, the occupation forces (in the role of
fishermen or divers) are forced to utilize artificial measures to survive in the basically unfriendly „sea‟
(Mack, 1975: 177). Appropriately, Japanese forces operating in North China during the 1930s termed
some of their counterinsurgency operations conducted against Máo‟s guerillas „draining the water‟
(Johnson, 1962a: 656), and a commonly-used concept in successive insurgencies in Southeast Asia,
North Africa, and the Middle East has been the need to „drain the swamps‟ in order to terminate the
insurgent base.
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need for unified popular support. In The Revolutionary Path, a pamphlet published
during the 1920s that provided an introduction to Marxism-Leninism and its relevance to
the Vietnamese people, Hồ noted that the support of the peasantry would be a crucial
prerequisite for victory over French authorities. A few years later, in an article entitled
The Party‟s Military Work Among the Peasants, Hồ wrote that successful proletariat
revolution would not be possible in rural and semi-rural countries without the active (as
opposed to passively sympathetic) support of the peasantry. This field of thought was
unique at the time, since rival Vietnamese nationalist leaders and philosophers had
shown little interest in the role of the uneducated rural masses (Duiker, 2000: 132, 137,
181). In the end, Hồ‟s vision of a united uprising by the rural masses predominated to
decimate French control in Indochina and, subsequently, that of the United States. 55
Giáp, the brilliant Vietnamese military strategist (and close friend of Hồ) who
eventually served as the commander of the People‟s Army of Việt Nam, closely followed
Máo‟s theories of revolutionary warfare while incorporating several concepts of his own.
Among those additional concepts was the necessity of creating a „psychological base
for the people,‟ whether nationalism or Communism, to bond the indigenous population
together with the ultimate goals of the insurgent leadership (MacDonald, 1993: 82-83,
99-100). He succeeded to the point that Jacques Phillipe Leclerc, initial Commander of
French Union Forces in Indochina, would say, “This is not a fight against an army, it is a
fight against a whole nation” (MacDonald, 1993: 67).56

55

Guevara, writing during the 1960s, also stressed the necessity for gaining active popular support, not
just passive acquiescence on the Lawrence model, to insure insurgent survivability (Guevara, 1969: 50).
Writer Bernard Fall agreed, writing that, while the French were viewed as alien, the Communist-led Việt
Minh could depend up “the instinctive support of the native population” (Johnson, 1962a: 652).
56
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Not everyone agreed with the basic foundation concepts developed by von
Clausewitz and Lawrence. Allen, a British Foreign Service Office conducting a wartime
evaluation of Gideon Force, found Wingate‟s use of Lawrence‟s concepts to be
outdated, and determined a rugged geography which impeded the movements of
conventional forces and provided ready cover and concealment for guerillas to be the
chief prerequisite for successful insurgent operations. Under those concepts, he found
the Arabian Desert to be particularly unsuited to guerilla operations, and Lawrence‟s
successful campaigns there to have been achievable only in the absence of modern
reconnaissance and attack aircraft (Allen, 1943: 19).57 Tito, who led the Yugoslav
partisan movement58 against German occupation during the Second World War (and
subsequently served as the first Prime Minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia), tended to downplay the necessity of seeking popular support (although he
understood the necessity of understanding the attitudes of the popular masses) and
primarily credited his successful campaigns to studious political work and the steadfast

57

Allen‟s theories regarding air reconnaissance appeared to have little validity in the subsequent colonial
conflict in French Indochina, with the Việt Minh‟s extensive use of ground camouflage frustrating French
aerial reconnaissance efforts (Fall, 1961: 60). Tito also took issue with Allen, finding geography to be of
relative unimportance in conducting guerilla operations (Dedijer, 1951: 341-342). Niccolò Machiavelli
placed strong importance upon geography, however, writing that soldiers must “become familiar with the
terrain: how mountains rise, how the valleys open out and plains spread out, as well as with the
characteristics of rivers and swamps” (Machiavelli, 1517/1988: 52-53). Gates and Buhaug display a
similar understanding of terrain issues, writing that some of the greatest blunders made by military
commanders over the past 200 years (General Baron Levon Bennigsen at Friedland in 1807, Major
General George McClellan at Antietem in 1862, General Ludwig Benedek at Könnigratz in 1866, and
Lieutenant General Mark Clark at Rapido in 1944) were the result of ignoring the implications of
geography (Buhaug and Gates, 2002: 418). While Machiavelli was speaking in terms of conventional
warfare instead of counterinsurgency campaigns (as were Buhaug and Gates), geographical location in
relation to exploitable natural resources is clearly a major factor in insurgency viability, and difficult terrain
can slow down the progress of virtually any army (Brown, 1977; Bennett, 1991; Collier, 2000; Fairhead,
2000; Keen, 1998; Le Billon, 1997, 2001b: 564-565; Renner, 1996; Suliman, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999).
58

Not to be confused with the Serb-dominated Chetnik movement, led by Dragoljub Mihailović.
71

nature of the fighting leadership, believing that if these factors were correctly carried
out, the population would fight to the last man (Dedijer, 1951: 341-342).
Insurgent groups faced with a limited base of support from within the population
may find it necessary to scale back operations to prevent themselves from being
overwhelmed by robust government counterinsurgency measures. The fragility of the
support base for such guerilla groups as the Cellules Communistes Combattantes
(CCC) in Belgium, Action Directe (AD) in France, Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in
Germany, and Brigate Rosse (BR) in Italy restricted their efforts to implement viable
insurgencies during the 1970s and 1980s. Robust counterinsurgency efforts conducted
by the affected governments thus had popular support to hobble these organizations,
and all four terror groups had been either eliminated or disbanded by the early 1990s.
Conversely, populations who have been antagonized by ongoing government
counterinsurgency measures and neglect of their own perceived interests may provide a
fertile ground for insurgent groups to capitalize upon, enabling organizations such as
Hizb‟ullah in Southern Lebanon and Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya (HAMAS) in
Gaza and Judea/Samaria to gain a groundswell of popular support by providing vital
social services and resisting oppressive government policies. In such situations, more
intrusive government counterinsurgency operations often unwittingly serve to increase
popular support for insurgents (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006: 879-880).
C.

Strategies of Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency measures conducted against insurgencies such as these by

foreign forces enjoyed wide success prior to the advent of the Second World War. An
examination of the COW Extra-State Dataset for conflicts taking place during 1816-1945
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demonstrates that foreign intervening powers were successful in overcoming insurgent
challenges in 78 out of 91 conflicts, for a success rate of 85.71% (Sarkees, 2000: 123144).59 As a result, the major powers of the 1930s had every reason to believe that
military efforts to maintain their sway within the developing world would continue to find
success in the post-1945 period as well, and typically relied upon one of two somewhat
contradictory schools of thought – social welfare or cost-benefit – to accomplish that
goal (Shultz, 1978a: 109-110).
Social Welfare Approach
During the post-Second World War period, a great deal of enthusiasm came
about among American international relations scholars regarding the means by which
Western realist wisdom could be utilized to benefit the emerging post-colonial Third
World. The result was modernization theory, the child of the Behavioralist Revolution
and the „first wave‟ of the rational-scientific (positivist) quest of international relations
concepts which sought to apply the experiences of Western industrialized society to
developing countries beset with issues involving poverty, unemployment, and
ideological struggle. Modernization theory was driven by the twin concepts of Western
capitalist order and individualist choice, although it was more readily identified by its
condescending ethnocentrism and patronizing exasperation with native customs and
religious observances.60 Essentially a celebration of Western modernity and rationality,
the theory‟s concepts were apparently thought to be fully transportable to the diverse

59

That success rate included British victories in 19 of 20 conflicts, Dutch victories in two out of three
conflicts, and France winning all 15 of her military interventions (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).
60

Indeed, it was thought that ethnic loyalties and „primordial sentiments‟ would eventually just fade away,
replaced by a more rational identity formation based upon loyalty to the state (Berger, 2003: 431-432).
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societies of the Third World regardless of existing historical, cultural, or religious
differences, and able to fully resolve chronic problems that had beset those peoples for
centuries (George, 1994:

94-100).

Such rejuvenated societies would then form a

bulwark to contain the spread of Communism within post-Second World War Africa and
Asia, operating on a more scientifically-grounded level than was found in the populist
hysteria of the McCarthy era. Enthusiasm for the potential of modernization theory was
heightened with the 1954 establishment of the Social Science Research Council‟s
Committee on Comparative Politics, which, through the efforts of such notable founding
members as Gabriel Almond, Taylor Cole, George Kahin, Roy Macridis, Guy Pauker,
and Lucian Pye, provided a platform for promoting theoretical applications. Importantly
for the period, Pye, Pauker, and Kahin had conducted most of their research on
Southeast Asia, and, as time progressed, many academics under their mentorship went
on to take up full-time positions with various government agencies where the
imperatives of Cold War politics began to influence their work (Berger, 2003: 427, 429).
A major thrust of modernization theory was that the progress of developing
societies could be dramatically accelerated by replacing the grinding fatalism of Third
World societies with the rationality of Western values of discipline, respect for achieved
status, social mobility, and human empathy (Latham, 2006: 32-33). In this light, the
legacy of colonialism was seen in a more positive light, since “the more backward of the
races at least had the ability to imitate” (Mazrui, 1968: 76). Within the United States,
modernization theory was closely associated with the Presidential administration of
John F. Kennedy and the optimism of the early 1960s (Shultz, 1978a: 110). Social
welfare strategies, a natural offspring of modernization theory, suggested that
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insurgencies flourished in countries governed through poor leadership and underadministration, and proposed counterinsurgency policies that centered upon developing
strong, responsive, law-abiding, corruption-free governments that addressed broadlybased issues of distribution, racial, and community problems (Shafer, 1988: 62-63).
This approach assumed that pure preference was the rationale behind popular support
for insurgent movements, and determined that such a preference could be redirected
through a properly robust exercise of government authority and control (Shultz, 1978a:
110).61 As such, it conformed well with modernization theory‟s concepts of „constructive
counterinsurgency‟ that involved school and hospital construction, the extension of road
and communications networks, and such counterinsurgency tactics as security rewards
programs, border sealing, and population resettlement; the latter being an extremely
controversial measure (Campbell, 1968:

140-141, 153-154, 156, 160-161; Berger,

2003: 426; Sepp, 2005: 10-11; Celeski, 2006: 55; Clark, 2006: 8). The commonality
shared among these programs involved a concerted attempt to protect the population
from intimidation by the insurgents while offering incentives to encourage popular
support of the indigenous government established by the foreign power.
Policies reflecting the social welfare approach led the United Kingdom to victory
during its Malayan campaign of 1948-1960, and many military scholars now consider
the British to be the final authority regarding this strategy and its bid to win the „hearts
61

Social welfare strategies may possess spurious concepts, viewing, as they do, more intrusive
government as better government. First, the centralization envisioned through this approach may be
resented by village elites who have long maintained wide autonomy over their regional fiefdoms. Second,
traditional village mores may be shattered by a more invasive government employing policies of cultural
homogenization designed to construct a singular national identity. Insurgent groups promising support for
the status quo may thus find endorsement in both cases, especially when government authority is difficult
61
to project (Shafer, 1988: 64-66, 69-70).
The actual willingness and ability of governments to truly
engage the population in this manner is also questionable, since the reforms required to undercut the
insurgency may require ruling elites to relinquish their own hold on power (Shafer, 1988: 64-66, 69-70).
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and minds‟ of an occupied people (Pye, 1956: 102-103). Given the success of social
welfare polices in Malaya, the same strategy subsequently typified the initial American
campaign in South Vietnam during the Kennedy Administration and throughout the
remainder of President Lyndon Johnson‟s first term in 1964 (Shultz, 1978A: 110). On
the face of it, the social welfare strategy should have been a good choice for those
campaigns since both British and American occupiers appeared to be confronting
Máoist-style guerillas claiming to represent oppressed populations, and popularlysupported indigenous governments such as the one which took power in Malaya during
1957 possess limited vulnerabilities for exploitation by Máoist ideologues (MacGillivray,
1958: 161; Biddle, 2006: 5-8). American efforts to construct a similar regime in South
Vietnam faltered, however, as political unrest following the assassination of South
Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm made it difficult to establish a viable replacement
government there that was not viewed by the nationalist Vietnamese as a neo-colonial
puppet (Hoopes, 1970: 606; Shultz, 1978a: 110).
Cost-Benefit Approach
During the French campaign in Algeria (1954-1962), French General André
Beaufre sought to prove that the achievement of psychological and moral disintegration
of one‟s adversary would lead to victory, since all warfare represented a clash of two
opposing wills (Beaufre, 1965: 22-24). Formulating tactics based upon these concepts,
he successfully defeated FLN guerillas in the Constantine East area by combining
ruthless military activities with intensive psychological warfare (Horne, 1979:

166).

Charles Wolf of the RAND Corporation was intrigued by these concepts and, in the
wake of Diệm‟s assassination, followed up on Beaufre‟s ideas by introducing elements
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of economics and game theory (subsequently known as „rational choice theory‟) into the
social welfare theoretical base to allow more flexibility in confronting insurgencies
(Berger, 2003:

426). These concepts, shifting from earlier notions of „constructive

counterinsurgency‟ to ideas of „coercive counterinsurgency,‟ were subsequently
developed by Wolf, in concert with his colleague, Nathan Leites, into the suppressive, or
cost-benefit, approach that focused entirely upon the demand side of the issue: the
receptivity of the environment for insurgency. In so doing, the two men argued that
social welfare counterinsurgents were ignoring the value of firm applications of military
force and coercion in counterinsurgency operations, and described confrontations
between governments and insurgencies as being little more than contests in the
effective management of coercion; contests that governments, possessing more robust
capacities in resource management and population control, would be likely to win
(Leites and Wolf, 1966: 19, 155-156, 158, 228; Shafer, 1988: 71, 73).62
This approach operates on several assumptions: (1) that coercion and force can
be used to control and/or modify collective social behavior, (2) that the population,
individually and collectively, behaves as rational actors, calculating costs and benefits,
(3) that insurgents rely upon coercion and force to effect societal compliance, and (4)
62

Scholars hold differing positions regarding the impact of official coercion against opposition
movements. Buss argues that high levels of coercion can indeed inhibit aggression in individuals, and
that the robust usage of coercion may successfully crush anti-regime activities in their infancy (Buss,
1961: 57-59). Muller and Seligson further contend that the initial spike in popular violence in response to
the onset of government coercion is unlikely to become regime-threatening, and that long-term rebellion
will be more difficult to organize (Muller and Seligson, 1987: 444-445). Although Blanton, Mason, and
Athow tend to agree with that assessment, they add that coercive strategies may lead to more militant
opposition in the future (Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001: 485), and Galtung suggests that coercive
sanctions often increase rather than decrease group resistance (Galtung, 1967: 378-416). Gurr notes
that “force threatens and angers men, especially if they believe it to be illicit” and that “angered, they want
to retaliate” (Gurr, 1970: 232), and Ekstein writes that, for societies with a potential for political violence,
official coercion may intensify the very instability it seeks to dissuade (Ekstein, 1970).
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that counterinsurgency strategy will be successful only if government coercion is more
painful than that applied by the insurgency (Shultz, 1978a: 110, 122). 63 Proponents of
this approach (e.g., Pauker 1959; Huntington 1968) tend to define insurgencies in terms
of inputs and outputs, with insurgent inputs of recruits, supplies, and intelligence
information converted into the outputs of population conversion and attacks against both
occupation forces and collaborators. To counter this cycle, the government must (a)
raise the costs to the insurgency of obtaining those inputs and/or reduce the inputs
gained for a specific cost, with the ultimate goal being input denial, (b) reduce the
efficiency of the insurgency‟s production process by which it converts inputs to outputs,
(c) reduce the effect of those outputs on both the population and the government,
and/or increase the ability of both entities to absorb those outputs (Shultz, 1978a: 110111).64 Not surprisingly, counterinsurgency tactics related to the cost-benefit approach
include „Search and Destroy,‟ population resettlement, attacks on insurgent sanctuaries
63

Cost-benefit strategies may suffer from basic analytical flaws. Scott finds an integral subjective bias
through the assumption of Western-style rationality and goal-seeking on the part of affected populations
(Scott, 1958: 9-10, 13), and Shultz argues inherent ethnocentrist elements fail to take into account
emotional factors unique to non-Western societies (Shultz, 1978a: 114-115). Shafer questions the
assumption of insurgents being foreign-inspired and dependent upon coercion for popular support, since
that appears to be contrary to the writings of such insurgency theorists as Máo, Giáp, Che Guevara, and
Régis Debray (Shultz, 1978a: 76; Shafer, 1988: 73). In addition, the implied assumption of the
legitimacy of established governments, the illegitimacy of rebellion, and the passive, apolitical nature of
the peasantry do not appear to reflect the long-term stamina of insurgencies in Algeria, Vietnam, Western
Sahara, or East Timor (Leites and Wolf, 1966: 233; Talbott, 1980: 246-247; Karnow, 1983: 29, 36, 685;
Shafer, 1988: 73; Sala, 1997: 453; Mohsen-Finan, 2002: 5-6; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18).
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These strategies may not be viable when applied to existing insurgencies, however. Research
conducted by Johnson and Armstrong regarding insurgencies across Europe, China, and Russia found
that foreign occupations which relied heavily upon coercion frequently stimulated popular resistance
movements (Johnson, 1962b; Armstrong, 1964a, 1964b); findings supported by Thompson‟s studies in
Malaya and Vietnam (Thompson, 1966). Lynn argues that qualitative violence used by government
forces against guerillas operating within civilian populations often engenders heightened insurgencies
(Lynn, 2005: 23-24, 27), and Kilcullen blames burgeoning insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq to the
injudicious use of firepower by American forces (Kilcullen, 2006: 103); Marighela adds that government
coercive retaliation for guerilla attacks invariably heightens popular support for insurgency (Crenshaw,
1981: 387).
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in neighboring countries, and focused terminations of insurgent infrastructure. 65 The
commonalities shared among these programs involve a concerted attempt to frighten
affected populations from supporting or even associating with suspected guerillas, and
these basic concepts and assumptions have since formed the basis for significant work
on civil war occurrence and termination by scholars such as Azam, Collier, Doyal, Fett,
Hirshleifer, Hoeffler, Mason, and Sambanis (Shultz, 1978a: 110-111; Valentino, Huth,
and Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 385-386).
As is the case with the social welfare approach, certain types of insurgencies
may respond better than others to coercive campaigns. Given the entrenched identity
groups produced by primordial nationalism, the foreign powers listed on the post-1945
portion of the COW Extra-State Dataset which utilized coercion to counter intensely
nationalist insurgencies may have acted rationally, since „hearts and minds‟ strategies
would have been unlikely to convince such xenophobia groupings to moderate their
antagonism to foreign intrusion (Biddle, 2006:

5-8).

The cost-benefit approach as

employed by the Soviets (and, later, the Americans) in Afghanistan and the Americans
in Iraq would also appear to have been logical strategies, since it was unlikely that
either indigenous population would ever welcome a long-term presence from foreign
occupiers, no matter how gentle that occupation. In the case of the Soviets, however,
that strategy only postponed the inevitable, since the besieged Afghan government of
65

Population resettlement is a case in point, as its use with the cost-benefit strategy carries implications
of punishment, rather than opportunity, for affected populations. The tactic has often unwittingly served to
further alienate the peasantry from the government, as was the case in British Kenya, French Algeria,
Portuguese Africa, the American involvement in Vietnam, and Ian Smith‟s government in the Rhodesian
statelet (Fall, 1963: 378; Bender, 1972: 336-349, 356; Tho, 1977: 14; Preston, 2004: 72-75, 77; Elkins,
2005a: B9-B10; 2005b; Latham, 2006: 35, 37). For that reason, South Vietnamese Colonel Phạm Ngọc
Thảo, overseer of the Strategic Hamlet Program and a covert North Vietnamese intelligence officer,
strongly promoted the program because he believed it would undermine the position of the Saigon regime
in the rural areas of the country (Berman, 2007: 148-149).
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Dr. Najib‟ullah Ahmadzai collapsed within a few years of Soviet withdrawal (The World
Factbook, 2007: 4); an outcome that may eventually be repeated in both Afghanistan
and Iraq following the termination of the American military commitment.
D.

General Failure of Foreign Counterinsurgency Measures Since 1945
Despite the counterinsurgency strategy employed by foreign powers since 1945,

the common factor has been failure regardless of the resources deployed against the
insurgencies or the length of time committed to the campaigns. This is graphically
illustrated by the COW Extra-State Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 which finds
foreign powers losing 12 of the 17 conflicts engaged in for a success rate of only
29.41%; a staggering drop of 56.30 percentage points in their war-winning capabilities
over the previous period.

Hechter writes that the perception of state weakness

increases the chance that nationalist groups will engage in violence to exploit the state‟s
vulnerabilities, and the weakened Europe that emerged from the Second World War
period was clearly open to challenge in the colonial sphere (Hechter, 1995: 64). In
Southeast Asia, European control was shaken by Japanese defeat of the colonial
powers resident there, and Japanese initiatives to grant measures of independence to
Vietnam and Indonesia placed returning French and Dutch colonial forces in the
unenviable position of attempting to overthrow popularly-supported indigenous
administrations (Fryer and Jackson, 1977: 64, 66; Tonnesson, 1985: 10-12). In North
Africa and the Middle East, the 1947-1948 creation of the State of Israel provided a
focus for a general, unifying Arab movement against foreign control that was driven by
the populist nationalism of Egyptian President Gamāl „Abd an-Nāṣir (Adams, 1988:
561-562, 564-566).

In sub-Saharan Africa, indigenous African nationalism became
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defined as a modern-day political movement at the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945
when it moved from simply extolling the greatness of the ancient civilizations of Egypt
and Ethiopia to issuing specific demands for decolonization and indigenous selfgovernment (Mazrui, 1982: 26; Mboukou, 1983, 280-281).
Meanwhile, the United Nations was collectively and the Soviet Union and the
United States were individually able to bring tremendous diplomatic and military power
to bear against foreign counterinsurgency campaigns with which they disagreed.
Revised concepts of international law espoused by the newly-formed United Nations
(previously mentioned in Chapter One) no longer recognized the legitimacy of nonindigenous rule in the post-1945 developing world, and increasingly viewed foreign
counterinsurgency measures as efforts by advanced countries to brutally crush the
nationalist goals of native peoples.

These efforts were further complicated by the

emerging bi-polar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in which
both super-powers were selectively supporting both nationalist insurgencies and state
actors fighting those insurgencies with the goal of supplanting the authority of the former
colonial powers with spheres of influence of their own (Miller, 1970; Kramer, Helmut and
Bauer, Helfried, 1972). By 1960, most of the remaining colonial dependencies resided
in Africa, where Belgium, France, Portugal, white-ruled South Africa, Spain, and the
United Kingdom continued to maintain control of large swaths of territory. British Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan‟s „Winds of Change‟ speech of February 1960 sounded the
death knell for most of the remaining pockets of European colonial control in Africa
(Myers, 2000: 556-563-564), however, and by the time of Ian Smith‟s 1965 Unilateral
Declaration of Independence for Southern Rhodesia, British and French colonial
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withdrawal had allowed for the formation of an unyielding spirit of African nationalist
pressure against remaining white minority-rule intransigence, not only within Rhodesia,
but in the Portuguese territories and the Republic of South Africa itself. This pressure
from a wide grouping of newly-independent African states ensured that sanctions
remained in effect against Rhodesia, the activities of indigenous insurgencies in
Rhodesia and throughout Portuguese Africa were strengthened, and the trend of
diplomatic sanctions against apartheid South Africa was heightened; a combination that
eventually spelled the end of white minority rule in throughout the continent (Mazrui,
1982: 28).
As foreign counterinsurgency campaigns conducted in the Third World during
this period were coming under increasing international pressure, both the social welfare
and the cost-benefit approaches were found to possess serious limitations in reducing
insurgencies.

Social welfare strategies were subject to inconsistencies and

contradictions; succeeding when employed by the United Kingdom against the Malayan
Races Liberation Army in Malaya (Pye, 1956), floundering when used by American
troops against the Việt Cộng in pre-1965 South Vietnam (Hoopes, 1970: 606; Shultz,
1978a: 110), and failing to prevent continuing unrest when attempted by Moroccan
authorities in Western Sahara after 1991 (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18). Coercive
strategies associated with the cost-benefit approach which had previously achieved
broad success throughout Asia and Africa (Montagne, 1947: 42; Gordge, 1949: 133136; Crawford, 2003:

18) also began to exhibit inconsistencies across the board;

succeeding when employed by the French in Madagascar against the Movement
Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM) (Tronchon, 1986; Cole and
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Middleton, 2001: 10), the Chinese against the Chushi Gangdrug in Tibet (Chen, 2006:
54, 61-62, 71, 77-80; Goldstein, 2006: 150; McGranahan, 2006: 109-111, 113-118,
121, 124, 127-128), and the British against the Mau Mau in Kenya (Elkins, 2000: 29),
and resulting in failure when utilized by the French against the Việt Minh in Indochina
(Katzenbach, 1952: 211), Habib Bourguiba‟s Neo-Destour Party in Tunisia (Hunson,
1977: 223, 380), the Armée de Libération Nationale in Morocco (Halstead, 1969: 97),
the FLN in Algeria (Talbott, 1980:

72-73), and the L'Union des populations du

Cameroun in Cameroun (Howe, 1966: 255-260), and by the Portuguese against the
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), the Movimento Popular de Libertação
de Angola (MPLA), the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)
in Angola, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde in GuineaBissau (PAIGC), and FRELIMO in Mozambique (Chabal, 1981: 83; Marcum, 1978:
177).66
Given that a common link among four of the five successful counterinsurgency
programs listed in the COW Extra-State Dataset was the lack of either United Nations or
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Neither has early success with the cost-benefit strategy always led to long-term pacification. Although
the United States used the strategy with some success against the Việt Cộng in South Vietnam during the
late 1960s (with programs such as the Phoenix program of focused terminations and attacks against
insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring countries (Hoopes, 1970: 606; Andrade and Willbanks, 2006: 1821)), American efforts to disengage from the unending conflict led to the signing of a controversial
agreement with the North Vietnamese government during 1973 which legitimated the political presence of
the Việt Cộng in South Vietnam and set the stage for the collapse of the South Vietnamese statelet less
than 15 months later (Karnow, 1983: 29, 36, 685; Tonnesson, 1985: 27). After seizing East Timor in
1975, the Indonesian government‟s use of the cost-benefit strategy over a period of several years allowed
it to decimate the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil) insurgency there by
the early 1980s (Liddle, 1992: 66). Continuing nationalist unrest throughout the 1980s and 1990s
eventually led the war-weary Indonesian government to withdraw from the territory, however, and
recognize a Falintil government there in 2002 (Sala, 1997: 453; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 23, 28;
Philpott, 2007: 14). In Western Sahara, Moroccan cost-benefit measures conducted over a period of 16
years eventually brought POLISARIO insurgents to negotiations during 1991, but have been unable to
quell unrest and repressed nationalism in the territory to this day (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6, 9-18).
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great power opposition, I argue that partial explanation for the decline in performance by
foreign counterinsurgency forces may be found the altered nature of the post-1945 bipolar balance of power that encouraged insurgency and condemned foreign control of
indigenous territories within the developing world (Gordge, 1949: 133, 136-138; Talbot,
1949: 323-324; Komer, 1972: 6; Campbell, 1968: 140-141, 153-154, 156, 160-161;
United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-2008).67 I also
argue that the choice of counterinsurgency strategies has been essentially insignificant
to the outcomes of the conflicts.

I will qualitatively investigate these arguments by

evaluating a series of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns contained with the COW
Extra-State Data set to determine if unsuccessful campaigns have been the focus of
significant United Nations and/or great power pressure; pressure that either implicitly or
explicitly granted heightened legitimacy to nationalist insurgent forces. Drawn from the
discussion above, three hypotheses are defined and subsequently will be empirically
evaluated in the remaining chapters (see Appendix VII).
Hypothesis #1: The higher the level of United Nations condemnation of foreign
counterinsurgency measures, the less successful will be those measures. Cases will be
chosen on the basis of the combined number of General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions pertaining to the insurgency, and success or failure will be judged on the
basis of COW Extra-State Dataset determinations.
Those four counterinsurgency campaigns include the United Kingdom‟s campaign against the Malayan
Races Liberation Army in Malaya (1948-1957), India‟s campaign against the Razakars in Hyderabad
(1948), France‟s campaign against the MDRM in Madagascar (1947-1948), and the PRC‟s campaign
against indigenous forces in Tibet (1950-1951).
While the Chinese government subsequently
encountered international opposition to its 1959-1974 operations against Chushi Gangdrug insurgents in
the region, the nature of that opposition was too weak and unfocused to seriously question Chinese
control of the territory (Kramer, 2006: 6-7, 10-11, 13; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
#1353, #1723, and #2079).
67
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Hypothesis #2: The higher the level of great power recognition and support of
the legitimacy of an insurgency, the less successful will be foreign counterinsurgency
measures. International recognition will be determined through primary and secondary
sources of insurgency recognition, and success or failure will be judged on the basis of
COW Extra-State Dataset determinations.
Hypothesis #3:

The employment of either the Social Welfare or the Cost-

Benefit approach to counterinsurgency operations will not be significant in determining
success in such operations. The nature of the strategy utilized will be determined on
the basis of primary and secondary sources detailing counterinsurgency practices, and
success or failure will be judged on the basis of COW Extra-State Dataset
determinations.
E.

Methodology for Hypotheses Testing
To empirically evaluate these hypotheses, I have selected four case studies out

of the 17 insurgencies contained within the COW Extra-State Dataset through a Most
Different Systems design/Method of Agreement (Mill, 1888, pp. 278-283),68 choosing
the two cases with the highest amount of United Nations resolutions, a case with the
medium amount of United Nations resolutions, and one of the four cases with no United
Nations involvement at all. These cases will then be studied in an effort to determine
the actual impact of United Nations pressure and great power opposition against each
68

The Most Different Systems design assumes that the phenomenon being explained resides at a subsystemic level, and attempts to deter whether relationships among variables hold up across varied
locations. Unlike the Most Similar Systems design which may identify several possible causes but can
eliminate none, the basic logic of the Most Different Systems design is falsification; seeking to eliminate
possible causes for observed phenomena rather than finding positive relationships (Popper, 1959). In
addition, while the Most Similar Systems design often focuses upon states as a unit of analysis, the Most
Different Systems design tends to focus upon relationships among variables that exist across a range of
very different states (Peters, 1998: 36-41).
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of the foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Finally, an evaluation will be conducted to
determine the actual nature of the counterinsurgency strategy utilized by each
intervening power, and whether any pattern can be determined among them.
F.

Summary
Although differences are apparent among many of the better-known insurgency

theorists of the 20th century regarding the relative importance of terrain, political
philosophy, and insurgency structure upon insurgent success (Allen, 1943: 19; Dedijer,
1951: 341-342; MacDonald, 1993: 82-83, 99-100), broad support exists within the
academic literature for the necessity of gaining the support, or at least the
acquiescence, of the affected population in order to defeat foreign occupation and/or
control (Lawrence, 1935: 153-154; Garnett, ed., 1951: 99; Sykes, 1959: 324; Johnson,
1962a: 649; Suyin, 1972: 394-395; Mack, 1975: 177; Desai and Eckstein, 1990: 443,
461). Gaining consensus regarding counterinsurgency strategies is somewhat more
complex, since both the social welfare and the cost-benefit approaches have their
proponents and have encountered success and failure during the past sixty years
(Leites and Wolf, 1966: 19, 155-156, 158, 228; Shultz, 1978a: 109-110; Shafer, 1988:
73).

Regardless of the strategy employed, the lessons of post-Second World War

independence movements in the developing world were bitterly learned by foreign
powers attempting to quell indigenous insurgencies in the region, however, with
victories credited to insurgent movements rising from 14.29% in the pre-1945 period to
70.59% in the post-war era (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).
I argue that partial explanation for this steep decline in counterinsurgency
performance can be found in the altered international world order that came into place
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following the Second World War, with the former multi-polar balance of power replaced
by a bi-polar arrangement which competed for dominance in the developing world; a
situation further complicated by the newly-formed international body of the United
Nations seeking to determine political legitimacy in international affairs (Miller, 1970;
Kramer, Helmut and Bauer, Helfried, 1972).

I further argue that the choice of

counterinsurgency strategies is basically insignificant regarding conflict outcomes.

I

have prepared three hypotheses to evaluate these arguments. In Chapter III, I briefly
evaluate the 17 foreign counterinsurgency campaigns carried out during the post-war
era, followed by in-depth evaluations conducted in Chapter IV of four of these
campaigns

chosen

to

represent

a

counterinsurgency approaches.

87

variety

of

international

pressure

and

CHAPTER III: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ACROSS 17 INSURGENCIES
A.

Introduction
Empirical evidence contained within the COW Extra-State Dataset demonstrates

that rebellions conducted against foreign occupation were significantly more likely to
succeed during the post-1945 era than they were at any other period within the dataset,
regardless of the counterinsurgency strategy employed (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144). I
argue that opposition to those counterinsurgency efforts both from great powers seeking
political advantage and from an activist United Nations rejuvenated by the membership
of former colonial states provides explanation to this phenomenon, since that
combination of international pressure reduced the maneuvering room of foreign powers,
motivated insurgent movements, and rendered foreign control of the developing world
untenable (Appendices II and III, Miller, 1970; Kramer, Helmut and Bauer, Helfried,
1972; Hechter, 1995:

64).

I further argue that these foreign counterinsurgency

campaigns tended to fail regardless of the strategy employed (Appendix IV).
In this chapter, I examine concepts that are common across these varied
campaigns in an effort to isolate variables which led to success or failure (Peters, 1998:
36-41). I then seek to determine the extent to which those concepts provide support to
my three hypotheses. Finally, I prepare for in-depth case analyses in Chapter IV.
B.

Operationalization of Concepts
For the purposes of this dissertation, the independent variable of United Nations

opposition (Hypothesis #1) has been operationalized through data contained in
websites affiliated with the United Nations Documentation Centre, New York, New York
which provide a record of all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions issued
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since 1946. By entering the name of a given territory as a search term, the resolutions
involving that territory are revealed, and the number of those resolutions are then added
together to yield a quantitative measure of United Nations concern.69 The independent
variable of great power opposition (Hypothesis #2) has been operationalized by
verbiage found in the academic literature detailing insurgent recognition and support by
countries and regional power-blocs. This variable can be operationalized through state
condemnations of foreign counterinsurgency measures, official recognition of insurgent
movements, and/or evidence of military support to guerilla organizations. 70

The

independent variable of counterinsurgency strategy (Hypothesis #3) has been more
difficult to operationalize since a certain amount of ambiguity often exists when defining
strategies and few governments are willing to admit they conduct coercive campaigns.
As a result, I have used sources within the academic literature to gain insight, wherever
possible, into the type of strategies employed in these campaigns. When such sourcing
was not available, I evaluated information relating to the exact nature of military
operations, with heightened levels of physical destruction and civilian casualties
69

While the tone of these resolutions varied from expressions of concern to outright condemnation, they
all indicated United Nations interest and implicitly questioned the legitimacy of the occupying power. It is
instructive to note that, during the course of my evaluation, I found no United Nations resolutions that
supported the maintenance of the status quo regarding the occupying powers in these territories or
granted support to the continuance of that occupation.
70

In some cases, the exact point of condemnation or recognition is very clear. During the course of a
conference on North African Affairs held in Cairo during February 15-24, 1947, the newly-formed Jāmi „at
ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya issued a declaration calling for the abolition of the French protectorates in Morocco
and Tunisia and the independence of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; a stunning denouncement of French
authority and legitimacy in North Africa that quickly reverberated throughout the region (Cowan, 1951:
350-351, 363). On January 18, 1950, the government of the newly-formed PRC formally recognized Hồ
Chí Minh‟s administration as the legitimate authority in Vietnam; the Soviet Union followed suit twelve
days later on January 30, 1950 (Tonnesson, 1985: 18). Significant military support subsequently
provided to the Việt Minh by the Chinese government allowed the insurgent movement to take control of
the Chinese frontier by October of that year (capturing roughly six thousand French troops in the
process), and destroy any remaining French pretentions for achieving victory in the conflict (Karnow,
1983: 184-185).
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employed being indicative of the cost-benefit approach.71 Further insight was available
in reports of high civilian casualty rates, and in determinations of just war.72 Cases in
which the strategy was not clearly defined are listed as Strategy Unclear, while cases in
which both approaches were utilized are listed as Mixture of Both (Appendix IV). The
dependent variable of victory or defeat for foreign counterinsurgency forces has, for all
three hypotheses, been operationalized through data contained within the COW ExtraState Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).73
C.

General Indications Regarding Insurgency Evaluations
United Nations opposition to foreign counterinsurgency campaigns appears to

dramatically embolden guerilla movements and destabilize foreign military occupation

71

Few scholars would dispute the overall social welfare nature of the 1948-1960 British campaign in
Malaya (Pye, 1956: 102-103), and the American campaign in South Vietnam through 1964 is often
described in the academic literature as similarly following the social welfare model (Latham, 2000: 14-15,
58-59, 68). In contrast, France‟s 1947-1948 campaign in Madagascar has been described by Cole and
Middleton as representing one of the bloodiest episodes of state repression in African colonial history,
and would clearly represent a cost-benefit approach to counterinsurgency (Cole and Middleton, 2001:
10). Lieutenant General Thomas Metz also appeared to deny employing a social welfare approach in
Iraq during late July 2004 when he stated that he didn‟t use the concept of winning hearts and minds to
represent “one of the metrics of success” in that campaign (Christenson, 2004: 1; Krepinevich, 2005:
101). Operation „Phantom Fury,‟ conducted by American troops against insurgents in Fallujah during
November of that year, resulted in 18,000 of the city‟s 39,000 buildings being damaged or destroyed and
over 1,000 civilians killed (Kahl, 2007: 30-31), a scale of destruction further suggestive of a coercive
cost-benefit campaign (Hills, 2006: 623-639).
72

An estimated 87,000 Tibetans died during the course of Chinese counterinsurgency operations
conducted during the 18 month period following the Tibetan uprising of March 1959. Given that the total
strength of the Chushi Gangdrug insurgency had approximated only 5,000 guerillas during June 1958,
this casualty listing appears to include a high percentage of civilians and is indicative of a cost-benefit
campaign (McGranahan, 2006:
109-111, 113-114, 119-120).
Excessive firepower was also
characteristic of American/South Vietnamese counterinsurgency operations of the 1960s to the point that
O‟Brien, an authority on the conduct of just war, writes that “the principles of proportion and discrimination
were violated sufficiently by the abuse of firepower so as to leave a record of violations of the basic
principles of the jus in bello on a very large number of occasions”; a clear indication of a coercive costbenefit approach (O‟Brien, William, 1981: 101).
73

This dataset provides a listing of indices for the 17 extra-state conflicts which occurred during that
period for which at least one thousand deaths occurred during a calendar year. In section Q of the
dataset, the number one is listed for an insurgent victory, while the number two reflects a victory for the
foreign power (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).
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and political control. Of the 17 cases listed within the COW Extra-State Dataset for the
period of 1945-1997, twelve engendered United Nations pressure in the form of
accusatory or condemnatory resolutions issued by either the General Assembly or the
Security Council (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 19462008). Of those twelve cases, only the Indonesian campaign in East Timor is listed in
the COW dataset as a victory for the occupying power, demonstrating that United
Nations opposition coincides with the defeat of foreign counterinsurgency operations
over 91% of the time (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).74 At the same time, four of the five
remaining cases which encountered no United Nations pressure at all resulted in
victories for the occupying powers, for a success rate of 80% (Appendix II). Evaluated
through a correlation coefficient, these combined results yield a 72% negative

74

The claim by the COW Extra-State Dataset of an Indonesian victory in East Timor as of 1977 is
questionable. From the time of the Indonesian invasion of 1975 through the late 1970s, Forças Armadas
da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil) was judged by Salla to be in control of most of the
territory‟s interior and held the loyalties of the majority of its population (Salla, 1997: 453). Liddle writes
that only by the early 1980s had Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia‟s cost-benefit measures
successfully eliminated Falintil as a serious threat to the integrity of the Indonesian state (Liddle, 1992:
66), and Philpott reminds us that residual Falintil opposition continued until the occupation ended in 2002
with the Indonesian withdrawal of its sovereignty from the territory (Philpott, 2007: 1, 4, 8). Since the
Indonesian government no longer maintains any pretentions of sovereignty in East Timor, I would now
judge this campaign to represent a defeat for Indonesia. Having said that, the dataset also lists the
questionable claims of a British defeat in Kenya as of 1956 and a Moroccan defeat in Western Sahara as
of 1983. In fact, the United Kingdom had essentially defeated the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya by 1956
with the capture of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, and continued to maintain sovereignty within the
territory through 1963 when independence was conferred upon an indigenous administration which was
decidedly anti-Mau Mau (Nissimi, 2006: 8, 9; Anderson, 2005: 3). Since the Mau Mau themselves were
unable to seize power from the British colonial government, I would judge this campaign to represent a
qualified victory for the United Kingdom. The situation in Western Sahara is far more clear. While
POLISARIO had indeed placed Moroccan forces into a virtual state of siege by the late 1970s,
subsequent United States and French military support of the Moroccan position (coupled with a fading of
United Nations interest) allowed L'Armée royale du Maroc to stabilize its position by the early 1980s, and
force POLISARIO to accept a ceasefire by 1991 that has allowed the Moroccan government to maintain
de-facto sovereignty over the territory ever since (Campbell, 2003: 47-48; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6;
United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1975-2008). Since the Moroccan
government continues to exercise sovereignty in Western Sahara, I would judge this campaign to
represent a clear victory for Morocco. Even so, I accede to the results offered by the COW dataset in all
three cases for reasons of consistency.
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correlation between the application of United Nations pressure and occupation power
victory, and provide significant empirical support for Hypothesis #1 (Appendix VIII).
Such international pressure appears to have been an important factor in the
diplomatic isolation of the Netherlands‟ counterinsurgency efforts in the Netherlands
East Indies (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1947-1949), Portuguese
campaigns in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique (United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, 1961-1972; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 19611974; Chabal, 1981: 99), and South African military operations in Namibia (United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1947-1990; United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, 1968-1989; Albright, 1994: 42; O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111); it also prompted
early French withdrawal from the Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates (Soustelle,
1956: 119-120; Gershovich, 2004: 143), and served to hamper French moves to retain
the all-important territory of Algeria (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions,
1952-1961).

While Moroccan authorities were eventually able to mitigate United

Nations pressure over the status of Western Sahara by effectively dividing the African
and Arab elements of the United Nations General Assembly into adversarial camps
(United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1976-1987), the apparent indifference of
the United Nations to counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the Chinese in Tibet,
the French in Cameroun, Indochina, and Madagascar, the British in Kenya and Malaya,
and the Indonesians in East Timor (after 1982) allowed those governments to conduct
extensive campaigns without significant international oversight (United Nations General
Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-1971).
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The impact of United Nations pressure as an independent variable can be clearly
seen in two of these cases in particular: the Indonesian campaign in East Timor, and
the Moroccan campaign in Western Sahara. Indonesia‟s 1975 invasion of Portuguese
East Timor and its campaign against Falintil were countered by two Security Council
resolutions issued during 1975-1976 and eight General Assembly resolutions issued
during 1975-1982 calling for full Indonesian military withdrawal (United Nations Security
Council Resolutions #384 and #389, 1975-1976; United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions #3485, #31/53, #32/34, #33/39, #34/40, #35/27, #36/50, and #37/30, 19751982). While Falintil‟s fortunes soared through the late 1970s under this strong United
Nations support (Salla, 1997: 453), the subsequent fading of United Nations pressure
allowed the Indonesian government to conduct an unfettered coercive campaign that
virtually annihilated the insurgent group by the early 1980s (Philpott, 2007:

6, 10;

Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 23, 28). Strong United Nations opposition also initially
battered Morocco‟s 1976 invasion of the former Spanish Sahara with three pre-emptive
Security Council resolutions issued during 1975 and seven General Assembly
resolutions issued during 1975-1980 calling for Moroccan withdrawal and eventually
supporting the POLISARIO insurgents (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
#3458, #31/32, #31/45, #32/22, #33/31 #34/37 and #35/19, 1975-1980; United Nations
Security Council Resolutions #377, #379, and #380, 1975). With such robust support,
POLISARIO was invigorated to place Moroccan garrisons in the territory into a virtual
state of siege by the late 1970s (Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 284-285; Zunes, 1995: 3135), only to be thrown onto the defensive during the 1980s as United Nations interest
waned (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6; Campbell, 2003: 47-48). By 1991, POLISARIO
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was forced to accept a ceasefire – ironically enough, under United Nations auspices that granted Morocco de-facto sovereignty over the territory (United Nations Security
Council Resolutions #658 and #690, 1990-1991; Campbell, 2003: 47-48).
Great power opposition to foreign counterinsurgency operations has had an
impact similar to that of United Nations pressure, serving to undermine foreign control of
territories within the developing world by granting political and military support to
indigenous independence movements.

Of the 17 cases under evaluation, nine

provoked opposition from great powers or from region power-blocs, and all nine are
listed in the dataset as defeats for the occupying powers; a 100% rate of failure. Five of
the remaining eight cases which attracted no such opposition are listed within the
dataset as victories for the occupying powers, for a success rate of 62.5% (Appendix
III). While these results are not as robust as those regarding United Nations opposition,
they still provide empirical support for Hypothesis #2.
The impact of opposition to foreign counterinsurgency operations by great
powers and regional power-blocs has resonated throughout the developing world for
well over sixty years. Condemnations of French authority in Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia by Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya and Egyptian President Gamāl „Abd an-Nāṣir
during the post-Second World War era encouraged native rebellions and led to over a
decade of no-holds-barred conflict that shattered the façade of French legitimacy in the
region. As French authority waned, an indigenous Arab nationalism arose that had no
place for French colonial control (and rejected the direct French citizenship granted
Algerian natives), and which eventually defeated the political resolve to maintain French
sovereignty across North Africa (Behr, 1958: 280; Soustelle, 1956: 123-124; Hudson,
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1977: 354-355; Talbott, 1980: 72-73). Subsequent Soviet military support delivered to
indigenous guerillas in Portuguese Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s heightened
de-facto insurgent control of Portuguese colonial territory, while Soviet surface-to-air
missiles decisively reduced the ability of the Forca Aerea Portuguesa (Portuguese Air
Force) to provide close support to counterinsurgency operations, especially in GuineaBissau (Chabal, 1981:

75, 80-83, 91, 95-97).75

The crumbling military situation

eventually led a grouping of disillusioned Portuguese military officers under the aegis of
Movimento das Forças Armadas to launch a coup d‟etat against the repressive
Portuguese government that resulted in Portuguese colonial withdrawal from Africa.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets moved against South African control of
Namibia by delivering military support to indigenous insurgents and landing Cuban
ground combat troops to provide leadership and direction to them. These activities
placed South African forces on the defensive throughout the region and eventually dealt
a decisive defeat to South African forces in the territory during May 1988, forcing the
South African government to abruptly provide terms for Namibian independence that
soon rebounded politically within South Africa itself (O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). United
States support of the Chushi Gangdrug insurgency in mid-1950s Tibet engendered a
different outcome, however.

While American resources might have, at the time,

seemed to portend an end to Chinese control of the territory, the limited, covert nature
of that support provided no real legitimacy for the insurgency, and served as little more
than a distraction for Chinese military forces. The termination of that limited amount of
75

Not surprisingly, uncontested PAIGC control of extensive swaths of territory in Guinea-Bissau led the
insurgent group to declare independence for the territory on September 24, 1973. While the Portuguese
government deliberately ignored that proclamation for nearly a year, it still represented a devastating blow
to Portuguese national prestige (Mendy, 2003: 57; The World Factbook, 2007: 245).
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American support following the establishment of heightened Sino-American relations in
1971 left the Chushi Gangdrug in an politically and militarily untenable situation that led
to the collapse of the insurgency three years later (Goldstein, 2006: 150; Kramer, 2006:
6-7, 10-11, 13).
This great power opposition can similarly be tracked as an independent variable
with the French campaign in Indochina and the Moroccan campaign in Western Sahara.
After French forces returned to Indochina in September 1945, they fought an uphill
battle against Hồ Chí Minh‟s Việt Minh guerillas with varying degrees of success for
nearly five years in an attempt to consolidate French authority over the region. After the
Soviet Union and the PRC granted recognition to Hồ‟s administration during January
1950, however, 60,000 resupplied and highly-motivated Việt Minh troops quickly went
on the offensive, and within nine months had taken Dongkhe, Caobang, Langsom,
Laokay, and Thai Nguyen, seized control of the Chinese frontier, and essentially
terminated any chance for a French victory in the theatre (Katzenbach, 1952: 190;
Karnow, 1983: 184-185; Tonnesson, 1985: 11-12, 18). Following Morocco‟s 1975
invasion of the former Spanish Sahara, the regional power-blocs of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offered direct support to
POLISARIO insurgents even as they condemned the Moroccan occupation.
POLISARIO fortunes rose with such strong regional backing, only to slump as the
Moroccan government subsequently used the country‟s unique position as both an Arab
and an African state to successfully counter OAU and NAM denunciations with support
for its territorial claims from Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya and the Islamic Conference
(Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 284-285; Zunes, 1995: 23, 31-35).
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Both the social welfare and the cost-benefit approaches to counterinsurgency
were employed by foreign governments seeking to destroy insurgencies within the
developing world during the post-Second World War period. My final determinations of
the 17 cases under evaluation found seven aligned most closely with the cost-benefit
approach, six involving a mixture of the two, two indeterminate, and two reflecting the
social welfare approach (Appendix IV). Of the seven campaigns utilizing cost-benefit
strategies, three were successful, for a success rate of 48.8%. Both of the campaigns
utilizing social welfare strategies achieved success, for a success rate of 100%. The
remaining six campaigns that utilized a mixture of the two approaches all resulted in
failure, as did the two campaigns in which the strategy was indeterminate. While these
results do appear to give the advantage to the social welfare approach, it must be
remembered that three campaigns which clearly utilized coercive counterinsurgency
strategies on the model of the cost-benefit approach - France‟s campaign in 1947-1948
Madagascar, Indonesia‟s 1975-1977 campaign in East Timor, and China in 1950-1951
Tibet - also achieved victory, and these combined results provide a limited amount of
support for Hypothesis #3 (Appendix I).
D.

Selection of Case Studies
In all cases, foreign counterinsurgency campaigns tended to stumble in the face

of opposition from either the United Nations or great powers, and succeed where such
opposition was not employed (Appendices I, II, and III). Further evidence to support this
concept can be found in the COW Extra-State Dataset in which four of the five victories
credited to foreign powers during 1946-1997 occurred in the total absence of
international

pressure

(Sarkees,

2000:
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123-144;

United

Nations

General

Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-2008; Gordge, 1949:

133, 136-138;

Talbot, 1949: 325-327; Campbell, 1968: 140-141, 153-154, 156, 160-161; Chen, 2006:
56). To test my argument in depth, I have selected four cases from the total of 17 found
in the post-1945 COW Extra-State Dataset to serve as exemplars for the impact of
United Nations pressure upon foreign counterinsurgency operations. Those include the
South African campaign in Namibia and the Moroccan campaign in Western Sahara
serving to represent the highest levels of United Nations involvement, the Chinese
campaign(s) in Tibet serving as the mid-point,76 and the British campaign in Malaya
serving to represent the total lack of United Nations interest (Appendix V).
E.

Summary
Of the 17 insurgencies covered by the COW Extra-State Dataset, only the

French campaign in Madagascar, the Indian campaign in Hyderabad, the initial Chinese
annexation of Tibet, and the British campaign in Malaya were conducted without
interference from the United Nations, regional power-blocs, or great powers (United
Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-2008), and all four
campaigns resulted in clear victories for the intervening powers.

Meanwhile,

insurgencies prospered in East Timor and Western Sahara while United Nations
support was forthcoming and faced defeat when that support was terminated (United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1975-2008; Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 284-285;
Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6; Campbell, 2003: 47-48), and insurgent fortunes in both
French Indochina and Western Sahara prospered most notably while receiving great

76

This campaign includes both China‟s initial 1950-1951 annexation of Tibet as well as China‟s 19591974 counterinsurgency campaign against the Chushi Gangdrug.
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power support. Counterinsurgency strategies varied across the five countries credited
by the COW Extra-State Dataset with victories, with China, France, and Indonesia
employing the cost-benefit strategy, and India and the United Kingdom utilizing the
social welfare approach.

In all cases, these outcomes appear to provide empirical

support for all three of my hypotheses (Appendices I, II, III, and IV).
In Chapter IV, the four case studies previously selected will be evaluated in detail
to determine exactly how elements of international opposition and counterinsurgency
strategies combine to lead foreign powers to either victory or defeat. A final evaluation
of this study will then be provide in Chapter Five, along with suggestions for future
evaluations.
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CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDIES
A.

Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter Three, a brief evaluation of the 17 cases listed within

the COW Extra-State Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 showed that foreign
counterinsurgency campaigns faltered when confronted with opposition from either the
United Nations or great powers/power blocs and succeeded when such opposition was
not present.

Of the five cases that are categorized as victories for the foreign

intervening power, only the Indonesian campaign in East Timor encountered any United
Nations opposition, and Falintil insurgents‟ initial successes there withered away as
United Nations interest waned. Likewise, all but one of the twelve cases categorized as
defeats encountered United Nations opposition, and the single case that did not –
French counterinsurgency operations in Indochina – collapsed under massive Chinese
and Soviet military support to Việt Minh guerillas (Appendices I, II, and III; Sarkees,
2000: 123-144; United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 19462008; Gordge, 1949: 133, 136-138; Talbot, 1949: 325-327; Campbell, 1968: 140-141,
153-154, 156, 160-161; Chen, 2006:

56).

A correlation coefficient constructed to

compare these results yields a 72% negative correlation between the application of
United Nations pressure and occupation power victory, providing significant empirical
support for Hypothesis #1 (Appendix VIII).
To test my argument in depth, I have selected four of these 17 cases to serve as
exemplars for the impact of United Nations and/or great power/power bloc pressure
upon foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In order to gain a fairly broad perspective, I
selected the two cases with the highest levels of United Nations involvement (the South
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African campaign in Namibia and the Moroccan campaign in Western Sahara), the case
at the midpoint of United Nations interest (the Chinese campaign(s) in Tibet), and one of
the five cases that received no United Nations resolutions at all (the British campaign in
Malaya). These four cases were then evaluated in detail to determine the nature of the
counterinsurgency strategies and the manner in which United Nations and/or great
power/power bloc opposition impacted overall counterinsurgency efforts (Appendix V).77
These four case studies provide an interesting window into understanding the
impact of United Nations/Great Power sanctions. South Africa‟s presence in Namibia
came under international scrutiny during the first year of United Nations operations, and,
by the late 1960s, South African counterinsurgency strategies being deployed in the
territory against a determined, nationalist guerilla movement were facing widespread
international denunciations that hobbled those strategies for the remainder of the
conflict there (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 19471990). Soviet and Cuban support for the Namibian insurgency was also an important

77

Both United Nations and great power/power bloc opposition to foreign counterinsurgency operations
often manifested itself as direct material support to insurgent groups. In at least five cases (Indochina,
Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Namibia, and Western Sahara), members of the General Assembly offered
their national territory as safe havens and training grounds for insurgent groups (Tonnesson, 1985: 18;
Karnow, 1983: 183-184; Sepp, 2005: 11; Celeski, 2006: 55; United Nations Security Council
Resolutions #273, #275, #289, #290, #294, #295, #302, #312, #321, #385, #387, #393, #428, #447,
#454, #466, #475, #545, #546, #577, #602, and #606; Zunes, 1995: 26) and, in at least three cases
(Indochina, Portuguese Africa, and Namibia), great power opposition manifested itself through training
programs and military equipment delivered directly to guerillas (Tonnesson, 1985: 18; Karnow, 1983:
183-184; Chabal, 1981: 75, 80-83, 91, 95-97; Zunes, 1995: 31-35). Even when great power/power bloc
opposition did not directly involve such support, it could still be devastating, however. When American
officials directly threatened the Dutch government during early 1949 with curtailment of all United States
Marshall Plan should Soekarno‟s indigenous government fail to secure an independent Indonesia, the
viability of further Dutch counterinsurgency efforts collapsed (Collis, 1950: 173-176; Friend, 2003: 3738). In a different manner, condemnations of French authority in Algeria by Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al„Arabiyya during 1947 shattered the façade of French legitimacy in the territory by encouraging Algerians
to view themselves as Muslim Arabs instead of French citizens and severed the emotional link French
authorities had spent nearly 120 years constructing (Behr, 1958: 280; Soustelle, 1956: 123-124;
Hudson, 1977: 354-355; Talbott, 1980: 72-73).
101

factor in the eventual South African defeat, since, by the mid-1980s, South African
forces faced the possibility of being militarily overwhelmed by battle-hardened Cuban
troops (Albright, 1994: 42) . Moroccan efforts to annex Western Sahara during the mid1970s initially floundered against a robust, nationalist insurgency and were further
stunted by strong United Nations denunciations of Morocco‟s counterinsurgency
campaign (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1974-2008). Only after
utilizing Morocco‟s unique status as both an Arab and an African state was the
Moroccan government able to successfully divide the General Assembly among its Arab
and African blocs during the early 1980s; it removed a potential threat from the Security
Council by co-opting France and the United States in its endeavors. In a like manner,
Moroccan authorities were able to counter denunciations from the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with support from Jāmi „at
ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya and the Islamic Conference (United Nations General Assembly
Resolution #34/37, 1979; Zunes, 1995: 23).

With the United Nations and regional

power-blocs effectively sidelined, Moroccan authorities were able to contain the guerilla
movement and successfully establish its authority in the territory; albeit, amid continuing
popular unrest resulting from over thirty years of harsh military occupation (United
Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1991-2008; Stephan and Mundy, 2006:

6;

Zunes, 1995: 23). China‟s initial military operations conducted in Tibet during 19501951 encountered no United Nations or great power opposition as Chinese authority
was quickly reestablished in the territory against a placid, fatalistic local population
(Sheng, 2006: 15-16, 18-19, 22-23, 31-32). Following the onset of Tibetan rebellion in
March 1959, three vaguely-worded General Assembly declarations and a covert, poorly102

defined American campaign of support to the Chushi Gangdrug guerillas failed to
significantly impact Chinese counterinsurgency measures due to the questionable
nationalism of the guerillas and the lack of any official goal for an independent Tibet on
the part of either the United Nations or the United States (United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions #1353, #1723, and #2079, 1959, 1961, and 1965; McGranahan,
2006: 121-124, 127-128). In post-Second World War Malaya, a Communist-inspired
insurgency failed to triumph over British colonial forces due to its inability to inspire overt
great power support that might have found voice in the Security Council, or even the
support of minor powers that could have supported the insurgent‟s cause in the General
Assembly. With British authorities thus spared any opposition from the United Nations
and Chinese support limited to the general goal of spreading Communism across the
developing world, the Malayan Communist Party was forced to abandon its goals during
1958 and accede to a British-brokered, Malay-dominated Malayan state (United Nations
General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1948-1960; Newsinger, 2002: 57-58).
There is also considerable evidence that governments sponsoring these
counterinsurgency campaigns held significant concerns regarding the threat of
international opposition. This was clearly the case among three of the four case studies
undertaken in this chapter.

As insurgency flared in Malaya during 1948, British

authorities, possibly fearing a Security Council seizure of the issue along the lines of the
Council‟s on-going seizure of the insurgency in the Netherlands East Indies (United
Nations Security Council Resolutions #27, #30, #31, #32, #35, #36, #40, #41, #55, #63,
#64, #65, and #67, 1946-1949), conducted a concerted campaign to present the
insurgency to the world as a Soviet/Chinese-sponsored program designed to
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overwhelm the developing countries of Southeast Asia (NAA A452/2, 1968: 3). The
British government also liberally invoked the spectre of the “well-known international
Communist ménage” to obtain “sympathy and support from American public opinion in
our praiseworthy struggle” and avoid the perception of their counterinsurgency
campaign as simply being of “a bad colonial power coping with rebellions” (Watson,
1949). The Portuguese ambassador to the United States followed suit in 1961, quickly
interpreting the initial insurgent attack against Portuguese authorities in Luanda, Angola
of February 4, 1961 as “part of the Communist assault on the Portuguese position . . .
with the aim of weakening the Western position and provoking a situation which might
be propitious for the intervention of the forces of international Communism,” adding that
“it would be of the utmost interest to the free world that public opinion in the United
States should become aware of the Communist conspiracy now in action against
Portugal” (Ribeiro, 2002: 168; NA, SDCF, 1960-1963).78 When the Liberian delegate to
the United Nations subsequently requested, on February 20, 1961, an urgent meeting of
the Security council to discuss the situation in Angola, the Portuguese government
pressured its North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners in the Security Council to deny
the request, possibly fearing a Security Council seizure of the issue of Portugal‟s African
empire (NA, SDCF, 1960-1963).79 The flood of United Nations condemnations against
78

The ambassador had reason to worry about the American response. Less than two months earlier,
President-elect John Kennedy had described Portuguese rule in Africa as “intolerable,” adding that
“silence on issues affecting Portuguese Africa is a liability far out-weighing any short-term strategic
considerations” (Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, 1960).
79

The Security Council did in fact meet regarding the issue during March 10-14, 1961. One day later,
Angolan insurgents struck Portuguese populations in northern Angola, killing at least 200 Portuguese
nationals; an incident directly linked by Portuguese authorities to the Security Council meeting (NA,
SDCF, 1960-1963). Clearly, the Portuguese took United Nations pressure seriously and fought to
circumvent it.
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South African control of Namibia that came about during the 1960s and 1970s also led
that government to define its counterinsurgency operations as an extension of its basic
anti-Communist position in southern Africa (Horton, 1999: Occasional Paper #27); a
position that, at least temporarily, appears to have led France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States to reject a mandatory United Nations arms embargo against the
apartheid state (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #3411, 1975). Mounting
international isolation subsequently led South African authorities to develop nuclear
weapons in a vain attempt to encourage Western governments to offer security
guarantees to the besieged country to ensure that the weapons were never used,
however (Albright, 1994: 37-42). Only in China does it appear that the government had
little regard for the threat of international pressure from the United Nations and great
powers.80
United Nations/great power denunciation of imperial interventions appears to
have been a primary driver of counterinsurgency failure in the post Second World War
era. Alternative explanations do not consistently account for outcomes in the four cases
reviewed in this chapter.

Neither the varied geographical locations of the conflicts

(Northwest Africa, Southwest Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia) nor the fact that
three of the four counterinsurgency campaigns were conducted in territories contiguous
to the intervening state appeared to have any significant impact upon the outcomes of
80

The hesitant manner with which this pressure was applied may account for that seeming lack of
concern. While the General Assembly issued three resolutions critical of Chinese counterinsurgency
operations during 1959, 1961, and 1965, none of the resolutions specifically mentioned China by name,
and the Security Council kept its silence throughout the period (the failure of the United Nations to grant
membership to the PRC also assured that any such resolutions would be viewed with little more than
contempt by the Chinese government) (Grunfeld, 1996: 180). In addition, while the United States, Nepal,
and India conspired to deploy an insurgency against Chinese rule in Tibet, the limited number of guerillas
involved and the lack of any realistic goals to guide their activities ensured that the Chinese government
would view them as little more than a nuisance (Goldstein, 2006: 150; Grunfeld, 1996: 180).
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the conflicts (South Africa‟s campaign in neighboring, contiguous Namibia failed, while
the United Kingdom‟s campaign in Malaya – over 6,550 air miles distant – succeeded).
No common factor could be found among the four cases in ethnicity (with Arabs
and Berbers in Western Sahara, Black African tribesmen in Namibia, the homogeneous
Tibetans of the High Asian Plateau, and the multi-ethnicity of Malaya in which the ethnic
Chinese staffed the insurgency), nor did any commonality in religious practice (with
Sunni Islam in Western Sahara, Christianity (primarily of the Lutheran denomination) in
Namibia, Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet, and a patchwork of Sunni Islam, Buddhism,
Christianity, and Hinduism in Malaya) exist to offer any explanatory value. The choice
of counterinsurgency strategy also appears to lack significance, since both the costbenefit and social welfare approaches led to victory for China and the United Kingdom
respectively, South Africa encountered defeat with its cost-benefit approach, and
Morocco‟s apparent blending of the two approaches has resulted in continuing unrest in
Western Sahara.
B.

South Africa, and Defeat in Namibia (1966-1988)
European colonialism was first introduced into Southwest Africa (today known as

Namibia) by Germany during 1884. Following German defeat in the First World War,
the territory became a Class „C‟ League of Nations Mandate on December 17, 1920,
administered by the neighboring Union of South Africa (United Nations General
Assembly Resolution #937, 1955).

During the post-Second World War wave of

decolonization, the South African government (subsequently restyled during 1961 as
the Republic of South Africa) introduced repressive apartheid measures into its internal
policies as well as in its governance of Southwest Africa, and sought to incorporate the
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territory into South Africa itself (O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). That incorporation was denied
during the First Session of the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, with the
recommendation that the mandated territory be placed under the international trustee
system under the aegis of the United Nations Charter, Chapter XII (United Nations
Charter, 1945; United Nations General Assembly Resolution #65, 1946). Over the next
44 years, at least 150 increasingly harsh resolutions would be issued by the General
Assembly, with only the years of 1952 and 1964 passing with no such resolutions
regarding the territory handed down (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions,
1947-1990).81
Modern African nationalism began gaining prominence during that time period,
primarily among Namibian migrant workers employed in South Africa. During 1957, a
group of these Namibians formed the Ovamboland People‟s Congress (OPC), with the
stated goal of improving conditions for Namibian workers. A political agenda was also
developed for the organization, partly due to personal contacts with South African
members of the African National Congress (ANC), and in 1959, the Ovamboland
People‟s Organization (OPO) was established to incorporate that agenda. One year
later, OPO was renamed the South-West Africa People‟s Organization (SWAPO), and
81

That listing of General Assembly resolutions included #141, #227, #337, #338, #449, #570, #749, #844,
#851, #852, #904, #934, #935, #936, #937, #938, #939, #940, #941, #942, #1047, #1054, #1055, #1056,
#1057, #1058, #1059, #1060, #1061, #1138, #1139, #1140, #1141, #1142, #1143, #1243, #1244, #1245,
#1246, #1247, #1333, #1356, #1359, #1361, #1362, #1563, #1564, #1565, #1566, #1567, #1568, #1593,
#1596, #1702, #1703, #1704, #1705, #1804, #1805, #1806, #1899, #1900, #1901, #1979, #2074, #2075,
#2076, #2145, #2146, #2235, #2236, #2288, #2324, #2325, #2349, #2403, #2404, #2425, #2498, #2517,
#2518, #2554, #2678, #2679, #2680, #2703, #2871, #2872, #2873, #2979, #3030, #3031, #3111, #3112,
#3117, #3295, #3296, #3299, #3398, #3399, #3400, #31/152, #31/153, #32/9, #32/35, #32/41, #33/40,
#33/182, #33/206, #34/41, #34/92, #34/174, #35/28, #35/227, #36/51, #36/121, #37/31, #37/233, #38/36,
#38/50, #39/42, #39/50, #41/14, #41/39, #41/39[A], #41/39[B], #41/39[C], #41/39[D], #41/39[E], #41/123,
#42/14, #42/14[A], #42/14[B], #42/14[C], #42/14[D], #42/14[E], #42/74, #43/26, #43/26[A], #43/26[B],
#43/26[C], #43/26[D], #43/26[E], #43/26, #43/134, #44/84, #44/143, #44/243, #44/243[A], and #44/243[B]
(United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-1990).
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specifically dedicated to the establishment of an independent Namibian state. SWAPO
stressed the use of peaceful methods for the attainment of that goal, and soon sought to
encourage the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render a legal opinion on the
validity of South Africa‟s League of Nations Mandate (Moroney, ed., 1989: 383). The
General Assembly also sought to raise the pressure on the South African government
with the issuance of Resolution #2074 on December 17, 1965, terming South African
racial policies practiced in South West Africa to constitute a crime against humanity
(United Nations General Assembly Resolution #2074, 1965). Even with pressure of this
magnitude from the General Assembly, however, the IJC refused to rule on the question
of South Africa‟s mandate.

With no clear legal recourse under international law,

SWAPO leaders soon determined that an armed struggle remained the only option, and
the first armed clash between SWAPO guerillas and South African authorities took
place during August and September 1966. South African forces responded by detaining
a number of SWAPO leaders inside Namibia, and, after subjecting them to acts of
torture, sentenced them to lengthy prison terms (Moroney, 1989: 383). Given the
nature of the South African response both at the time and subsequently throughout this
conflict, South African counterinsurgency measures appear to have best approximated
the cost-benefit approach. Within that approach were South African policies of racial
exclusion that involved the large-scale removal of natives from ancestral areas into „selfgoverning homelands‟ (reminiscent of population resettlement policies that had
previously been successful only in Malaya), and eventually included attacks against
insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring countries that drew a host of United Nations
condemnations (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1966-1990).
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The General Assembly quickly responded to the outbreak of conflict with the
issuance of Resolution #2145 on October 27, 1966, accusing the South African
government of maladministration in the territory, and declaring Southwest Africa to be a
direct responsibility of the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly Resolution
#2145, 1966).

The Security Council demonstrated far more restraint regarding the

issue, waiting nearly 15 months before addressing the issues raised in General
Assembly Resolution #2145. It finally did so on January 25, 1968 with the issuance of
Security Council Resolution #245, which declared that, in line with General Assembly
Resolution #2145, South West Africa would henceforth become the responsibility of the
United Nations (United Nations Security Council Resolution #245, 1968).

Security

Council Resolution #246 quickly followed on March 14, 1968, condemning South Africa
for not having already transferred the nature of its mandate upon the territory (United
Nations Security Council Resolution #246, 1968). Both of these resolutions were issued
unanimously, giving the impression that Security Council members felt the need to
present a united front on the issue. During the next 21 years, at least 37 additional
Security Council resolutions would add their weight to the continuing barrage of General
Assembly resolutions which gradually chipped away at South African legitimacy in
South West Africa (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1968-1989). Many of
those resolutions included abstentions from important world powers, however, those
abstentions may have served to convince the South African government that significant
maneuvering room still continued to exist, especially within the foreign policies of the
United States, for conducting robust counterinsurgency operations against SWAPO
insurgents.
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Meanwhile, the General Assembly continued to lead the way in isolating South
Africa from the world community.

On December 16, 1968, General Assembly

Resolution #2403 was issued, referring to the territory for the first time as „Namibia‟
(after the territory‟s Namib Desert), and recognizing the legitimacy of indigenous
insurgency against South African rule, although no direct references to SWAPO itself
were made (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #2403, 1968). Although the
Security Council followed the new verbiage of „Namibia‟ on March 20, 1969 with the
issuance of Resolution #264, this resolution did not include verbiage legitimizing
insurgency, and was passed with two important abstentions: France and the United
Kingdom (United Nations Security Council Resolution #264, 1969).

By August 12,

1969, the Security Council had joined the General Assembly in recognizing the
legitimacy of the insurgency, however, with the issuance of Resolution #369 (again, with
no direct references to SWAPO itself), albeit with four abstentions: Finland, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States (United Nations Security Council Resolution
#269, 1969). Within the short space of three years, the activities of armed insurgents
against South African authorities had been judged by the full weight of the United
Nations to be legitimate.

This verbiage was subsequently toned down in Security

Council Resolution #276, issued on January 30, 1970 that, while condemning the South
African government, deleted verbiage recognizing insurgent legitimacy. Perhaps due to
this more moderate phraseology, the United States did not abstain from supporting the
resolution, although both France and the United Kingdom continued to withhold their
support (United Nations Security Council Resolution #276, 1970).

Two further

resolutions were issued by the Security Council during 1970: Resolution #283 and
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Resolution #284. Resolution #283, while continuing to delete phraseology recognizing
insurgent legitimacy, called upon member states to further isolate South African-ruled
Namibia, while Resolution #284 called upon the ICJ to render an advisory opinion
regarding the legal consequences of South Africa‟s continuing occupation of the
territory. Once again, the United States did not abstain, although France and the United
Kingdom abstained from Resolution #283, and the Soviet Union joined with the United
Kingdom to abstain from Resolution #284 (United Nations Security Council Resolutions
#283 and #284, 1970).
By June 21, 1971, the ICJ had complied with the wishes of the Security Council,
issuing an advisory opinion that found Security Council Resolution #245 to be legally
binding in its termination of the former League of Nations mandate, and determining that
South Africa was now occupying Namibia without title. It thus followed that member
states of the United Nations were under obligation to abstain from entering into treaty
relationships conducted by the government of South Africa on behalf of Namibia (Legal
Consequences for States of the Continuing Presence of South Africa in Namibia (SouthWest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 276 (1970), 1971).

The Security

Council‟s immediate reaction to the advisory opinion of the ICJ was somewhat muted,
however (a somewhat surprising outcome given that the Security Council had itself
requested the ruling), with Resolution #300, issued unanimously on October 12, 1971,
calling upon the South African military to respect the sovereignty of Zambia (United
Nations Security Council Resolution #300, 1971).

Four more Security Council

resolutions were handed down during 1972: Resolution #309, issued unanimously on
February 4, 1972 and somewhat vaguely calling upon the Secretary-General of the
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United Nations to initiate contacts across the breadth of Namibia in an effort to allow the
native peoples to exercise self-determination and independence, Resolution #310, also
issued on February 4, 1972 and castigating the South African government for failing to
abide by existing United Nations resolutions (with France and the United Kingdom
abstaining), Resolution #319, issued unanimously on August 1, 1972 and noting with
appreciation efforts conducted by the Secretary-General in implementing Resolution
#309, and Resolution #323, issued on December 6, 1972, noting that the results of the
Secretary-General‟s efforts provided evidence that an “overwhelming majority” of
Namibians consulted were in favor of the withdrawal of the South African administration
(with the Soviet Union abstaining, and the People‟s Republic of China not participating)
(United Nations Security Council Resolutions #309, #310, #319, and #323, 1972). A
further resolution was handed down by the Security Council during 1973 further
reflecting upon the Secretary-General‟s consultative efforts; Resolution #342, issued
unanimously on December 11, 1973, asking the Secretary-General to keep the Security
Council fully informed of future developments regarding Namibia (United Nations
Security Council Resolution #342, 1973).
Meanwhile, the General Assembly continued to issue damning resolutions
against continuing South African occupation of Namibia, going far beyond what the
Security Council was willing to state.

By December 12, 1973, General Assembly

Resolution #3111 had gone beyond legitimizing insurgent activities to “noting with
satisfaction” SWAPO‟s progress toward the goal of “national liberation” and recognizing
the insurgent group as the “authentic representative of the Namibian people” (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution #3111, 1973; O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). This was a
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major statement of support for SWAPO political legitimacy that would never be reflected
in Security Council resolutions regarding South African-administered Namibia. Indeed,
nothing else was heard from the Security Council until December 17, 1974 when
Resolution #366, passed unanimously, demanded that the South African government
take steps to transfer political power in Namibia to a native government under the aegis
of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council Resolution #366, 1974).
Meanwhile, South African political fortunes in Namibia were strongly impacted by
the April 1974 collapse of the repressive Portuguese government and its replacement
by a liberal administration in Lisbon dedicated to terminating Portugal‟s centuries-old
colonial presence in Africa (Chabal, 1981:

99).

In line with that political agenda,

Angola, the northern neighbor to Southwest Africa, was scheduled to be granted
independence on November 11, 1975 (Mendy, 2003:

57).

No clear indigenous

successor government had been formed in Angola, however, and fighting broke out
during the fall of 1975 among the rival groups of FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA that would
continue unabated until 2002 (The World Factbook, 2007: 18). The openly Marxist
MPLA was soon receiving significant military deliveries from the Soviet Union through a
Soviet military airlift, which was soon enhanced by the intervention of Cuban combat
troops equipped by the Soviet government (Kissinger, 1999: 907-909). The South
African government feared that a victory by the Marxist MPLA would result in political
and military support to SWAPO, and began offering support to both FNLA and UNITA
while also launching its own military attacks into MPLA-controlled areas of Angola
(Moroney, ed., 1989: 384). South African authorities additionally counted on United
States bi-polar Cold War policies to ensure the survival of South African apartheid over
113

the loss of the region‟s important strategic resources to pro-Soviet forces. In line with
these concepts, the South African government sought to define its counterinsurgency
campaigns as an extension of its basic anti-Communist position in southern Africa;
especially „Soviet-style Communism‟ as found within the MPLA (Horton, 1999:
Occasional Paper #27).82 Evidence that those tactics were taken seriously by the great
powers is suggested by Security Council silence on the issue of Namibia during 1975; a
silence which contrasted dramatically with the outrage of the General Assembly which
issued, on December 10, 1975, General Assembly Resolution #3411, noting “with
regret” that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States “through abuse of their
veto,” had prevented the Security Council from establishing a mandatory arms embargo
against South Africa, and condemning France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States for implicitly encouraging “inhuman” South African
policies through pursuance of their economic interests in the area (United Nations
General Assembly Resolution #3411, 1975).
By 1976, however, the Security Council was reacting to the General Assembly
challenge, unanimously issuing Resolution #385 on January 30, 1976 to castigate the
South African government for its continuing occupation of Namibia, Resolution #387 on
March 31, 1976 (with abstentions by France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, and the PRC not participating) to condemn South African use of Namibia
as a military platform for attacks against Angola, and Resolution #393 on July 30, 1976
(with an abstention by the United States) to condemn South African attacks against

By 1968, South Africa‟s Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 had been extended throughout
Namibia (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #2404, 1968).
82
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Zambia. Resolution #393 was arguably the most important, since it again recognized
the legitimacy of the Namibian insurgency (while declining to refer to SWAPO by name)
and commended such „front-line‟ states as Zambia for providing material support to the
Namibian guerillas (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #385, #387, and #393,
1976).
While these resolutions may have motivated both SWAPO and Angolan forces in
their efforts against South African incursions, direct Cuban military support under the
aegis of the Soviet Union was vital in enabling the MPLA to drive the South African
military back across the Namibian border by the end of March 1976, and allow the
Angolan government to begin providing SWAPO with sanctuaries for its growing
campaign against South African rule (Moroney, ed., 1989: 384). This combination of
widespread United Nations condemnation and increasing Soviet/Cuban pressure soon
led to heightened South African isolation and garrison state desperation that was
reflected in ominous political/military policies: the development of nuclear weapons with
which to both prevent great power intervention and, at the same time, co-opt its support.
These activities were conducted at the country‟s Valindaba Y-Plant, commissioned in
1974, which, by 1977, had produced a fission device on the model of the weapon which
devastated Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945. Eventually, four such devices would
be completed (to be delivered by modified Blackburn Buccaneer strike aircraft), and it
was hoped by South African authorities that the appearance of credibility in nuclear
deterrence would encourage Western governments to take actions in support of South
Africa‟s apartheid system to ensure that those weapons were never used. As such,
these activities were implicitly designed to quietly come to the attention of the great
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powers, and, by the summer of 1977, their existence had been confirmed by the Soviet
KGB, which, despite the confrontation of the Cold War, alerted the United States
government.83 To deter this perceived threat to world peace (and to the Soviet position
in southern Africa), the Soviet government proposed a pre-emptive air strike against the
Valindaba installation; a proposal rejected by the United States, and thus never carried
out by the Soviet military (Albright, 1994: 37-42).
While the United States determined to prevent a military strike against South
African facilities, the subsequent response of the Security Council may have surprised
the South African government, since, far from offering support to the South African
security dilemma, Resolution #418, issued on November 4, 1977, noted that the
Security Council was “gravely concerned that South Africa is at the threshold of
producing nuclear weapons,” warned member states not to provide assistance to such a
program, and enacted the long-awaited “mandatory arms embargo” against the South
African government (United Nations Security Council Resolution #418, 1977). The fact
that this resolution, with its accompanying mandatory arms embargo, passed
unanimously appears to have reflected an unwillingness by the permanent members of
the Security Council (which then comprised all of the declared nuclear weapons
powers) to extend the nuclear monopoly beyond themselves, especially within such an
unstable region. General Assembly Resolution #32/105, issued December 14, 1977,
further condemned the “continuing collaboration by certain governments” in enabling the
South African government to pursue nuclear development; the State of Israel may have
83

The KGB had a covert intelligence source for such information in the form of Commodore Dieter
Gerhardt, commander of the South African naval base at Simonstown. He was eventually detected by
South African security services, and arrested during 1982 (Albright, David, 1994: 42).
116

been alluded to within that context, since the resolution had, in the previous section,
demanded the Israeli government terminate all collaboration with South Africa in “the
military and nuclear fields” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #32/105,
1977). On May 6, 1978, United States reluctance to legitimize insurgency came to an
end with the unanimous issuance of Security Council Resolution #428, decrying South
African penetration of Angolan territory, legitimizing the Namibian insurgency (although
SWAPO was still not mentioned by name), and commending the Angolan government
for supporting the guerillas (United Nations Security Council Resolution #428, 1978).84
Later that year, Security Council Resolution #431, issued on July 27, 1978 (with
abstentions by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), called for the Secretary-General
to appoint a special representative for Namibia to prepare the territory for independence
(United Nations Security Council Resolution #431, 1978). Security Council Resolution
#432, issued unanimously the same day, called for the political integration of the South
African territory of Walvis Bay into Namibia (United Nations Security Council Resolution
#432, 1978). Security Council Resolution #435, issued on September 29, 1978 (with
abstentions by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), provided direct references to
SWAPO as it determined to establish a United Nations Transition Assistance Group to
further the goal of Namibian independence (United Nations Security Council Resolution
#435, 1978), and Security Council Resolution #439, issued on November 13, 1978 with
abstentions by Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
condemned South African plans to proceed with unrecognized territorial elections
The United State‟s reluctance to formally legitimize insurgent activity might have resulted from the
American failure to destroy the Việt Cộng insurgency in South Vietnam just a few years earlier.
84
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(United Nations Security Council Resolution #439, 1978).85 These resolutions, which
legitimized the insurgency, called for an independent Namibian state which would
include the long-held South African territory of Walvis Bay, and refused recognition to
South African-sponsored elections for Namibia were devastating for South African
policy-makers, especially since the United States abstained from voting on only the
relatively minor issue of territorial elections (Moroney, ed., 1989: 386-387).
The scale of the fighting increased during the late 1970s, and by 1979, 60,000
South African troops were stationed in Namibia, supported by seven major air bases
along with the large existing naval base at the South African enclave of Walvis Bay
(Moroney, ed., 1989:

384-386).

Further Security Council resolutions were issued

during 1979 and 1980, with Resolution #447 (issued on March 28, 1979), Resolution
#454 (issued on November 2, 1979), and Resolution #475 (issued June 27, 1980)
condemning South African military forces for violating Angolan sovereignty. All three
resolutions passed with abstentions by France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #447, #454, and #475, 1979-1980),
however, perhaps suggestive of continuing Cold War concerns by Western great
powers of Soviet dominance in the region (Horton, 1999:

Occasional Paper #27).

Interestingly enough, Security Council Resolution #466, issued on April 11, 1980 and
condemning South African military violation of Zambian sovereignty passed
unanimously; perhaps since Zambia was not viewed in the West as a Soviet client state
along the lines of Angola (United Nations Security Council Resolution #466, 1980).

85

Interestingly enough, Security Council Resolution #435 would eventually serve as the legal basis for
the implementation plan for Namibian independence (Moroney, ed., 1989: 386-387).
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South African troop commitments to counterinsurgency operations in Namibia
and Angola continued to increase during the 1980s, with military and paramilitary forces
estimated at around 100,000 by the latter part of the decade; approximately 9,000 of
which were essentially stationed in southern Angola (Moroney, ed., 1989: 384-386). By
the mid-1980s, however, heightened Soviet support for both Angola and SWAPO was
reflected by the presence of about 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola battling both South
African troops and their Angolan surrogates. Albright quotes an unnamed South African
official in stating that only the relative restraint displayed by the Soviet Union prevented
Cuban troops in Angola from overwhelming the South African position there during that
time period (Albright, 1994: 42), and the Security Council perhaps presciently exhibited
more restraint regarding South African counterinsurgency campaigns against SWAPO
during that strained period, with no resolutions issued regarding the matter at all during
1981 and 1982, and none of the four issued during 1983-1984 –Resolution #532
(issued unanimously on May 31, 1982), Resolution #539 (issued on October 28, 1982
with the United States abstaining), Resolution #545 (issued on December 20, 1983 with
the United States abstaining), and Resolution #546 (issued on January 6, 1984 with the
United Kingdom and the United States abstaining) – reiterating the 1978 legitimization
of the SWAPO insurgency.

While both Resolutions #532 and #539 condemned

continuing South African occupation of Namibia (with Resolution #539 using harsher
language), Resolutions #545 and #546 again condemned South African operations in
Angola; something the United States (and, typically, the United Kingdom) was still
prepared to abstain from supporting (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #532,
#539, and #545, 1983).
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By the mid-1980s, however, Security Council activities may have begun to reflect
increasing American and British acceptance of the futility of the South African struggle
with both MPLA and SWAPO, since only one of five Security Council resolutions
(Resolution #566, issued on June 19, 1985, again reflecting the legitimacy of the
Namibian insurgency while deleting direct references to SWAPO) handed down during
1985 passed with United States and United Kingdom abstentions. Resolutions #567
(issued unanimously on June 20, 1985), #571 (issued unanimously on September 20,
1985), #574 (issued unanimously on October 7, 1985), and #577 (issued unanimously
on December 6, 1985) all decried South African military violations of Angolan
sovereignty, with Resolution #574 reaffirming the right of the People‟s Republic of
Angola to take necessary measures to defend itself against South African forces, and
Resolution #577 commending the Angolan government for its support of the Namibian
insurgency (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #566, #567, #571, #574, and
#577, 1985).
The perception of South African military successes during 1986 and 1987 (during
which time, the South African government claimed the virtual destruction of SWAPO),
combined with reports that SWAPO guerillas, in targeting white farming areas, were
now engaging in activities more readily defined as terrorism, may have briefly altered
United States perceptions of the conflict, however (Moroney, 1989: 384-386), since no
Security Council resolutions regarding Namibia were handed down during 1986, and
Resolution #601, issued on October 30, 1987 and welcoming the readiness of SWAPO
representatives to arrange a cease-fire, was abstained to by the United States (United
Nations Security Council Resolution #601, 1987). Resolutions #602 (issued November
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25, 1987) and Resolution #606 (issued December 23, 1987), both of which condemned
South African military intrusion into Angolan territory (albeit, on more moderate terms
than found in past resolutions), were passed unanimously, however (United Nations
Security Council Resolutions #602 and #606, 1987).
Regardless of South African claims of the destruction of SWAPO as a functioning
entity, the insurgent group continued to deploy an estimated 9,000 – 10,000 guerillas
armed with Soviet-bloc weapons in northern Namibia and southern Angola during 1988
(Moroney, ed., 1989: 384-386). During May of that year, the façade of South African
military prowess was roundly shattered by a defeat at the hands of the Cuban military at
Cuito Cuanavale, Angola; a defeat which ended South African aspirations of a military
settlement of the Namibia/Angola issue on grounds favorable to South Africa
(O‟Sullivan, 2005:

111).

Nine rounds of international talks between government

representatives of Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States were initiated later
that month and lasted until November of that year, setting the stage for the full
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and a South African pledge of full
independence for Namibia through the implementation of Security Council Resolution
#435 (Moroney, ed., 1989: 386-387). To effect those decolonization efforts, the United
Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) established an interim administration
in Namibia during 1989 to provide peacekeeping operations within the territory while
Security Council Resolution #435 was implemented (further defined in Security Council
Resolutions #629 and #632, issued on January 16, 1989 and February 16, 1989
respectively (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #629 and #632, 1989)),
repatriate 40,000 exiles, and provide adequate security for elections held there later that
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year (O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). Two final Security Council resolutions reflected South
African desperation to salvage something during this transition process from the
decades-long counterinsurgency program: Resolution #640, issued unanimously on
August 29, 1989 and demanding the disbandment of pro-South African Namibian
militias and commando units allegedly being utilized to intimidate the native population,
and Resolution #643, issued unanimously on October 31, 1989 and demanding full
South African compliance with Security Council Resolutions #435, #632, and #640
(United Nations Security Council Resolutions #640 and #643, 1989). Once the election
results were verified, UNTAG personnel departed Southwest Africa and the South
African mandate of Southwest Africa received formal independence as the Republic of
Namibia on March 21, 1990 under a SWAPO-led government, an outcome that
underlined the ultimate futility of the 22 year conflict for South Africa (The World
Factbook, 2007: 399-400). Just over four years later, white minority rule in South Africa
itself faded into history; possibly hastened along by African nationalism heightened by
the long-term conflict in the region (The World Factbook, 2007: 525- 526).
In retrospect, it is fairly clear that, by the mid-1970s, white minority rule in Africa
was truly passé against robust sub-Saharan African nationalism. With African military
prowess successfully terminating Portuguese rule in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and
Mozambique and, subsequently, white minority-rule in the Rhodesian statelet, the time
of reckoning had come for colonial rule in Southwest Africa and white minority rule in
South Africa itself. Increasing United Nations pressure successfully served to isolate
internationally the South African administration of Namibia, empower Namibian
nationalism and serve as the focus for Pan-African nationalism, and heighten
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indigenous repugnance of foreign domination, leaving the South African government to
do little more than conduct a holding action in the territory while fighting a native
insurgency confident of its ultimate victory. Great power intervention in the form of
Soviet support and Cuban client troops may have been more decisive in actually
defeating South African counterinsurgency efforts, however; especially in the face of
American political inability to adequately embrace South African racial policies in the
territory and accept the possibility of South African nuclear weapons deployment
(United Nations Security Council Resolution #418, 1977).
C.

Morocco, and Defeat in Western Sahara (1975-1983)
Spain‟s overall political presence in northwest Africa was approaching its 500th

anniversary during the late 1960s, when an intermittent, low-level indigenous
insurgency against Spanish rule broke out during 1967 in Spanish Sahara, a
phosphate-rich region fronting along the Atlantic Ocean and sandwiched between
Morocco and Mauritania. By 1973, this insurgency had been consolidated and enlarged
by the POLISARIO Front into a viable challenge for Spanish colonial authorities
(Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 5-6). The previous twenty years of European experience
in reducing insurgencies within their African domains was not heartening, and, after
spending nearly two years attempting to resolve the conflict with POLISARIO on terms
favorable to Spanish interests, the Spanish government abruptly announced on May 23,
1975 that it would soon abandon the struggle and withdraw its sovereignty from the
territory (Marks, 1976: 3-4).
Morocco had earlier made a somewhat unstructured formal claim to Spanish
Sahara within the context of the United Nations on November 20, 1958 when, in a
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communiqué to the Secretary-General, the Moroccan government stated a “claim [to]
certain African territories at present under Spanish control as an integral part of
Moroccan national territory” (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,
1975: 17). That claim was further defined and reiterated on October 12, 1961, during
the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, when the Moroccan representative, in
countering Spanish plans to submit information on the territory, stated that “those cities
and regions [of Spanish Sahara] formed an integral part of Morocco and the statutes at
present governing them were contrary to international law and incompatible with the
territorial sovereignty and integrity of Morocco” (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of
16 October 1975, 1975:

17).

While that claim continued to be pressed by the

Moroccan government within the General Assembly until 1966, it lay dormant there for
an eight year period until it was reinstated on September 23, 1974 in an unsuccessful
attempt to detach the issue from the decolonization proceedings carried on by the
United Nations.

The Mauritanian government had launched a similar claim to the

General Assembly during 1960, shortly after Mauritania became a member of the
United Nations, with a statement that Western Sahara was a part of its national territory.
Unlike the Moroccan position, the Mauritanian government qualified the statement by
agreeing to acquiesce with the will of the territorial population, and did not press a direct
legal claim to the territory. The Spanish announcement of May 23, 1975 quickly brought
these rival claims into sharp focus within the General Assembly, however, and the
government of Algeria was among the most vocal in supporting complete independence
for the restive Spanish colony (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,
1975: 18, 22).
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Algeria was not alone in its concerns regarding the future of the territory. By
December 13, 1974, the matter had been seized by the General Assembly, which
issued Resolution #3292, calling for the ICJ to deliver an advisory opinion regarding the
territory of Spanish Sahara, addressing such issues as terra nullius (whether or not the
territory was actually peopled by an indigenous population), the legality of Morocco‟s
historic claim to the territory as stated in various documents and treaties, and the
legitimacy of any overlapping Mauritanian territorial claims. The thrust of the resolution
appeared to favor independence for the territory since it contained references to the
ground-breaking General Assembly Resolution #1514, and issued a request for the
“Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep
the situation in the Territory under review” (United Nations General Assembly
Resolution #3292, 1974).
The ICJ accepted the request, delivering its advisory opinion on October 16,
1975. In that opinion, it was determined that, at the time of the Spanish conquest, the
territory was not terra nullius, since it was peopled and occupied. The claims of the
governments of Morocco and Mauritania were found to be difficult to uphold, since no
clear evidence was found that the tribal leaders of Western Sahara had ever effectively
recognized the authority of either of those entities in the manner of offering obeisance,
paying taxes, or contributing troops for the common defense.

The court noted,

however, that even though neither state had ever exercised any viable territorial
sovereignty over the territory, the possibility still existed that the Sultan of Morocco may
have exercised authority over some of the Western Saharan tribes at various periods of
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time. Perhaps most damaging to the legality of the Moroccan claim was, however, the
decision by the court that none of the historical documents and treaties (including the
Treaty of Marrakesh of 1967, the Hispano-Moroccan Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation of 20 November 1861, a treaty with the United States of 1836, a treaty with
the United Kingdom of 1856 dealing with the safety of mariners, the Treaty of Tetuan of
1860, Anglo-Moroccan Agreement of 13 March 1895, and the Franco-German
exchange of letters of 4 November 1911) presented by the Moroccan government as
evidence of its legal claim to the territory established official international recognition of
Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, although

indications of recognition of

Moroccan authority or influence over some nomads in the territory could again be
construed from documents relating to shipwrecked sailors (Western Sahara: Advisory
Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1975: 4, 29-31, 39-54).
A similar line of reasoning was applied to the more vaguely-defined Mauritanian
claim. The Mauritanian position was much weaker, since Mauritania, as a modern
political entity, had not existed prior to French colonization, and, as a result, the
Mauritanian claim appeared to fare somewhat worse than did the claim of Morocco.
Much of the phraseology supporting Mauritanian claims appeared to rest simply upon
the nomadic character of the peoples of Western Sahara, who did indeed, from time to
time, move across political frontiers.

While the court acknowledged such nomadic

behavior and found that basic „rights relating to the land‟ had formerly existed between
Western Sahara and the „Mauritanian entity‟ that constituted legal ties between the two
territories, such ties were not judged to constitute viable evidence of Mauritanian
sovereignty, a central allegiance of tribes, or even of „simply inclusion‟ within the same
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political entity (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1975: 47-48,
53-55, 56-57, 60).
The court closed its advisory opinion by stating that no evidence of territorial
sovereignty between either Morocco or Mauritania and Western Sahara had been found
which would affect the application of General Assembly Resolution #1514 and grant
self-determination for the peoples of the territory (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of
16 October 1975, 1975:

60).

Stymied by the legal process, both Morocco and

Mauritania prevailed directly upon Spain to divide the territory between them before
withdrawing Spanish sovereignty (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 19), even as the United
States, viewing Morocco as a staunch Cold War ally and one of the few Arab states
willing to play an important role in an American-brokered Middle East peace process,
moved to grant strong diplomatic support to the Moroccan territorial claim (Campbell,
2003:

38).86

To further enforce that claim, the Moroccan government launched a

„Green March‟ of 350,000 Moroccan „volunteers‟ who entered the territory on November
6, 1975 to seize it for Morocco.

The entry of the massive number of Moroccans

shattered any optimism remaining among the Sahrawi peoples from the issuance of the
ICJ advisory opinion, and most of them, led by elements of POLISARIO, fled across the
small Algerian frontier to seek refuge in Tindouf, Algeria, leaving remnants of the
population behind in Al „Ayun to protest the invasion (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 5-6).

86

The Moroccan government, widely viewed internationally as the model of a stable, moderate Arab
regime, successfully portrayed POLISARIO as a leftist-dominated organization under the control of
Algeria. Since that time, Moroccan officials have variously described POLISARIO as being a movement
of Cuban mercenaries, Iranian-backed revolutionaries, allies of such Palestinian terrorists as Ahmed
Jibril, and – most recently – al-Qa‟eda (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 19). The fact that Algeria and Libya
were both supporting POLISARIO may have also served to heighten American concerns, given that both
states – especially the latter – were widely viewed in the United States as being politically radical.
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Meanwhile, the Spanish government, even as it stated its willingness to withdraw
from the territory, emphasized the unique character of the Western Saharan peoples
and denied their cultural inclusion within either of the neighboring states (Western
Sahara:

Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1975: 54). Facing a de-facto fait

accompli from Morocco and political pressure from the United States, however, the
Spanish government, led by the dying Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Franco
y Bahamonde, shelved its plans to hold a territorial referendum and, without consulting
the Saharan people, signed the Madrid Accords eight days later on November 14, 1975.
Those accords provided for the participation by deputy governors, nominated by the
governments of Morocco and Mauritania, in the governance of the territory pending the
Spanish withdrawal of sovereignty.

Even though verbiage contained within this

document stated that the views of the Saharan population would be respected, it was
viewed by both Moroccan and Mauritanian officials as little more than an agreement for
partition (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 5-6).
Fearing an imminent annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania,
the Security Council responded quickly, issuing Resolution #377 by consensus on
October 22, 1975 which appealed to the parties concerned to demonstrate restraint,
and Resolution #379 by consensus on November 2, 1975 which asked Moroccan King
Hassan II to forgo the Green March. When the Moroccan government ignored these
resolutions and set the Green March into effect four days later on November 6, 1975,
the Security Council responded that same day by issuing Resolution #380 by
consensus, „deploring‟ the conducting of the Green March and calling for the withdrawal
of all Moroccan personnel from the territory of Western Sahara (United Nations Security
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Council Resolutions #377, #379, and #380, 1975). Meanwhile, the General Assembly
continued to express optimism with Resolution #3458, issued on December 10, 1975,
reaffirming the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and requesting the
parties to the Madrid Accords to ensure respect for Sahrawi aspirations (United Nations
General Assembly Resolution #3458, 1975).
The governments of Morocco and Mauritania continued to press ahead with
partition and annexation, however, settling the nature of that partition on February 27,
1976; on the very day that POLISARIO declared the independence of the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic. The population of Spanish Sahara was estimated at that time to
number less than 100,000, of which an estimated 68,000 were refugees living abroad or
within the peripheries of the territory, many as a result of the „Green March‟ of
November 1975. Although the POLISARIO Front, now fielding roughly 5,000-7,000
troops, was widely believed to have the support of much of this population, a large-scale
military invasion mounted that spring by both Moroccan and Mauritanian troops forced
POLISARIO to seek refuge along the small Algerian frontier adjacent to the refugee
center in Tindouf as the former Spanish Sahara was politically divided between its two
larger neighbors (Mercer, 1976: 504-507).
The Security Council, faced with this apparent disregard by both Morocco and
Mauritania for any realistic Sahrawi self-determination, exhibited a somewhat surprising
silence and declined to hand down any further resolutions regarding the matter for
nearly 13 years (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1976-1987). The issue of
Western Sahara was also a contentious matter for General Assembly, given that both
Mauritanian and Morocco were post-colonial, indigenously-ruled African states claiming
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to be addressing an injustice wrought against them by 15th century Spanish colonialism
(Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1975: 4, 29-31, 39-57, 60).
General Assembly resolutions issued regarding Western Sahara during 1976, 1977,
and 1978 thus castigated neither Morocco nor Mauritania for their invasion and
annexation of the territory but simply continued to express the hope that the national
aspirations of the Sahrawi peoples would eventually be taken into account (United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions #31/32, #31/45, #32/22, and #33/31, 19761978). Western Sahara was also a difficult issue to resolve for other Third Worlddominated international organizations, such as the OAU and NAM, to resolve, and the
Moroccan government sought to exploit this lack of Third World unity for Western
Saharan independence by describing POLISARIO as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Algerian regime, designed to advance Algeria‟s radical agenda (Solarz, 1979/1980:
281, 285).
In conducting its subsequent counterinsurgency mission, L'Armée royale du
Maroc appears to have used the „cost-benefit‟ approach, involving the systematic torture
of political prisoners and violently repressive military campaigns designed to rid the
territory of nationalist sentiment (Smith, 1987: 145). American military aid to Morocco
also served to reduce Algerian military ascendancy in the region, leading the Moroccan
government to threaten to violate the Algerian frontier and attack Sahrawi refugee
camps in Tindouf (Zunes, 1995: 26).87 In contrast, the POLISARIO has, over the years,
made defined efforts to avoid civilian casualties by targeting only Moroccan troops;
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Incursions into Mauritanian territory were routine until the Moroccan military moved to a more defensive
strategy during 1982 (Zunes, 1995: 26).
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efforts that eventually garnered wide international support for the independence
movement (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6). As the Moroccan/Mauritanian occupation
set in, POLISARIO began to receive military support from both Algeria and Libya, and
by August 1979 the insurgent group had succeeded to forcing Mauritania to relinquish
any formal claims to the former colony. Although Morocco quickly extended its formal
territorial claim to include the entirety of the former Spanish Sahara, Moroccan forces
had themselves, by that time, been forced out of all but a miniscule portion of Saharan
territory that was centered, in typical colonial fashion, within the urban enclaves. Inside
those besieged towns, some 50,000 Moroccan troops attempted to enforce the
Moroccan claim of sovereignty over the entire territory while being continuously harried
by an estimated 12,000–15,000 full-time POLISARIO guerillas (Solarz, 1979/1980: 281,
284-285).
The steadfastness of POLISARIO did not go unnoticed internationally. Solarz, in
testifying before Congress during 1979, noted that evaluations conducted by area
specialists, journalists, and veteran observers of African liberation movements that
included spending time with POLISARIO units and in Sahrawi refugee camps
contended that the POLISARIO had, by the late 1970s, managed to create a viable
nationalist conscience (as opposed to mere tribalism) within the Sahrawi people along
with a remarkable degree of independent organizational competence (U. S. Policy and
the Conflict in Western Sahara, 1979).

Solarz quotes a leading (and un-named)

Spanish official with extensive experience in Western Sahara who summed up
POLISARIO activities within the Sahrawi peoples by stating that “POLISARIO has
created a nation” (Solarz, 1979/1980: 286). POLISARIO‟s efforts at nation-building led
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the OAU, at its annual summit held in Monrovia, Liberia during July 17-20, 1979, to call
for a ceasefire and a territorial referendum in Western Sahara by a vote of 33 to two,
with eight abstentions. The subsequent NAM Conference in Havana, Cuba endorsed
the OAU resolution, and condemned Morocco for its annexation of the former
Mauritanian claim. By the end of 1979, a total of 32 countries (most of which were in
Africa, but also included Mexico) had recognized the POLISARIO as the legitimate
authority in Western Sahara (Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 285). The General Assembly
eventually reflected this sea-change in Resolution #34/37, issued on November 21,
1979, which noted the actions by the OAU and NAM “with satisfaction” and, for the first
time, „deploring‟ the situation “resulting from the continuing occupation of Western
Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently
evacuated by Mauritania” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #34/37, 1979).
One year later, on November 11, 1980, Resolution #35/19 reiterated these concerns
and recognized the legitimacy of the anti-Moroccan insurgency, while declining to name
POLISARIO directly (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #35/19, 1980).
As a result, the fortunes of POLISARIO appeared to be on the rise during that
time period, and the COW Extra-State Dataset defines, with some validity, the status of
the insurgency in Western Sahara as late as 1983 as representing a victory for the
insurgents (Sarkees, 2000:

123-144).

Efforts were made by Moroccan officials to

portray POLISARIO as representing the forefront of Communist encroachment in
Northwest Africa, however, and the administration of President Jimmy Carter, shaken
by the fall of Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, agreed to supply military and financial aid for
L'Armée royale du Maroc during October 1979 in the form of Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopter
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gunships and North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft (Solarz,
1979/1980:

287-288, 296).88

The United States, France, and Sa‟udi Arabia

dramatically increased their support of the Moroccan position over the next few years
with counterinsurgency training; training further enhanced with technical assistance that
enabled Moroccan authorities to construct an 800 mile sand-wall that isolated 80% of
the territory from penetration by POLISARIO. This vital assistance revived Morocco‟s
declining fortunes, and allowed L'Armée royale du Maroc to secure its position in the
territory (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6). The Moroccan government was also skillful
diplomatically in playing a unique hand in the developing world as both an African state
and an Arab state; while the OAU backed Sahrawi self-determination and allowed
POLISARIO membership in the regional body (leading Morocco to withdraw its own
membership in retaliation) (Campbell, 2003: 47), the major influence wielded by King
Hassan II in both Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya and the Islamic Conference kept
Algerian officials from even placing the issue before either organization (Zunes, 1995:
23).89 Among international Arab organizations, only the Arab Steadfastness Front (a
grouping of hard-line Arab states opposed to American-sponsored peace negotiations
with Israel) formally endorsed the POLISARIO cause, and that endorsement amounted
to little more than rhetoric (Zunes, 1995: 23). This diplomatic push appears to have
yielded important results for the Moroccan position in Western Sahara, since the nature
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In fact, POLISARIO was the only major liberation movement in Africa not to request or receive direct
Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban military assistance (Solarz, 1979/1980: 287).
On January 8, 1999, Esmat Abdul Meguid, Secretary-General of the Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya, put
the issue to rest by stating that the organization supported Morocco's territorial integrity in the Sahara
issue (Arab League Supports Morocco‟s Territorial Integrity, 1999: 1).
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of the General Assembly resolutions underwent a definable change during the latter part
of 1981.

Harsh condemnations of Moroccan activities in Western Sahara and

legitimization of POLISARIO activities within the territory were now replaced with
appeals for a territorial referendum; verbiage that would set the tone for all future
General Assembly resolutions (numbering at least 46 through the year 2008) regarding
Western Sahara (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1982-2008).90
Even with these enhancements to the Moroccan political and military position in
Western Sahara, a military stalemate set in between L'Armée royale du Maroc and
POLISARIO during the late 1980s with the POLISARIO in loose control of a small
„liberated zone‟ outside the sand-wall, and 180,000 Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria
(Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6). During late 1988, however, anti-government rioting
erupted in neighboring Algeria that included an attack upon POLISARIO headquarters
in Algiers by Algerian activists resentful of the costs of supporting the Sahrawi cause. A
subsequent win by the radical Front Islamique du Salut during the initial round of
elections in December 1991 led Algerian officials to suspend an upcoming second
round of voting which would have likely discharged the long-ruling FLN party from
power. The combination of these events served to distract the Algerian government
from the conflict in Western Sahara and reduced leverage for POLISARIO operations.
The assumption in diplomatic circles that King Hassan II would lose his throne should
he concede defeat to POLISARIO also significantly raised the stakes both for the
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That listing of resolutions included #36/46, #37/28, #38/40, #39/40, #40/50, #41/16, #42/78, #43/33,
#44/88, #45/21, #46/67, #47/25, #48/49, #48/250, ##48/250[A], #48/250[B], #49/44, #49/247, #50/36,
#50/36, #51/143, #52/228[A], #52/228[B], #52/75, #53/64, #53/18[A], #53/18[B], #54/87, #54/268,
#55/141, #55/262, #56/69, #56/298, #57/135, #57/309, #57/331, #58/109, #58/309, #59/131, #59/308,
#60/114, #60/280, #61/125, #61/290, #62/116, and #63/105 (United Nations General Assembly/Security
Council Resolutions, 1981-2008).
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Moroccan government and for its American, French, and Persian Gulf supporters, and
granted heightened maneuvering room for L'Armée royale du Maroc in its
counterinsurgency operations (Zunes, 1995: 31-35).91
These events were reflected in activities by the Security Council, which, following
a period of dormancy regarding the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara of nearly
13 years, again took up the matter of Western Sahara on September 20, 1988 with the
issuance of Resolution #621 (United Nations Security Council Resolution #621, 1988).
Both that resolution and Resolution #658, issued on June 27, 1990, refrained from any
condemnations of Moroccan counterinsurgency operations or legitimization of
POLISARIO operations, and simply pressed the goal of a territory referendum; an effort
that culminated with the issuance of Resolution #690 on April 29, 1991, authorizing the
formation of Mission des Nations unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara
Occidental (MINURSO) to take necessary steps to hold such a referendum (United
Nations Security Council Resolutions #658 and #690, 1990-1991).

A cease-fire

between L'Armée royale du Maroc and POLISARIO was finally concluded on
September 6, 1991 in an effort to end the violence, and MINURSO was given the task
of both monitoring the ceasefire and identifying eligible participants for a referendum.
The „eligibility question‟ has been continually shelved ever since, however, due to the
Moroccan position that only current territorial residents must be allowed to participate; a
population that includes Moroccan citizens who participated in the 1975 Green March
and their descendants, but excludes the significant Sahrawi Diaspora exiled in Algerian
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King Hassan II, ever the flexible politician, continued to play to his American supporters during this
period by sending troops to fight along those of the United States during the Gulf War of JanuaryFebruary 1991, despite the deep unpopularity of that move with the Moroccan people (Campbell, 2003:
38).
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refugee camps, the greater Maghreb, and Europe.

Such a position would virtually

insure a vote for continued Moroccan rule, and is thus totally unacceptable to
POLISARIO (Campbell, 2003: 47-48). By 1996, Amnesty International was charging
that MINURSO was essentially following the dictates of the Moroccan government, and,
in doing so, was a “silent witness to blatant human rights violations” (Amnesty
International, 1996: 12). Even so, a series of at least 83 additional resolutions by both
the General Assembly and the Security Council would be issued during 1991-2008,
calling for a referendum which would never be held while Morocco further secured its
grip on Western Sahara and tens of thousands of Sahrawi people languished in refugee
camps (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1991-2008).92
A brief Intifada erupted during September-October 1999, followed by sporadic
demonstrations that continued throughout the territory for the next six years; unrest that
has required the long-term stationing of 120,000 troops to sustain Moroccan authority
within the territory and protect the 200,000 Moroccan settlers moved there by the
Moroccan government (currently outnumbering native Sahrawis by roughly two to one)
to insure the defeat of any possible referendum on Saharan independence. Although
official Sahrawi representation within Morocco is currently conducted primarily through
the Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (an organization created by the Moroccan
monarchy and staffed with pro-integration tribal elders), the Moroccan government, in
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This listing of resolutions included United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #46/67, #47/25,
#48/49, #48/250, #48/250[A], #48/250[B], #49/44,#49/427, #50/36, #51/143, #52/75, #52/228[A],
#52/228[B], #53/18[A], #53/18[B], #53/64, #54/87, #54/268, #55/141, #55/262, #56/69, #56/298, #57/109,
#57/135, #57/309, #57/331, #58/109, #58/309, #59/131, #59/308, #60/114, #60/280, #61/125, #61/290,
#62/116, and #63/105, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions #809, #907, #1033, #1942,
#1056, #1084, #1108, #1131, #1133, #1148, #1163, #1185, #1198, #1204, #1215, #1224, #1228, #1232,
#1235, #1238, #1263, #1282, #1292, #1309, #1324, #1342, #1349, #1359, #1380, #1394, #1406, #1429,
#1463, #1469, #1485, #1495, #1513, #1523, #1541, #1570, #1598, #1634, #1675, #1720, #1754, #1783
and #1813 (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1991-2008).
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an effort to further discourage Saharan nationalism, encourages native Sahrawis to
assimilate within metropolitan Morocco through offers of employment and free housing.
Even with such blandishments, however, a second Intifada broke out in the territory
during May 2005 following the transfer of a popular POLISARIO prisoner from the
Saharan town of al-„Ayun to a location in the southern region of metropolitan Morocco.
Amid the violence, the Moroccan government announced an offer, during November of
that year, of „enhanced autonomy‟ for the territory under general Moroccan sovereignty
(Stephan and Mundy, 2006:

9-18).

While an autonomy plan was subsequently

presented to the United Nations during 2007, the territory still remains under de-facto
Moroccan sovereignty, although its legal status under international law remains
unresolved (The World Factbook, 2007: 627-628).
Exploiting divisions existing within the General Assembly and among the OAU,
the Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya, and the Islamic Conference allowed the Moroccan
government to reduce the international isolation that doomed South Africa‟s campaigns
in Namibia. Great power support of the Moroccan position by the United States and
France, enhanced by support from Sa„udi Arabia and the Gulf states, also ensured that
POLISARIO would be denied the legitimacy and recognition it needed to present a
viable alternative to Moroccan rule. Meanwhile, the Moroccan government has made
inroads into co-opting indigenous nationalism by morphing its original cost-benefit
approach to counterinsurgency toward an approach along the lines of the social welfare
model that encourages native Sahrawis to assimilate within metropolitan Morocco and
emphasizes Morocco as the motherland for the Arab and Berber population residing
along the Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa.
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King Mohammed VI also attempts to

present himself as a quasi-father figure who seeks to call into remembrance a past
union of these peoples in the area he terms the „Great South.‟

This combined

counterinsurgency strategy has resulted in a number of disillusioned former POLISARIO
guerillas moving to Morocco proper to live and work as Moroccan citizens, and may
indeed be, as Moroccan officials claim, a sign of the decline of POLISARIO as a political
force (Stephan and Mundy, 2006:

9-18).

Even so, unrest continues among the

indigenous population to the point that the the Moroccan government finally presented
an autonomy plan for the territory to the United Nations during 2007. It thus remains to
be seen whether the nationalists of POLISARIO, having now contested Moroccan rule
for nearly 33 years, will ever set aside their dream of independence (Mohsen-Finan,
2002: 5-6; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18; The World Factbook, 2007: 627-628).
Given the success of the Moroccan government at dividing its critics, little outside
support can now be found for Sahrawi nationalist aspirations outside of non-government
organizations (NGOs) such as the Roxbury, Massachusetts-based Freedom House,
which recently found the Moroccan administration in Western Sahara to be among the
'worst of the worst' globally (Worst of the Worst, 2009: 2).
It is enlightening to compare this counterinsurgency campaign with the previous
one conducted by the South African government. Both countries faced strong insurgent
movements in territories they claimed as their own (although South Africa‟s claim to
Namibia was arguably more legitimate that Morocco‟s claim to Western Sahara, given
the League of Nations mandate under which South Africa exercised sovereignty over
the territory), both countries were physically contiguous with the territories involved, and
both countries, at times, used strong coercive measures associated with the cost138

benefit approach. In both cases, guerillas were able to gain sanctuary and training
camps within neighboring states, both insurgent groups gained legitimacy through the
verbiage of United Nations resolutions, and insurgents in both cases continued to strive
for independent statehood for an extended period of years (24 years for SWAPO, and
34 years – thus far – for POLISARIO).93

The cases differed in the nature of

international support for the insurgencies, however. Whereas the Soviet Union and its
Cuban auxiliaries were actively involved in support of the Namibian insurgents,
POLISARIO searched in vain for great power support (Albright, 1994: 42; Stephan and
Mundy, 2006: 6). The reaction of the United Nations to the conflict in Western Sahara
also differed dramatically from that of the Namibian case. While the United Nations
membership was fairly united in opposition to South African counterinsurgency
operations for well over twenty years (although France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom frequently abstained from anti-South African resolutions in the Security
Council), United Nations‟ unity regarding Western Sahara was frustrated from the start.
After issuing three strong resolutions during late 1975 (United Nations Security Council
Resolutions #377, #379, and #380, 1975), the Security Council went into silence for the
next 13 years, possibly because France and the United States, both of which were
permanent members of the Security Council, were actively being co-opted by the
Moroccan government into supporting the annexation (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6).
The General Assembly, on the other hand, initiated its interest in the matter by passing
four resolutions during 1976-1978 expressing vague wishes for Sahrawi self93

By 1973, the United Nations General Assembly had recognized the legitimacy of the anti-South African
insurgency in Namibia by referring to SWAPO by name, whereas the Assembly only recognized the antiMoroccan insurgency in Western Sahara as a general grouping without specific references to
POLISARIO ((United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #5111 and #32/19, 1973 and 1980).
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determination (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #31/32, #31/45, #32/22,
and #33/31, 1976-1978), only to heighten its opposition to foreign occupation of the
territory during 1979-1980 by directly naming and castigating both Morocco and
Mauritania and recognizing the legitimacy of the insurgency (United Nations General
Assembly Resolution #34/37, 1979; United Nations General Assembly Resolution
#35/19, 1980). During that period of rising General Assembly support, POLISARIO
motivation was enhanced to the point that Moroccan occupation forces found
themselves in a virtual state of siege; indeed, by 1983, the COW Extra-State Dataset
had coded this conflict as a defeat for Morocco (Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 284-285;
Sarkees, 2000:

123-144).

By the early 1980s, however, a split in the General

Assembly between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab states linked to Jāmi „at ad-Duwal
al-„Arabiyya and the Islamic Conference reduced General Assembly resolutions to mere
calls for a territorial referendum; calls that were routinely ignored by a Moroccan
government which was now being openly courted by both France and the United States
(United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1982-2008; Stephan and Mundy, 2006:
6). By 1988, this lack of international support had left POLISARIO virtually friendless
and forced it to accede to a temporary political solution of Moroccan administration that
eventually granted quasi-legitimacy to an occupation that continues to this day (United
Nations Security Council Resolutions #621, #658, and #690, 1988-1991).94 Even so,
the rising and falling of POLISARIO‟s fortunes in concert with the ebb and flow of
General Assembly support provides support for Hypothesis #1, while the lack of great
94

This continuance of the Moroccan occupation leads me to disagree with the COW Extra-State
Dataset‟s coding of this conflict as a victory for POLISARIO and argue that the conflict should now be
codes as a victory for Morocco (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).
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power opposition that has allowed the Moroccan government to prevail in its occupation
provides support for Hypothesis #2.
D.

China, and Victory in Tibet (1950-1951, through 1974)
Tibet has a long history with the Chinese state. During the Qing and Manchu

dynasties extending from 1644 through 1911, the imperial Chinese court began to
extend formal control over Tibet, with the stationing there of imperial envoys protected
by Chinese garrisons. In the wake of early 19th century European incursions into China,
however, Tibet obtained substantial autonomy to the point that Chinese control became
essentially symbolic.

Although this autonomy further increased following the 1911

revolution that established the Republic of China, claims of continuing Chinese
sovereignty were enhanced during the next few decades by the lack of meaningful
efforts on the part of Tibetan officials to secure de jure symbols of independence might
gain international recognition (Chen, 2006: 56).
Following the October 1, 1949 declaration of the PRC, however, Tibetan
representatives were sent to India, the United Kingdom, and the United States to appeal
for support of Tibet‟s membership in the United Nations as an independent state. None
of the three countries offered any such support, and cautioned the Tibetans against
unduly provoking the PRC. Nor were any resolutions issued by the United Nations in
support of Tibetan independence. Meanwhile, Máo Zédōng, Chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party, was developing a sudden urgency for reincorporating Tibet into the
Chinese state; an urgency that now appears to have derived from his suspicions that
India, the United Kingdom, and the United States were actively working to incorporate
Tibet into an emerging anti-PRC political bloc encircling the Chinese state (Sheng,
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2006: 17, 25). Máo had, in fact, received a certain amount of Tibetan encouragement
for the reincorporation of the territory into the PRC as a result of an internal religious
rivalry between the Dalai Lama and the Pachen Lama for leadership in the territory.
The 13th Dalai Lama had died during 1933, and the 9th Pachen Lama followed him in
death in 1937, even as the two year-old Tenzin Gyatso was being recognized as being
the 10th incarnation of the Dalai Lama. It took twelve more years until Lobsang Trinley
Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen was recognized in 1949 as being the 14th Pachen Lama, and
since that recognition was conducted by followers of the late 9 th Pachen Lama living in
exile in Xining, China, only the earlier recognition of the Dalai Lama was confirmed by
Tibetan authorities. This rebuff led the Pachen Lama to express loyalty to the newly
proclaimed PRC on October 1, 1949, and call for the „liberation‟ of Tibet at an early date
in order to press for his own confirmation (Sheng, 2006: 29).
During the following year, Chinese forces prepared for the impending operation
through which Tibetan annexation would be effected, and by early October 1950,
deployment of Chinese military assets in Sichuan Province on Tibet‟s eastern frontier
had been completed. In the Changdu area of eastern Tibet, adjacent from Sichuan
Province, the Tibetan military stood at 8,000 strong, with 4,500 regular troops backed by
3,500 militiamen, and, on October 6, 1950, elements of the Chinese People‟s Liberation
Army (PLA) 18th Army with a manpower of 40,000 troops entered Tibet in two
detachments in an effort to encircle Changdu.

Although PLA forces suffered high

losses due to exhaustion and the difficult terrain, Changdu was taken on October 24,
1950 with Tibetan losses of 5,700 troops and militiamen; fully 70% of Tibet‟s military
assets in the area. The suddenness with which the Changdu garrison collapsed did not
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go unnoticed by the Tibetan population.

Many local officials now viewed further

resistance as futile, and were willing to endorse Máo‟s Ten Agreements (published on
November 11, 1950) regarding the nature of the Chinese presence in Tibet. To secure
further local cooperation, Máo promised the Tibetans that the PLA‟s purpose in its
campaign was to cleanse Tibet of foreign imperialists and Jiang Jieshi reactionaries,
and agreed to inform Tibetan authorities in advance of further PLA movements, adding
that cooperation with the PLA would reduce the need for large numbers of Chinese
troops to be introduced into the territory. With Tibetan resistance now checkmated, the
main adversary to the Chinese occupation would be the bitter cold which inflicted heavy
casualties on both soldiers and horses (Sheng, 2006: 15-16, 18-19, 22-23, 31-32).
In the wake of the military collapse at Changdu, the Dalai Lama, just enthroned
as Tibetan head of state, departed Lhasa and resettled in Yadong, near the Indian
frontier. He then sent a message to Máo; calling for negotiations, but rejecting the
incorporation of Tibet within the PRC and demanding a full Chinese military withdrawal.
The Indian government, fearing a change in the balance of power in South Asia, initially
provided political support to Tibetan authorities by condemning the Chinese operation,
but President Jawaharlal Nehru declined to sponsor Tibetan efforts to bring the case
before the United Nations after bluntly being informed by Máo that Tibet was an integral
part of the Chinese state whose frontiers would be robustly defended. With Indian
support blocked, the Dalai Lama, desperate to salvage a measure of autonomy for the
territory, arranged to send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate Tibet‟s political status
only to find Máo now demanding Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen‟s
confirmation by Tibetan authorities as the 14 th Pachen Lama be announced prior to any
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such negotiations. With no outside support from either the major powers or the United
Nations, the Dalai Lama soon agreed to Máo‟s demands, and, on May 24, 1951, signed
the Seventeenth Agreement of Tibet‟s „peaceful liberation‟ by the PLA (Sheng, 2006:
23, 30-31). While the Dalai Lama would remain the spiritual and religious leader of
Tibet, the actual authority would from this time forward be held by the Chinese
government itself (Chen, 2006: 54).
Indian President Nehru was not at all comfortable with the Chinese presence
directly across India‟s northeastern frontier, however, and his efforts to encourage
Tibetan notables to establish a people‟s democratic movement for the advancement of
Tibetan independence soon led to the formation of the Mimang Tsogpa, or People‟s
Party. Elements of a nationalist insurgency also began to form in the eastern region of
Kham shortly after the incorporation of Tibet within the PRC, due to local protests
against the replacement of local secular and religious leadership with direct Chinese
authority.

Worsening conditions in that region led many of those disenchanted

individuals to the environs of Lhasa, where, during the course of the 1950s, they sought
to form a volunteer guerilla army to support the Dalai Lama at the same time as the
Mimang Tsogpa was distributing pamphlets and urging the people to unite against the
Chinese presence (McGranahan, 2006: 109-111).
By 1956, The Far East Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became
interested in these anti-Chinese efforts, and began to offer material support toward the
formation of a Tibetan resistance army. This army, formed by uniting various disparate
guerilla groupings into a single entity known as the Chushi Gangdrug, held its
inauguration ceremony on June 16, 1958 in the Lhoka region, south of Lhasa, with
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about 5,000 guerillas deployed with a rank structure and administered as a quasi-army.
A merit system was also established, with a cash prize of 500 Indian rupees offered for
the capture of a PLA officer‟s documents and possessions.

By that time, Chushi

Gangdrug troops were being covertly trained at Camp Hale, Colorado; training that
would continue for the next six years in such fields as paramilitary operations, bomb
building, map making, photographic surveillance, radio operation techniques, and
intelligence collection (McGranahan, 2006:

109-111, 113-114).

That training also

included simulation in high-altitude, low-temperature combat operations, and on their
return to South Asia, the guerillas were resupplied at their base camps in Tibet and
Nepal by American aircraft flying through Indian airspace (Kramer, 2006: 11, 13).
The Chushi Gangdrug, far from being a mere creation of the CIA, was a genuine,
grassroots resistance movement against Chinese occupation, however, and CIA efforts
to manage the insurgency were often hindered by the agency‟s poor understanding of
Tibetan regional variations, language, and culture. While, to outside observation, this
organization was a pan-Tibetan resistance group, it was in fact dominated by
Khampans, many of whom were antagonistic to the central government in Lhasa even
as they were respectful of the Dalai Lama. CIA logistics were typically coordinated
through Gyalo Thondup, one of the Dalai Lama‟s elder brothers, who, being from the
northeast region of Amdo, was not always sympathetic to systems of authority laid down
by the Khampa, even though the Khampa were providing the bulk of the guerilla force.
In return, many of the Chushi Gangdrug soldiers viewed the worldly Thondup as being
more of a patron of American aid than a true resistance leader, while other members of
the insurgency retained strong elements of autonomy and allegiances based upon
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native-place networks. Failure by the CIA to understand these regional alliances of
politically fractured Tibet occasionally led to guerillas being sent into areas where they
lacked popular support, and, on at least one occasion, resulted in the decimation of a
Chushi Gangdrug unit caught in a PLA ambush (McGranahan, 2006: 109-111, 113118).
On March 10, 1959, amid rumors that Chinese authorities were planning to arrest
the Dalai Lama, a popular armed revolt involving thousands of Tibetans arose in Lhasa
against Chinese occupation. PLA troops were initially ordered to remain in Lhasa in
defensive positions to avoid inflaming the situation, and those orders would remain in
effect for ten days.95 By March 20, 1959, however, Chinese troops were directed to
take robust measures to crush the rebellion; taking control of all strategic points, and
containing the rebels in the capital city of Lhasa with the understanding that troop
reinforcements would arrive within ten days. On the following day, Chinese authorities
accused the Tibetan Kashag (council of ministers) of betrayal of the Chinese
motherland, and dissolved the Kashag seven days later. During the following weeks as
Chinese reinforcements arrived, Tibetan guerillas were ruthlessly hunted down in Lhasa
and in other parts of Tibet in a counterinsurgency operation of the cost-benefit mode
that was essentially concluded by the end of March, 1959, although the rebellion wasn‟t
fully contained until late 1961 (Chen, 2006: 54, 61-62, 71, 77-80).96

95
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During that time, the 14 Dalai Lama fled the capital, and, on March 31, 1959, crossed into India to the
city of Dharamsala, where he remains to this day (Chen, 2006: 54).
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The subsequent Chushi Gangdrug capture of classified documents from a PLA intelligence officer
proved that over 87,000 Tibetans had been killed in Lhasa alone during PLA counterinsurgency
operations conducted during March 1959 - September 1960 (McGranahan, 2006: 119-120).
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The United Nations, having moved into a more activist phase of its existence,
issued United Nations General Assembly Resolution #1353 on October 21, 1959 that
stated that “the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled . . . to civil and religious
liberty . . . [and] the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed” (United Nations
General Assembly Resolution #1353, 1959).97

Two further United Nations General

Assembly resolutions would follow; Resolution #1723 on December 20, 1961, which
renewed its call for “the cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination”
(United Nations General Assembly Resolution #1723, 1961), and Resolution #2079 on
December 18, 1965, which again renewed the call for “the cessation of all practices
which deprive the Tibetan people of the human rights and fundamental freedoms they
have always enjoyed” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution #2079, 1965).
Ominously missing from this latter resolution was the prescient verbiage relating to
either autonomy or self-determination found in the earlier two resolutions, and none of
these resolutions ever mentioned China by name, nor did they question the legitimacy
of Chinese rule in Tibet. Even if they had, United Nations‟ recognition of Taiwan instead
of the PRC as the legal representative of the Chinese people assured that any such
resolutions would be treated with little more than contempt by the Chinese government
(Grunfeld, 1996: 180).
The massive Tibetan exodus of 1959 led to Chushi Gangdrug operations being
eventually based in the little Tibetan kingdom of Mustang, located within the frontiers of
97

The decision by the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to
abstain from voting on this resolution served to weaken its impact (United Nations General Assembly
Resolution #1353, 1959).
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Nepal, where CIA support of the insurgency continued. Guerilla training at Camp Hale
also continued, with Chushi Gangdrug soldiers occasionally being parachuted into Tibet
from American aircraft (McGranahan, 2006: 120-122). Even so, Chushi Gangdrug
strength stood at only 2,100 guerillas by 1964; hardly enough to seriously challenge
Chinese control of Tibet, and regarded as little more than a foreign-inspired nuisance by
the Chinese government (Goldstein, 2006: 150). Indeed, the organization‟s Americanderived agenda was not truly designed to gain a viable independence for Tibet, but was
rather focused upon simply distracting the Chinese government, inflicting casualties
upon the PLA, and, most importantly, gathering intelligence against the PRC. Even this
limited support base from the United States came to an end in 1971 after National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger‟s secret trip to Beijing during July of that year led to a
strengthening of bonds between the two countries and the cessation of all American
support for the Tibetan guerillas (Kramer, 2006: 6-7, 10-11, 13). At that time, the
Nepali government, which had been quietly allowing the Chushi Gangdrug to operate
from its territory, moved to force the guerillas to withdraw altogether from Mustang. The
insurgency was finally terminated in 1974 by the intervention of the Dalai Lama‟s
brother-in-law, who convinced the remaining Chushi Gangdrug guerillas to cease
fighting and surrender to the Nepalese army. Since the over-riding allegiance of the
Chushi Gangdrug was to the Dalai Lama, the guerillas ceased operations and turned
their weapons over to Nepali authorities. Many of them received long sentences in
Nepali prisons, and Chushi Gangdrug survives today as little more than a Khampadominated social and political presence in the Tibetan community (McGranahan, 2006:
121-124, 127-128).
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Today, those who view Tibetan independence as a realistic possibility will take
little comfort from the international community. Since at least 1966, the United States
has categorically accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and specifically disallowed
relations with the Dharamsala-based Tibetan exile community led by the Dalai Lama
(Goldstein, 2004: 224).98 Shortly after Tibetan protests against Chinese rule erupted
during March 2008, European Union (EU) President José Manuel Durão Barroso
assured Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that Europe supported China‟s territorial integrity
and added that such support “naturally applies to Tibet” (EU Considers Tibet Part of
China, 2008: 1). This political support was markedly reinforced by an official statement
issued on October 29, 2008 by David Miliband, British Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, in which Miliband stated that the British government “do[es]
not support Tibetan independence . . . [and] regard[s] Tibet as part of the People‟s
Republic of China.” Within this statement, Miliband explicitly replaced the “outdated
concept of suzerainty” under which United Kingdom, former colonial authority over
much of South Asia, had previously viewed China‟s position in Tibet with full Chinese
sovereignty over the territory (Miliband, 2008: 1). From both the Chinese and the
international points of view, the matter is considered to be closed.
This insurgency floundered for a number of reasons.

First, as previously

mentioned, international support for Tibetan independence was then as it remains
today: virtually nonexistent. Even though Tibetan independence is currently a widely98

“Since at least 1996, US policy has explicitly recognized the Tibetan Autonomous Region . . . as part of
the People‟s Republic of China. This long-standing policy is consistent with the view of the entire
international community, including all China‟s neighbors: no country recognizes Tibet as a sovereign
state. Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United States does not conduct
diplomatic relations with the self-styled „Tibetan Government-in-Exile‟” (Relations of the United States with
Tibet, 1994).
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championed cause throughout much of academia and the arts, it is important to
remember that Tibet ceased to exist as a completely sovereign, independent state
during the late 17th century, having been politically subsumed by China (Chen, 2006:
56). Since that time, not a single country has ever recognized the independence of a
Tibetan political entity, and both the EU and the United Kingdom have recently affirmed
their recognition of full Chinese sovereignty of the territory (Relations of the United
States with Tibet, 1994; Grunfeld, 1996: 258; EU Considers Tibet Part of China, 2008:
1; Miliband, 2008: 1). Second, the United States government, which covertly supported
the Chushi Gangdrug, viewed the insurgency as little more than a platform for American
intelligence collection efforts and general harassment of Chinese occupation forces, and
at no time ever officially viewed Tibetan independence as being politically feasible, or
even desirable (Kramer, 2006: 6-7, 10-11, 13). Third, United Nations support of an
independent Tibet was limited to a single phrase mentioning self-determination within
General Assembly Resolution #1353; verbiage that was not repeated in General
Assembly Resolution #2079, the subsequent and final such resolution on the Tibetan
issue. On October 25, 1971, as per General Assembly Resolution #2758, the PRC
replaced Taiwan in both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
(United Nations General Assembly Resolution #2758, 1971), allowing Chinese interests
to be more fully protected and decreasing the likelihood that any further offending
resolutions would ever be passed. While United Nations pressure has successfully
been countered, interest by NGOs continues to impact global public opinion, with
Freedom House recently finding the Chinese administration in Tibet to be among the
top two of the 'worst of the worst' globally (Worst of the Worst, 2009: 2).
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This case differed radically from the previous two counterinsurgency campaigns,
even though the issues of United Nations condemnation and great power support of the
insurgency were very much in effect. First, United Nations pressure was very vague
and confined to the General Assembly which issued only three mild resolutions
regarding the conflict (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #1353, #1723,
and #2079), 1959, 1961, and 1965); a far cry from the combination of General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions which initially chastened Moroccan
intervention into Western Sahara and vilified South African counterinsurgency
operations in Namibia.

Second, great power support to insurgents – overt and

eventually definitive against South African forces in Namibia - was covert and
conducted through CIA channels; a potential advantage for the Chinese government in
being able to claim that no major power was recognizing the insurgency (Kramer, 2006:
11, 13; McGranahan, 2006: 109-111, 113-114). Third, Chushi Gangdrug insurgents
were united on little more than fealty to the Dalai Lama, and willingly ceased their
struggle at his indirect request during 1974 (McGranahan, 2006: 121-124, 127-128); a
far different motivation than the unrelenting nationalism that drove SWAPO and
POLISARIO to fight foreign occupation unceasingly for decades (Moroney, ed., 1989:
384-386; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18). Fourth, and perhaps most important, the
international pressure which drove the South Africans to develop nuclear weapons and
led the Moroccans to successfully divide the United Nations membership had little
impact upon the Chinese leadership, which regarded the United Nations with illdisguised contempt and the Chushi Gangdrug as little more than an American
provocation (Goldstein, 2006:

150; Grunfeld, 1996:
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180).

Faced with little viable

international opposition, the Chinese government was able to place the insurgency into
irrelevance. Few insurgencies can survive so ignominious a fate, and Chushi Gangdrug
was no exception.
E.

The United Kingdom, and Victory in Malaya (1948-1960)
British Malaya, located at the southern end of a narrow peninsula extending

southward from Southeast Asia into the South China Sea, was, by mid-20th century, a
long-term British possession with vital importance to the Sterling area of British
international currency flows due to its status as producer of one-third of the world‟s
rubber and tin (Silcock, 1952; 445-446). By the late 1940s, however, Malaya might well
have appeared to be an insurgent‟s paradise, with little future for continued British
authority (Ladwig, 2007: 57). Three-fourths of the territory was covered by jungle,
British authorities had only recently returned to the area following four years of wartime
Japanese occupation, and insurgencies were raging throughout the entire region: in
China, between the Communists and the Nationalists, in Indonesia, between Dutch
authorities and Indonesian rebels, in Indochina, between French authorities and Việt
Minh guerillas, and in the Philippines, between recently established government
authorities and Hukbalahap insurgents (Derry, 2003: 236). Even so, Malaya remained
quiet during the initial years of the post-Second World War era; a bastion of undisputed
European control within a sea of political instability (Pye, 1956: 70-71, 87-89).
Unrest simmered within the ethnic-Chinese community represented by the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), however; a consequence of the Japanese war-time
occupation of the region. Following the British capitulation of early 1942, the MCPinitiated Malayan People‟s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) had provided the bulk of
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resistance activities against Japanese forces, fielding roughly 7,000 guerillas in support
of Allied objectives. Although MPAJA insurgents managed to inflict only a few hundred
casualties against the highly-disciplined Japanese forces during the next three and onehalf years, the Chinese community itself paid a bitter price for providing such support,
losing up to 40,000 residents to Japanese retribution (Pye, 1956: 64-65, 69, 72).99 The
abrupt end to the war in the Pacific following the August 1945 nuclear attacks against
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan left a political vacuum in Japanese-occupied Southeast
Asia that was to shake European colonial domination in the area to its core, and by the
time that British Indian troops landed at Singapore on September 5, 1945 to re-establish
British sovereignty in Malaya, they found that the MPAJA, as the only viable military
force on the Malayan peninsula, had already established de-facto control across much
of the territory (Komer, 1972: 4).
As a gesture of understanding to the dynamic political situation, the British
government initially attempted to co-op the MPAJA, according them official military
status and staging impressive ceremonies in which MPAJA guerillas marched alongside
British Commonwealth troops under joint military command. Individual guerillas were
clothed, paid, and decorated by British authorities, and MCP leader Chin Peng,
considered by British authorities to be an outstanding guerilla leader, was invited to
London to receive the highly-coveted Order of the British Empire. Weapons were also
quietly collected from the guerillas, and the MPAJA eventually disbanded by the colonial
government (Komer, 1972: 4-5).

99

The MPAJA were more successful against fellow Malayans who did not share their vision of the future,
executing 2,543 of them as traitors and collaborators during the war years (Pye, 1956: 64-65, 69, 72).
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The MCP had not abandoned its goal of establishing a Communist state in
Malaya, however, and initially organized labor strikes to bring down the colonial
government before moving directly into terrorist activities that resulted in 191 murders
and abductions between October 1945 and December 1947 (Pye, 1956: 70-71, 87-89;
Komer, 1972:

5).

To counter the anti-colonial credentials of the MCP, the British

Colonial Office encouraged the formation of a Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to
allow for political expression among the ethnic Chinese apart from the Communists,
and, on February 1, 1948, announced the formation of a new political arrangement
entitled the Federation of Malaya to moderate nationalist demands by restoring
sovereign rights to the Malay sultans (Campbell, 1968: 139-140). This new political
arrangement markedly disfavored the Chinese community, however, since native
Malays automatically became citizens of the federation while second generation
residence was required for ethnic Chinese, even though ethnic Chinese and native
Malay communities in 1948 each accounted for approximately 42% of Malaya‟s six
million residents (the remainder including 13% Indian, 2% aboriginal, and 1%
European/Eurasian). Such a plan appeared to place existing Chinese communities into
the permanent status of a settler population, and a Gallup Poll of the period found that
less than one percent of Chinese residents would give undivided loyalty to the proposed
Malayan state (Hawkins, 1948: 76-80, 82).100 British officials also questioned the true
loyalty of the Chinese population, fearing that the activities of the MCP simply
100

While the poll, organized by Singapore newspaper Nan Chiau, received replies from 4,344
respondents, there was no system of selection, so the results are unscientific. Even so, it is remarkable
that only 38 individuals from that number were willing to surrender their existing Chinese citizenship in
order to become citizens of Malaya. Of the remainder, 4,275 were willing to accept Malayan citizenship
only within dual Chinese/Malayan nationality, and six were unwilling to accept Malayan citizenship in any
form (Hawkins, 1948: 82).
154

represented the onward march of monolithic international Communism. Those fears
would be heightened following the declaration of the PRC on October 1, 1949, with the
spectre of ethnic Chinese rule in Malaya serving as little more than a stalking horse for
de-facto control of the territory by the Communist leadership in Beijing (Silcock, 1949:
457-458).
MPAJA veterans, led by Chen Ping, were incensed by the diminished Chinese
position within this new political structure, and, believing that the Chinese community (if
not the entire Malayan population) would rally behind an effort to force out the British,
initiated a full-blown insurgency against the colonial administration with attacks against
police posts, communications facilities, rubber plantations, and tin-mining sites. The
insurgents initially took the title of the Malayan People‟s Anti-British Army (MPABA; so
named to provide linkage to their previous anti-Japanese activities), but soon renamed
the movement the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in an effort to co-op a wider
range of Malayan ethnic groupings. The establishment of a Communist state in Malaya
ruled by the ethnic-Chinese had little appeal outside of the Chinese community,
however, and even that community was badly split, with the insurgency being
denounced by a sizeable portion of the Malayan Chinese (especially those belonging to
the Kuomintang Party) as being unrepresentative of national aspirations (Hawkins,
1948: 76-80, 82; Pye, 1956: 87, 109 footnote; Hall, 1981: 877, 924). As a result, the
actual insurgency recruiting pool resided within a 500,000 strong grouping of Chinese
squatters (about one-twelfth of the national population) who had taken up residency on
the edge of the jungle during the time of the Japanese occupation and were considered
to have no legal rights to the land there whatsoever. Disenfranchised and disillusioned,
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they were easily induced to seek a change in the status quo and soon were responsible
for about 70% of total guerilla strength. Much of the remainder of the insurgency came
from MPAJA veterans who provided most of the officers of this underground army; an
army equipped primarily with light infantry weapons held over from wartime British
supply drops. In addition, a support group, approximately 11,000 strong and known as
the Min Yuen, was organized by the MCP to provide food, drugs, information, recruits,
and funding for MRLA operations (Komer, 1972: 7-8). With such basic competency in
organization, the MRLA was soon able to field between 7,000 and 12,000 Communist
guerillas operating in company-sized groups of about 100 members (Pye, 1956: 96-97,
109 footnote; Komer, 1972: 8-9).
The onset of this insurgency came at a bad time for British authorities, given that
British forces in Southeast Asia at the time consisted of just twelve infantry battalions
and one artillery battalion; less than half of which were combat troops (Ladwig, 2007:
58).

Outnumbered at best, the British were loath to acknowledge such a direct

challenge to their authority, and, for nearly four months, attempted to present the
insurgent campaign as reflecting simple criminal activity to be responded to with
traditional police methodology.

The resulting British inaction allowed the MRLA to

prosper during the next few months by heightening their attacks and gaining traction
among the population for their goals, and by the time a State of Emergency was finally
declared on June 16, 1948, the British position had further deteriorated (Pye, 1956: 8889; Rahman, 1965: 659-660).
The British government also had other concerns, being well aware of (and
personally involved in) the ongoing Security Council seizure
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of the Dutch

counterinsurgency campaign in the Netherlands East Indies; a seizure that eventually
doomed the Dutch political position there during January 1949 (United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, 1947-1949).

In an effort to avoid a similar fate for British

counterinsurgency measures in Malaya, the British government quickly presented the
MRLA insurgency to the West as being part and parcel of an international movement by
Communist forces designed to overwhelm and conquer the Third World (The Police and
Internal Security, 1966: I-4, L-1; Shafer, 1988: 59-60). Indeed, the verbiage of a
sensitive official British retrospective on the conflict (issued in 1968) described the
insurgent campaign as “part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is
strategically and economically one of the most important areas of South-East Asia”
(NAA A452/2, 1968: 3). It was also widely speculated by British authorities that an
overall plan for Southeast Asian insurgencies had been laid out by Soviet authorities at
a February 1948 Cominform conference in Calcutta, India attended by representatives
of most Asian Communist parties, since insurrections broke out later that year in Malaya
and Burma to complement the existing insurgencies in the Philippines, and French
Indochina (Komer, 1972: 6). The necessity of courting the vitally important United
States public opinion base on the issue was discussed in a Top Secret British document
dated December 1, 1949, with the notation that failure in this regard would deny the
necessary “sympathy and support from American public opinion in our praiseworthy
struggle to combat the well-known international Communist menace” and reduce the
issue to simply that of “a bad colonial power coping with rebellions” (Watson, 1949).
Overall, these efforts appear to have succeeded, since no resolutions were ever issued
against British authority in Malaya by either the United Nations Security Council or
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General Assembly during the twelve years of counterinsurgency operations (United
Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1948-1960).
The lack of such international pressure allowed the British to conduct an
innovative form of counterinsurgency campaign through the implementation of a longterm social welfare approach designed to reward the population for rejecting the
insurgency; indeed, British authorities could be virtually credited with inventing the
tactics involved therein (Pye, 1956:

102-103).

As part of that approach, British

regulations for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations were carefully defined to
strike only against the insurgency, not the civilian population, and those regulations
were essentially adhered to throughout the state of emergency, punishing troops who
exceeded their orders, and closely defining air strike missions to avoid hitting civilian
areas (Campbell, 1968: 147-148, 154, 157, 159-160). A mechanism also existed within
the sixty District War Executive Committees (DWECs), created among the native
population to coordinate local counterinsurgency activities, to confer with British troops
and determine the precise level of operational flexibility required to diminish the
insurgency without alienating the population (Ladwig, 2007: 61).
Counterinsurgency operations were subsequently broken down into three distinct
phases. During the first phase, lasting from 1948 through 1952, a system of national
registration was introduced, requiring all individuals over the age of twelve to carry
identity cards.

Border sealing was successfully conducted through an agreement

reached between the British colonial administration and the Thai government that
eventually allowed British forces to physically clear Malaya of insurgents from south to
north, forcing the remnants against the Thai border for final resolution (Campbell, 1968:
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140-141). An indigenous Malayan Army was created to defend the peninsula; an army
whose requirement for compulsory service led to the emigration of many young Chinese
and removed them from the MRLA‟s potential recruiting pool (Peterson, 1955: 312).
The British utilization of „food denial‟ was also found to be very effective against guerilla
forces operating in heavily forested regions (Campbell, 1968: 127, 140-141, 160), as it
forced the MRLA to take increased risks in order to secure food supplies; risks which
made them vulnerable to British ambushes (Ladwig, 2007: 61). In all cases, the British
focused upon building support for the government in areas of the country where the
insurgency was the weakest in an effort to create the perception of optimistic
momentum for the campaign (Markel, 2006: 39).
The official concern about „winning hearts and minds‟ did not rely entirely upon
the benignity of British forces, however, since British counter-insurgency methods were
often brutal and involved, at times, elements of a cost-benefit approach. Due to the
ethnic make-up of the insurgency, the rural Chinese were the principal target of the
counterinsurgency campaign, which involved both individual and mass detention,
deportation, and collective punishment, including communal fines and curfews.

By

1951, 2,800 Chinese had been deported back to the PRC, and, of the 25,641 Malayans
detained more than 28 days without trial under the Emergency Regulations, 22,667
were Chinese (Ramakrishna, 2001: 82). Collective punishment was also utilized, with
a 22 hour per day curfew being imposed during early 1952 on the guerilla stronghold of
Tanjong Malim, while simultaneously cutting the village‟s food ration in half to prevent
residents from supplying the insurgency (Markel, 2006: 39-40). Tactics of this sort
undoubted served to instill a strong antipathy within the Chinese rural communities
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against both the Malayan and British authorities, and potentially provided at least a
passive neutrality regarding MRLA activities (Ramakrishna, 2001: 82). This feeling of
antipathy was undoubted heighted by the controversial „Briggs Plan‟ of population
resettlement programs developed by General Sir Harold Briggs. Sir Harold, appointed
Director of Operations for British forces in Malaya during April 1950, quickly produced a
plan for defeating the insurgency entitled Federation Plan for the Elimination of the
Communist Organization and Armed Forces in Malaya that proposed resettlement of
the entire half-million strong Chinese squatter population. This resettlement program
was quickly carried out, and, by June 1952, over 400,000 such squatters had been
resettled into some 400 new villages (Newsinger, 2002: 49). Life in these villages was
onerous, with dusk-to-dawn curfews, body searches of workers departing for the rubber
plants (to insure they had no extra food to deliver to insurgents), and a large,
impersonal population element all contributing to the perception of an Asian
concentration camp program (Ramakrishna, 2001: 81-82). Not surprisingly, many of
those squatters, especially those affiliated with the insurgency, did not willingly acceded
to resettlement, especially as they watched their existing homes torn down, their
agricultural implements smashed, and their livestock killed or turned loose (Newsinger,
2002: 49-50).

Even so, nearly all of the 500,000 Chinese squatters were eventually

resettled in 550 of these „new villages‟ where, along with the 24-hour security
surveillance, they received thirty-year leaseholds upon farmland, indoor plumbing,
electricity, village home guards, and elected councils. As time went on, the repressive
aspects of the program gradually receded with the 50,000-strong grouping of home
guards eventually being all ethnic Chinese, the villagers gaining a reasonable hope of a
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viable future within the framework of an independent Malaya, and the isolation of the
squatter recruiting pool far from the jungle-bound guerilla bases slowly crushing any
remaining chances for an insurgent victory (Campbell, 1968: 157; Hall, 1981: 878,
924).101
By the early 1950s, the British government had assembled a robust military force
to decisively confront the insurgency, with nearly 40,000 British Commonwealth troops
(25,000 British, 10,500 Nepalese Gurkhas, and 4,500 Malay) backed up by
approximately 100,000 armed Malay auxiliary police officers (Pye, 1956:

96-97

footnotes, 109 footnote). This heightened security force, along with the primacy of the
social welfare approach within the British counterinsurgency campaign, successfully
denied any significant popular support for the insurgency to the point that by September
1951, the MRLA had renounced all acts of terrorism against the population and further
defined its attacks against British forces by using smaller units of 20 to 30 guerillas
(Campbell, 1968: 139, 142). At the same time, the MRLA was ordered by the MCP to
withdraw further into the jungle, and attempt to attain a measure of self-sufficiency from
the population (Newsinger, 2002: 52).
British authorities were determined to keep up the pressure, however, and further
enhanced counterinsurgency operations in December 1951 by merging the posts of
British High Commissioner for Malaya and Director of Military Operations to provide a
101

Nor were the Chinese squatters the only population placed under resettlement. Laborers assigned to
estates and mines - a grouping of nearly 650,000 people - were also viewed as being a potential force for
disruption, and were confined to tightly-guarded barbed wire-enclosed compounds. In addition, efforts
were made to similarly „resettle‟ the aboriginal tribes of the jungle areas; efforts which were abandoned
after thousands of such tribesmen died of disease and despair. All tolled, these policies resulted in the
compulsory movement of nearly 15% of the entire Malayan population. While those suspect areas of the
population were, indeed, successfully pacified, it is doubtful that any significant winning of their „hearts
and minds‟ ever took place among them (Newsinger, 2002: 51, 54, 56).
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unified control of both civil and military forces under General Sir Gerald Termpler, a
former director of military intelligence. Upon arriving in Malaya, Sir Gerald advised
government officials that all government activities were to be linked to the
counterinsurgency campaign, and assured that the „Briggs Plan‟ would continue to be
implemented (Ladwig, 2007: 63). Sir Gerald also became well known for stressing, at
every meeting he attended, the need to win the “hearts and minds of the Malayan
people” to the ideal of a free and democratic political process for an independent
Malaya (Pye, 1956: 102-103). This strategy was successful to the point that, by 1952,
Silcock could write that a civilian in Malaya had nearly as great a chance of being
involved in a road accident as being a victim of a “terrorist,” and that while British
military operations were costly, the conflict was “not a war like the war in Korea or even
the war in Indo-China” (Silcock, 1952: 445).
During the second phase of the counterinsurgency campaign, lasting from 1952
to 1955, the Royal Air Force supplied one hundred aircraft to assist in crushing the
insurgents, sending Douglas Dakota transports flying low over the jungle areas to
conduct psychological warfare campaigns (dropping surrender leaflets and conducting
voice broadcasts stating surrender terms), while strike aircraft dropped 33,000 tons of
bombs and fired nearly 100,000 rockets during the course of over 25,000 air sorties. At
the same time, Royal Navy surface vessels patrolled the seas around the peninsula to
prevent weaponry from being smuggled to the insurgents. During 1952 alone, 1,097
insurgents were killed, and numerous others were captured or encouraged to surrender
(Campbell, 1968: 140, 153-154, 156, 160-161). A rewards program was instituted
during February 1953, allowing for a reduction of the oppressive British security
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presence in areas deemed to be „white‟ and cleared of insurgent activity (Ramakrishna,
2001:

88-89), and, by May 1954, 1,314,400 Malayans (or nearly one-fourth of the

population) were residing within „white areas‟ in which the violence of the insurgency
often seemed far away indeed (Ramakrishna, 2001: 89).102 As the second phase of
the insurgency closed out, a total of 5,892 insurgents had been killed and approximately
1,700 more had surrendered to British security forces (Sully, 1968: 127). Those losses,
which reduced the insurgency down to approximately 3,000 guerillas, came at a price,
however; the lives of 1,563 members of the security forces (Campbell, 1968: 160).
Even so, by 1954, the fate of the insurgency was sealed as a result of these measures,
with only a lengthy mopping-up operation remaining to destroy it entirely (Ladwig, 2007:
64).
As the third and final phase of the insurgency, lasting from 1955 to 1960,
commenced, British forces became even more relentlessly effective. During 1956 and
1957, over 540 insurgents were killed, 84 captured, and 343 surrendered, at the cost of
only 58 members of the security forces (Sully, 1968: 127), reducing insurgent strength
to about 2,000 personnel, of which only about 200 were active combatants (Markel,
2006:

40).

During 1958, 153 insurgents were killed, 22 were captured, and 502

surrendered - at the cost of only ten British troops (Sully, 1968: 127). By that time, the
ethnic Chinese element represented only 38% of the population; a decline that further
justified the enhanced political provisions for the Malay majority while reducing the

102

Following the declaration of a region of Malacca as being „white,‟ large signs proclaiming „You are now
entering the Malacca White Area‟ were erected around the region, and travelers entering the area from a
dreary neighboring section of Malaya were often impressed by the liveliness of the people and the
bustling commercial activity. That perception led to further regions of Malaya competing for „white zone‟
status (Ramakrishna, 2001: 89).
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insurgency recruiting pool of young ethnic Chinese men (MacGillivray, 1958: 161). The
combination of these factors shattered the MRLA structure to the point that it no longer
existed as a viable guerilla movement, and the organization subsequently issued a
decision to “fold up the banner and silence the drums” (Newsinger, 2002: 57-58). The
insurgency was over.103
When independence was granted to Malaya by the United Kingdom on August
31, 1957, the indigenous Malayan government came into being with a broadly-based
national mandate to destroy the remainder of the Communist insurgency. Sir Donald
MacGillivray, British High Commissioner for Malaya, writing in the April 1958 issue of
International Affairs, noted that the Malayan insurgents had entirely lost the support they
might have initially enjoyed from the ethnic Chinese community, and were now facing a
newly independent Malayan government armed with a popular mandate to “keep up the
pressure against the Communists until they are wiped out” (MacGillivray, 1958: 161).
That transfer of power denied the colonial issue to the insurgents, and allowed the
Malayan government – with continuing British assistance - to finally crush any remnants
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This campaign was extremely costly for the era. Each contact made with armed insurgents cost
British authorities 1,000 security man-hours, while each confirmed kill cost 1,500 security man-hours,
resulting in total expenditures of £180,000,000 (Campbell, 1968: 153-154, 160-161). British-led security
forces suffered an estimated 4,425 casualties (including killed and wounded; within those figures, 519
British troops were killed and 959 wounded), and 4,668 civilian casualties resulted from combat
operations between the security forces and the MRLA. Insurgent casualties were meanwhile reported as
9,520 killed, 1,287 captured, and 2,702 surrendering to the government (Komer, 1972: 22). The British
heavy bomber campaign had been singularly ineffective against the extreme dispersion of the guerilla
network, with the 17,500 tones of ordinance dropped by Lincoln bomber squadrons between 1950 and
1958 credited with killing only 16 guerillas. While those strike missions undoubtedly denied the
insurgents much solace, the separation of the insurgency from its recruiting/ support pool (the key
element of any counterinsurgency campaign) was accomplished primarily through the combination of
sealing of the Malaya/Thai frontier and the „Briggs Plan‟ of population resettlement, regardless of how
repugnant the latter activities ultimately became (Newsinger, 2002: 50, 55). Interestingly enough,
Lawrence also determined aerial bombing of insurgent forces to be a waste of military resources (writing
that “guerilla tactics are a complete muffing of air force”), and argued that securing informers within
insurgent ranks represented the most lethal counterinsurgency tactic (Brown, 1988: 239).
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of the rebellion (Rahman, 1965: 659-661; Sully, 1968: 128, 179). On July 31, 1960,
the twelve-year old state of emergency was formally brought to an end with the
remaining 500 MRLA guerillas forced across Malaya‟s northern frontier into Thailand‟s
southern Yala Province, where they were to survive by levying „taxes‟ on rubber
plantations operated by ethnic-Chinese farmers (Sully, 1968: 128, 179). Incidental
guerilla encounters with Malayan (and, subsequently, Malaysian) authorities would
continue off and on for over two more decades, however (Rahman, 1965: 659-661;
Osbourne, 1979: 152-156).
British authorities utilized numerous controversial tactics (for which the Briggs
Plan serves as the exemplar) during the course of this campaign, and, had the United
Nations or one of the great powers applied enough pressure, those tactics might not
have had enough time to fully develop into viable measures. British efforts to portray
the insurgency as an element of international Communism may have prevented such
pressure from forming within the United States, and the ability of British forces to seal
the northern frontier on the Malayan peninsula also denied the possibility of any
physical reinforcement by the Soviet Union or the PRC of the besieged guerillas. Had
those elements been available to the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies or to the
French in Indochina, the outcomes of those campaigns might have been different
indeed. In addition, the British victory did not allow for a return to the status quo ante,
and the subsequent withdrawal of nearly 200 years of British sovereignty from the
Malayan Peninsula makes this campaign somewhat less than an unqualified win for the
United Kingdom.
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This case study, which was to serve as the exemplar of a successful
counterinsurgency campaign for the next fifty years, possessed a number of unique
elements which could not easily be extrapolated to other such campaigns, although
numerous countries have since attempted to do so.

First, Malaya‟s geographical

position as a peninsula with a relatively narrow northern frontier allowed British
authorities to seal the territory‟s borders almost completely, denying to MRLA the
external resupply and safe havens enjoyed by insurgents in Tibet, Namibia, and
Western Sahara.

Second, the large-scale popular support underlying SWAPO,

POLISARIO, and – to a lesser extent – Chushi Gangdrug was not available to MRLA,
given that its recruiting/support pool comprised less than nine percent of the population.
Third, successful British efforts to present the insurgency to the world at large as a
product of Communist-inspired terrorism prevented the coalescing of international
opposition from the United Nations and great powers that initially frustrated Moroccan
efforts in Western Sahara and eventually doomed the South African campaign in
Namibia (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1948-1960).
This lack of international interest allowed the British to conduct an unhurried social
welfare approach that would, over time, crush MRLA and consolidate British interests in
the region (Pye, 1956:

102-103).

The „forgotten war‟ status of the conflict also

permitted British forces to utilize such controversial tactics as individual/mass detention,
deportation, collective punishment, and large-scale population resettlement; tactics
which would have resulted in wide-spread condemnation against the governments of
South Africa and Morocco given the nature of international scrutiny focused upon the
conflicts in Namibia and Western Sahara (Ramakrishna, 2001: 82; Newsinger, 2002:
166

49; Markel, 2006: 39-40). Since United Nations/great power opposition succeeded in
destroying Dutch counterinsurgency efforts in the neighboring Netherlands East Indies
as the Malayan campaign entered its second year, the British government, along with
conducting a very competent counterinsurgency campaign, was also very fortunate in
being able to deter such pressure.
F.

Summary
As previously stated in Chapter Three, I find the outcomes of all four

counterinsurgency campaigns offering significant evidence for my three hypotheses.
The overwhelming United Nations opposition to South African occupation of Namibia
isolated the South African government both diplomatically and militarily to the point that
even the United States eventually agreed to the implementation of an arms embargo
against the South African military (United Nations Security Council Resolution #418,
1977).

Great power support of the SWAPO insurgents by the Soviet and Cuban

governments initially led South African authorities to develop nuclear weapons (Albright,
1994:

42), and subsequently, at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, destroyed

remaining South African goals of maintaining any form of political control over Namibia
(O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). The impact of both of these external forces appears to support
Hypotheses #1 and #2. United Nations opposition to Moroccan occupation of Western
Sahara lasted from 1975 through the early part of 1981, during which time POLISARIO
prospered to the point that Moroccan forces, under a virtual state of siege from up to
15,000 full time guerillas, were struggling to hold on to scattered urban enclaves within
the desert territory while yielding the vast interior of the country to the insurgency.
During that same period of insurgency successes, regional power-blocs such as the
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OAU and NAM were also condemning Moroccan counterinsurgency efforts (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution #34/37, 1979).104

Beginning in late 1981,

however, the tide began to turn with both the United Nations and regional political
groupings as the Moroccan government, using its unique position as both an African
and an Arab state, succeeded in moderating the voice of the General Assembly to the
point that subsequent resolutions offered little more than vague appeals for a undefined
territorial referendum (Solarz, 1979/1980:

281, 284-285; United Nations General

Assembly Resolutions, 1982-2008); OAU and NAM antipathy to the Moroccan position
was similarly blunted after Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya and the Islamic Conference
expressed support for the integrity of a Moroccan state extending from the Straits of
Gibraltar to the Mauritanian frontier (Zunes, 1995:

23).

From that time forward,

POLISARIO fortunes began to tumble; initially into stalemate, and ultimately into
submission (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6; Campbell, 2003: 47-48).

I argue that this

case study offers even more support for Hypotheses #1 and #2 than does the Namibian
case study, since the turning point in insurgency fortunes took place at the moment of
receding United Nations and regional power-bloc support; in short, the dependent
variable – success in counterinsurgency measures - underwent a defined change at the
time of an adjustment in the independent variables of United Nations and great power
support. Chinese occupation of Tibet was virtually unhindered by weak and ill-defined
General Assembly and United States opposition; General Assembly verbiage that failed
104

As previously mentioned, this dismal counterinsurgency scenario led the conflict to be listed within the
COW Extra-State Dataset as a defeat for Morocco as of 1983 (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144), but subsequent
events allowed the Moroccan government to prevail in its counterinsurgency efforts. As a result, I
disagree with the dataset and argue that the conflict should now be coded as a victory for Morocco as
long as the Moroccan government is able to maintain its current elements of sovereignty within the
territory.
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to even directly challenge Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, and American support of
Chushi Gangdrug insurgents that was limited to intelligence gathering and general
harassment (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #1353, #1723, and #2079,
1959,

1961,

and

1965;

McGranahan,

2006:

121-124,

127-128).

British

counterinsurgency operations in Malaya were meanwhile conducted unhindered entirely
by either United Nations or great power interest (United Nations General
Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1948-1960; Newsinger, 2002: 57-58). The fact
that the latter two counterinsurgency campaigns succeed further supports my
contentions in Hypotheses #1 and #2. Finally, successful counterinsurgency campaigns
were clearly achieved in both the Tibetan and Malayan cases (and somewhat less
clearly in the case of Western Sahara) regardless of the counterinsurgency strategy
employed, offering support for Hypothesis #3.
In the next and final chapter, I will offer my final conclusions for the impact of the
17 counterinsurgency campaigns in general and these four case studies in specific, and
suggest potential future studies that may impact the validity of those conclusions.
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS
A.

Introduction
Military operations conducted by major powers against irregular forces in foreign

countries no longer find unqualified acceptance in today‟s world. During the past sixty
years, formal reproaches conducted by the United Nations against such activities has
often served to make them untenable, regardless of either the countries involved or
counterinsurgency strategy employed (Appendices I, II, III, IV, and VIII).

Security

Council condemnations can be devastating to foreign counterinsurgency efforts, and the
ability of the five permanent members of the Council to veto resolutions of which they
disapprove has granted extended flexibility to military operations conducted by the
Americans, British, Chinese, French, and Soviets/Russians; flexibility that is not enjoyed
by other states.105 The General Assembly has been less cautious about castigating the
military activities of the five permanent members, however, and military operations
coming under strong General Assembly condemnation typically fail.106

105

While none of the counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the five permanent members have
engendered any Security Council condemnations, campaigns conducted by Indonesia, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa during that same time period were dramatically, and, at times,
fatally hobbled by Security Council seizures (United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1946-2008).
106

General Assembly interest extended well beyond the 17 campaigns listed in the COW Extra-State
Dataset. French campaigns in Cameroun, North Africa, and Suez met with at least 23 resolutions of
varying degrees of severity before falling to defeat (Soustell, 1956: 119-120; Howe, 1966: 261; Talbott,
1980: 72-73; Smolansky, 1956: 588-605). British campaigns in Aden and Suez collapsed during the
issuance of ten highly critical resolutions, and the British campaign in Oman, the subject of seven
resolutions (six of which were condemnatory), only began to be effective after the cessation of General
Assembly interest in 1970 (Newsinger, 2002: 130, 142-143, Smolansky, 1956: 588-605). British
campaigns in Cyprus and Kenya received only a total of three mild resolutions, however, and were both
generally successful (Anderson, 2005: 3; Elkins, 2005a: B11). While the three rather vague resolutions
issued against the Chinese campaign in Tibet provided little assistance to the insurgents given Chinese
antipathy to basic United Nations legitimacy (McGranahan, 2006: 121-124, 127-128), the Soviet
campaign in Afghanistan failed after enduring eight years of annual condemnations (Suhrke, 1990: 242).
Only the United States has escaped General Assembly condemnations of its counterinsurgency
campaigns (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 1946-2008).
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Great

power

condemnations

may

also

shatter

even

robust

foreign

counterinsurgency campaigns. In virtually all cases in which major powers such as the
United States, the Soviet Union, or the PRC offered succor to local insurgencies,
counterinsurgency measures eventually collapsed. During the past 64 years, those
defeats include the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, France in Indochina, the
Portuguese in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, the United States in Vietnam,
South Africa in Namibia, and the Soviets in Afghanistan (Friend, 2003:
Katzenbach, 1952:

190; Karnow, 1983:

184-185; Tonnesson, 1985:

37-38;

11-12, 18;

Chabal, 1981: 75, 80-83, 91, 95-97; Albright, 1994: 42; O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111; Nyrop,
1986: 35; Runov, 2002: xxiv, 53-72, 222, 312). The exception is, of course, the 19591974 Chinese campaign in Tibet which easily contained and eventually defeated the
Chushi Gangdrug despite the insurgency being supported by the United States
(Goldstein, 2006: 150; McGranahan, 2006: 120-122).
Even with such recent evidence of the importance of international pressure upon
the viability of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns, the need to court both international
opinion and the interests of affected great powers is rarely found to be an important
focus of counterinsurgency planning.107

Instead, many, if not most, modern

counterinsurgency instruction manuals (including the most recent one designed for the

107

Indeed, concerns regarding international opposition to the American exercise of the use of force have
come under clear derision within the United States during recent years. During candidate George Bush‟s
2000 presidential election campaign, future Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice denounced the
belief “that the support of many states - or even better, of institutions like the United Nations - is essential
to the legitimate exercise of power” (Kagan, 2004: 84). Glennon, in evaluating The National Security
Strategy of the United States (Bush, 2002: 15), wrote that the document made it very clear that the
United States would “no longer be bound by the [United Nations] Charter‟s rules governing the use of
force,” but would instead would utilize preemptive military force in the circumstances of its choosing,
regardless of international opinion (Glennon, 2003: 24).
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United States military, Counterinsurgency (Field Manual 3-24), issued in 2006) place
the probability of achieving victory over indigenous insurgents almost entirely within the
nature of the strategy utilized by counterinsurgent forces; either the social welfare
approach, or the cost-benefit approach (Kahl, 2006).

While the manual notes that

“eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers,” the belief is stated
that an affected population will have greater faith in the vitality of its own government
once it is clearly understood that a long-term commitment by American military forces is
in place (Counterinsurgency, 2006: 1-24, 1-26). I find the idea that an indigenous
population will accept the presence of an unruly foreign occupier as long as they believe
that occupier is determined to stay to be analytically unsound, to say the least.
International opinion, especially within the United Nations, confers legitimacy,
and I believe that indigenous populations are more likely to accept foreign occupation if
they believe it is legitimate.

Lacking such legitimacy, local antipathy to foreign

occupation may invigorate resistance movements even in the absence of formal
international condemnations.

While the United Nations has been virtually silent

regarding the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (although SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan publically stated prior to the invasion that such an action would
“would not be in conformity with the [United Nations] Charter” (Jervis, 2003: 375)), 108
regional anger at American military operations in Iraq has been palpable, with over 90%
108

The General Assembly has passed only two resolutions on the matter, both of which related strictly to
funding issues (United Nations General Assembly Resolutions #58/304 and #60/274, 2004, 2006). The
Security Council has passed five resolutions in which any questions regarding the legitimacy of the
occupation are limited to occasional reminders that „the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come
quickly‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #1483 and #1511, 2003), statements „looking
forward to the end of the occupation‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolution #1546, 2004), and
„recognizing the importance of consent of the sovereign government of Iraq for the presence of the
multinational force‟ (United Nations Security Council Resolutions #1723 and #1790, 2006-2008).
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of Jordanian, Moroccan, Palestinian, and Turkish respondents, and 80% of Indonesian
and Pakistani respondents indicating shortly after the invasion that the United States
“didn‟t try very hard” to avoid Iraqi civilian casualties (Pew Global Attitudes Project,
2003: 24-25). After Iraqi news reporter Muntaẓar az-Zaydī angrily hurled both of his
shoes at President George Bush during a press conference held at the Prime Minister‟s
palace in Baghdad, Iraq on December 14, 2008 to protest the continuing United Statesled occupation of the country, a poll jointly commissioned by American Broadcasting
Company, the British Broadcasting Company, and Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai found 62% of
Iraqis regarding az-Zaydī as a hero for standing up to the hated American presence
(Langer, 2009).109 Research conducted by Weede and Muller has shown that regimes
dependent upon the support of foreign occupation forces tend to lose legitimacy within
their populations (Weede and Muller, 1998: 54), and the current governments of both
Afghanistan and Iraq – installed following United States-led military invasion and
occupation – appear to be existentially dependent upon American military support. It
should be remembered that the United States lost the war in Vietnam even in the
109

This poll, conducted by D3 Systems of Vienna, Virginia and KA Research Ltd. Of Istanbul, Turkey, was
based upon 2,228 face-to-face interviews of a random sample of Iraqis conducted during February 17-25,
2009 (including oversamples in Anbar Province, Basra City, Mosul, and the Sadr City district of Baghdad),
and the results have a 2.5 margin of error (National Survey of Iraq, 2009). Az-Zaydī‟s act of defiance has
attracted wide-ranging support from across the Arab world and even beyond. The Lebanese television
channel NTV offered az-Zaydī a journalistic position with the salary in force from the moment he threw the
first shoe (Faraj, 2008). Regional public figures have also voiced support. Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa al-Thani promised az-Zaydī a „golden horse,‟ Libyan leader Mu„ammar al-Qaḏāfī has spoken
of granting the Iraqi reporter Libya‟s highest honor (Welcome Awaits Iraqi Shoe-Thrower, 2009: 1), and
Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim praised the shoe-throwing incident action as just retaliation
against President Bush for the invasion of Iraq (Malaysian Minister Yatim Praises Iraqi Shoe Thrower,
2008: 1). These official accolades for the humiliation of an American president are even more
impressive given the recent normalization of relations between the United States and Libya, the
reputation of Malaysia as being a moderate, Western-leaning state (the United States is Malaysia‟s
largest trading partner), and the fact that Qatar hosts the United States Central Command forward
headquarters and provided direct support to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq (Background
Note: Libya, 2009; Background Note: Malaysia, 2009; Background Note: Qatar, 2009).
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complete absence of United Nations resolutions due to the inability of the Americansponsored government in Saigon to exist without perpetual United States military
support (Karnow, 1983:

643).

While external actors may successfully question

legitimacy, Latham writes that only indigenous actors can provide it (Latham, 2006: 40),
and continuing to ignore both internal and international opinion regarding the basic
legitimacy of the United States military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq will provide
little benefit to American interests in the region.
The theoretical model for my dissertation includes three hypotheses which
acknowledge the value, clearly evident in the academic literature, of acquiring strong
international support and recognizing the interests of affected great powers before
engaging in counterinsurgency operations in foreign countries, while generally
discounting the importance of operational strategy in the final outcome of victory or
defeat. Hypothesis #1 states that the higher the level of United Nations condemnation
of foreign counterinsurgency measures, the less successful will be those measures,
Hypothesis #2 states that the higher the level of great power recognition and support of
the legitimacy of an insurgency, the less successful will be foreign counterinsurgency
measures, and Hypothesis #3 states that the employment of either the Social Welfare or
the Cost-Benefit approach to counterinsurgency operations will not be significant in
determining success in such operations. The independent variable of United Nations
opposition (Hypothesis #1) has been operationalized through websites affiliated with the
United Nations Documentation Centre, New York, New York which provide a record of
all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions issued since 1946.
independent

variable of

great

power opposition
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The

(Hypothesis #2) has been

operationalized by verbiage found in the academic literature detailing insurgent
recognition and support by countries and regional power-blocs.

The independent

variable of counterinsurgency strategy (Hypothesis #3) has been operationalized
through official statements of policy, judgments of military analysts, and sources in the
academic literature describing the nature of the various campaigns, especially those
involving reports of significant civilian casualties indicative of cost-benefit campaigns.110
The dependent variable of victory or defeat for foreign counterinsurgency forces has, in
all cases, been operationalized through data contained within the COW Extra-State
Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 (Sarkees, 2000: 123-144).
B.

Results of These Four Case Studies
In-dept evaluation of these four case studies appears to yield support for all three

hypotheses.

Both Hypothesis #1, which predicted that heightened levels of United

Nations condemnations of foreign counterinsurgency measures would impact the
viability of those measures, and Hypotheses #2, which posited that insurgencies
granted great power recognition would be more likely to defeat foreign occupation
powers, found support through the case study of South Africa‟s 1966-1988
counterinsurgency campaign against SWAPO. South African efforts to maintain control
of Namibia during that time period led the country into such international isolation from
the United Nations that the South African government, in a move of desperation,
developed nuclear weapons to encourage Western security guarantees and keep
potential threats at bay. United Nations recognition of insurgent legitimacy also may

Even with the assistance of these sources, four of the 17 cases resulted in a determination of „Mixture
of Both,‟ while two further cases resulted in a determination of „Strategy Unclear.‟ (Table IV).
110
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have served to motivate both SWAPO and its supporters in the MPLA, and indirectly
legitimize Cuban intervention into the conflict.

Against such wide-ranging United

Nations condemnation of South African policies, even the United States was eventually
forced to accept the defeat of its Cold War position in southern Africa and cease
abstaining from Security Council condemnations against its anti-Communist ally, South
Africa (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-1990).111
Soviet efforts through its Cuban client may have been nearly as important as United
Nations condemnations, however, since, by the mid-1980s, some South African officials
felt that an all-out effort by the 50,000 Cuban troops resident in the area might have
overwhelmed South African security forces in Namibia, and the Cuban military victory at
Cuito Cuanavale, Angola during May 1988 brought an decisive end to South African
goals of maintaining sovereignty in the territory (Albright, 1994: 42; O‟Sullivan, 2005:
111). I thus argue that, in the case of Namibia, both Hypotheses #1 and #2 contributed
equally to the defeat of South African counterinsurgency efforts.
Moroccan efforts to defeat POLISARIO insurgents in Western Sahara also
provide insight into the validity of Hypotheses #1 and #2. The Moroccan campaign
initially met condemnations from both the General Assembly and the Security Council
(United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1975), a denial by the
ICJ of legal title to the territory (Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,
111

As mentioned in Chapter IV, South African efforts to stem the flood of United Nations condemnations
against its control of Namibia by defining the SWAPO insurgency as a Communist movement may have
temporarily led France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to reject a mandatory United Nations
arms embargo against the South African state (Horton, 1999: Occasional Paper #27; United Nations
General Assembly Resolution #3411, 1975). Subsequent development of nuclear weapons by South
African authorities not only failed to force Western security guarantees, but triggered the long-deferred
mandatory arms embargo, however, and nearly led to Soviet air strikes against South Africa‟s Valindaba
nuclear facilities (United Nations Security Council Resolution #418, 1977; Albright, 1994: 37-42).
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1975: 4, 29-31, 39-54), and subsequent acceptance of POLISARIO legitimacy by both
the OAU and NAM that left Moroccan troops in a state of siege in the urban areas of the
territory by the late 1970s (Solarz, 1979/1980: 281, 284-285). Morocco‟s unique status
as both an African and an Arab state allowed it to successfully play Jāmi „at ad-Duwal
al-„Arabiyya off against the OAU with an acceptance by the former of Moroccan
territorial claims in Western Sahara (Zunes, 1995: 23; Campbell, 2003: 47), however,
and the 13-year silence regarding the issue from the Security Council along with the
bland nature of General Assembly resolutions from 1982 onward make it clear that little
unity existed for isolating or punishing Morocco for its counterinsurgency campaigns in
the territory (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 19762008). Great power recognition and support of the Moroccan government through the
efforts of the United States, France, and Sa‟udi Arabia, was also essential to the
success of Moroccan counterinsurgency campaigns (typified by the construction of the
800 mile long sand wall in the territory), and appear to have turned the tide against
POLISARIO; especially in the absence of any viable United Nations opposition
(Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6). As a result, I disagree with the COW Extra-State
Dataset that determines a defeat for Morocco in this campaign and argue that the
Moroccan efforts have thus far been successful, thanks to a combination of weak,
divided international opinion and robust great power recognition and support; an
outcome that appears to provide additional support for the Hypotheses #1 and #2.
Having said that, however, nationalist agitation for independence in Western Sahara
continues to the present day as a stark testament to the enduring quality of Sahrawi
national consciousness (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18).
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Further support for Hypotheses #1 and #2 can be found in Chinese efforts to
initially reintegrate Tibet within the People‟s Republic of China.

Once the Western

powers (here including India) fully understood the determination of Máo Zédōng‟s
administration to subjugate the territory during 1950, none of them were willing to
sponsor Tibetan membership in the United Nations despite desperate appeals by
Tibetan officials to support the initiative. With the collapse of Tibetan forces at Changdu
during October 1950, the United States, preparing to encounter an unprecedented
assault by Chinese forces in North Korea, appears to have been willing to accept the
inevitable Chinese victory there and offered no support at all for an independent Tibetan
entity (Sheng, 2006: 15-16, 17, 18-19, 22-23, 25, 31-32). While Indian President Nehru
encouraged a Tibetan independence movement during the 1950s and the CIA provided
direct assistance to the subsequent Chushi Gangdrug organization (McGranahan, 2006:
109-111, 113-114), neither India nor the United States ever recognized Tibetan
independence or even the Chushi Gangdrug as being the authentic representative of
the Tibetan people (Grunfeld, 1996: 258). Following the uprising of March 1959, the
CIA-funded Chushi Gangdrug insurgents served as little more than a platform for
American intelligence collection and harassment of PLA forces than as a truly viable
national liberation movement (McGranahan, 2006: 121, 124, 127-128). Even the three
General Assembly resolutions issued during 1959, 1961, and 1965 in opposition to
Chinese policies in Tibet declined to mention China by name, and none of them
questioned the actual legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet (United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions, 1959-1965). Nor did a single country during this period ever
recognize the independence of a Tibetan political entity, and none have done so to date
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(Grunfeld, 1996: 180, 258). With United Nations pressure negligible at best and great
power support from the United States and India far too limited to seriously challenge
Chinese authority in the territory, Chinese counterinsurgency operations were able to
continue virtually unhindered by international pressure (Goldstein, 2006: 150).
Additional support for Hypotheses #1 and #2 is also available in the British
counterinsurgency response to the MRLA insurgency in Malaya, as British efforts to
defeat Communist guerillas there were conducted in the silence of international
pressure, from either the United Nations or intervening great powers. Since the issue
was never seized by either the General Assembly or the Security Council (United
Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1948-1960), British forces
were able to conduct counterinsurgency operations without the international pressure
from the United Nations that led to Dutch defeat in the neighboring Netherlands East
Indies (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1947-1949).
Meanwhile, American pressure was successfully warded off by proactive British
perception management of the MRLA as a tool of international Communism (Shafer,
1988: 59-60), and Soviet/Chinese intervention was prevented by Malaya‟s geographical
position as a peninsula with a short, easily-sealed frontier (Campbell, 1968: 140-141); a
significant geographical advantage that French authorities in Indochina lacked in their
efforts to block Chinese support to the Việt Minh (Tonnesson, 1985: 18).112 In such an
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As previously mentioned, British authorities held strong concerns regarding international pressure
against their counterinsurgency efforts, and took robust measures to present the MRLA insurgency as a
Soviet/Chinese-sponsored program designed to incorporate the developing countries of Southeast Asia
into the „Communist Bloc‟ (NAA A452/2, 1968: 3). These measures were directly principally toward the
United States, with the goal of overcoming traditional American aversion to colonialism with the spectre of
advancing international Communism (Watson, 1949).
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advantageous counterinsurgency environment, British forces were free to utilize
unconventional tactics, such as the Briggs Plan, which, despite its repressive nature,
would be generally credited with the ultimate defeat of the MRLA (Hall, 1981: 878, 924;
Campbell, 1968: 157). That said, the culmination of the United Kingdom‟s successful
counterinsurgency campaign was predicated upon the withdrawal of British sovereignty
from the Malayan peninsula, and, had the British government been unwilling to hand
over sovereignty to an indigenous government, the MRLA‟s goal of uniting Malayan
society against foreign control might indeed have been more successful.113
Hypothesis #3 also appears to have gained support from this evaluation. The
cost-benefit approach was, by every source I was able to find within the literature (and
compounded

by

United

Nations

resolutions

condemning

South

African

counterinsurgency tactics), employed by South African forces in their campaign in
Namibia; a campaign which clearly failed (Moroney, ed., 1989:

383).

In a similar

manner, Chinese forces, following the March 1959 native uprising in Lhasa, Tibet,
responded with a brutal, coercive campaign of the cost-benefit model that drove the
Chushi Gangdrug guerillas into neighboring Nepal, forced the Dalai Lama into political
exile in Dharamsala, India (where he remains to this day), and successfully crushed any
pretentions of potential independence on the part of the Tibetan population (Chen,
2006: 54, 61-62, 71, 77-80; McGranahan, 2006: 119-120). Meanwhile, British forces
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It might also be suggested that, among these four cases, great power support appears to trump United
Nations pressure regarding the viability of counterinsurgency operations. Soviet-Cuban support of
SWAPO objectives in Namibia, not United Nations pressure, led to the terminal defeat of South African
forces during May 1988 (O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111), and Western support (combined with Jāmi „at ad-Duwal
al-„Arabiyya recognition of Moroccan claims in Northwest Africa) allowed the Moroccan government to
maintain its position in Western Sahara despite a continuing series of admittedly weak United Nations
resolutions (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 6).
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in Malaya can be credited with virtually inventing the social welfare approach which
concentrated upon rewarding regional communities that rejected the call of insurgency
and ultimately frustrated MRLA efforts to build a multi-racial consensus against British
rule among the ethnically divided population (Pye, 1956:

102-103).

Finally, the

Moroccan government appears to have employed both approaches in its ultimately
successful campaign in Western Sahara.

While Moroccan forces have utilized a

strongly coercive cost-benefit campaign in Western Sahara designed not only to defeat
the POLISARIO insurgents but to destroy any lingering feelings of Sahrawi nationalism
(Smith, 1987: 145), aspects of the social welfare approach appear to be involved in
Moroccan efforts to encourage native Sahrawis to assimilate within metropolitan
Morocco and view Moroccan King Mohammed VI as a paternal figure of leadership
(Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 9-18).
C.

Additional Evidence Across the Remaining 13 Cases
Similar evidence can be found among the remaining 13 cases listed in the COW

Extra-State Dataset, especially through the campaigns conducted within the
Netherlands East Indies, Portugal‟s African territories of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and
Mozambique, and the former Portuguese East Timor; given that they attracted the most
United Nations interest (Appendix II). The 13 Security Council resolutions addressing
Dutch counterinsurgency operations in the Netherlands East Indies issued during 19471949 stunted Dutch efforts to retain their 300-year old sway within the archipelago and
tended to guide significant areas of Dutch military and political policy for the conflict
(United Nations Security Council Resolutions #27, #30, #31, #32, #35, #36, #40, #41,
#55, #63, #64, #65, and #67, 1947-1949). The final resolution of January 28, 1949
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(adopted with no abstentions whatsoever) which demanded a complete withdrawal of
Netherlands sovereignty from most of the Indonesian archipelago by July 1, 1950 ended
any remaining Dutch hopes of maintaining their East Indian empire (excepting West
New Guinea, which remained Dutch territory until 1962), and may have been
responsible for the upsurge in insurgent activity that occurred over the next few months
against the politically weakened Netherlands government (United Nations Security
Council Resolution #67, 1949; Collins, 1950:

181-193).114

Following the onset of

guerilla activity in Angola during February 4, 1961, the Portuguese ambassador to the
United States quickly took active measures to block United Nations discussions of
Portuguese colonial control of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique (Ribeiro, 2002:
168; NA, SDCF, 1960-1963), and went on to blame subsequent Security Council
discussions of the matter for triggering the insurgent outrage of March 15 in northern
Angola which killed at least 200 Portuguese nationals (NA, SDCF, 1960-1963). Even
so, a barrage of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions (20 from the
Security

Council

and

31

from

the

General

Assembly)

against

Portuguese

counterinsurgency efforts over the next 13 years made Portugal, during that time period,
the third greatest target of United Nations resolutions (after South Africa and Morocco)

114

Dutch concern at the onset of United Nations pressure was so strong that three days after Security
Council Resolution #27 was issued on August 1, 1947, the Dutch colonial government brokered an
agreement with Soekarno‟s forces that temporarily reduced the level of violence in the territory (United
Nations Security Council Resolution #27, 1947; Ricklefs, 1991: 226). While the British and French
governments, conducting their own counterinsurgency efforts against indigenous guerillas in Southeast
Asia, abstained from ratifying a number of these 13 resolutions (United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, 1947-1948), the United States, apparently viewing Soekarno‟s Republican leadership to be
more reasonable than that of the Dutch government, ratified all 13 without issue (Ricklefs, 1991: 226).
By January 1949, even His Majesty‟s Government was willing to ratify the most damning of the 13
Security Council resolutions against the Dutch government; a surprising move considering the United
Kingdom‟s own sputtering counterinsurgency campaign in neighboring Malaya (United Nations Security
Council Resolution #67, 1949).
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and the second most condemned state in the world (after South Africa); a level of
political isolation that made it difficult for Portugal to claim any realistic legitimacy within
its African territories (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Resolutions,
1961-1974). Indonesia‟s 25 year occupation of East Timor (1975-2000) resulted in
twelve Security Council resolutions and 24 General Assembly resolutions, and the
brutal nature of that occupation and its suppression of Timorian nationalism caused
serious damage to Indonesia‟s national reputation and international credibility. While
the Indonesian government initially gained support from the United States and Australia
by branding Falintil insurgents as Communists, the closing of the Cold War in 1991
ended the basis of that justification in the West and led to increased international
scrutiny into issues of self-determination and human rights in the territory (Schwartz,
1994:

195, 207-208, 223).115

In all cases, international opposition held serious

consequences for occupying powers and provides additional support for Hypothesis #1.
Across those 13 cases, only four of the intervening states encountered any
appreciable great power opposition: the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, France
in Indochina, Portugal within its African empire, and South Africa in Namibia (Appendix
III). Sensing an apparent Dutch inattention to Security Council resolutions during early
January 1949, American authorities threatened to curtail all Marshall Plan aid to the
Netherlands should an independent Indonesian state fail to emerge from negotiations
115

Mirroring, after a fashion, Morocco‟s strategy over Western Sahara, the Indonesian government was
able to use the threat of Communism in East Timor to co-opt support from Australia and United States,
and the mantle of anti-colonialism to gain support from India and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations; successfully dividing and marginalizing United Nations condemnations (Schwartz, 1994 207-208;
Dunn, 1996:311-312). Interestingly enough, Indonesian aspirations to chair the NAM during the 1980s
were undercut by the country‟s occupation of East Timor, as many developing states apparently identified
with the occupied population in East Timor rather than with their Indonesian occupiers (Schwartz, 1994:
195-196).
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(Collins, 1950: 173-176; Friend, 2003: 37-38). Since the Netherlands were still striving
to rebuild from the carnage of the Second World War, such a threat served to make
continuation of the campaign in the East Indies untenable; a reminder that decisive
great power pressure against foreign counterinsurgency campaigns does not
necessarily require military support to insurgents (Collins, 1950: 173-176; Friend, 2003:
37-38). Following Soviet and Chinese recognition of Hồ Chí Minh‟s administration in
Vietnam during January 1950, 60,000 resupplied and highly-motivated Việt Minh troops
were able to take the offensive against French Union forces, and, by the end of the
year, take Dongkhe, Caobang, Langsom, Laokay, and Thai Nguyen, seize control of the
Chinese frontier, and doom the entire French campaign (Katzenbach, 1952:

190;

Karnow, 1983: 184-185; Tonnesson, 1985: 11-12, 18).116 Subsequent Soviet support
to FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA guerillas in Angola, PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, and
FRELIMO in Mozambique heightened insurgent capabilities while it constrained
Portuguese counterinsurgency operations in those territories; especially in GuineaBissau, where PAIGC (operating through a military unit entitled Forças Armadas
Revolucionarias do Povo) was able to acquire Soviet surface-to-air missiles that
successfully destroyed nearly 50% of the Forca Aerea Portuguesa aircraft deployed
within the territory (Chabal, 1981: 75, 80-83, 91, 95-97). Following the collapse of the
Portuguese African empire, Soviet opposition to South Africa‟s counterinsurgency
campaign in Namibia nearly resulted in a Soviet air strike against South African nuclear
facilities during the summer of 1977, and the Soviet support to SWAPO insurgents
Westad argues that Soviet and Chinese recognition of the Việt Minh may have been even more
significant to the French defeat than their subsequent material support, since it personally granted to Hồ
the legitimacy he needed to prevail against his indigenous opponents (Westad, 1992: 461); another case
in which successful great power pressure does not solely involve military resupply.
116
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which followed led to the presence of about 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola by the mid1980s; a substantial military force that could conceivably have overwhelmed the South
African position there during that time period (Albright, 1994:

37-42).

The Cuban

victory over South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale, Angola during May 1988 set the
stage for a humiliating South African withdrawal from Namibia and the eventual
unraveling of the apartheid South African state itself (O‟Sullivan, 2005: 111). In all four
cases,

great

power

opposition

resulted

in

serious

impacts

against

foreign

counterinsurgency operations, and provides further support for Hypothesis #2.
Both of the counterinsurgency strategies were utilized with these 13 cases, with
no significant results for victory or defeat (Appendix IV). The cost-benefit approach was
fairly clearly followed in five of these cases, three of which resulted in victories within the
COW Extra-State Dataset. The social welfare approach appeared to be followed in only
one of the cases; a case which also resulted in a victory.

A combination of both

approaches appeared to represent the counterinsurgency strategy in five of the cases,
all of which are listed as defeats. Finally, no clear strategy was apparent to this writer in
two of the cases, both of which are listed as defeats.117 The lack of any discernable
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The cases involving the cost-benefit approach include France in Madagascar (a victory), Indonesia in
East Timor (a victory, according to the COW Extra-State Dataset, although I argue otherwise), France in
Indochina (a defeat), the United Kingdom in Kenya (a defeat, according to the COW Extra-State Dataset,
although I argue otherwise), and France in Algeria (a defeat) (Cole and Middleton, 2001: 10, Cooper,
2006: 33; Kiernan, 2003: 594; Philpott, 2007: 6; Katzenbach, Jr., 1952: 190, 211; Elkins, 2000: 29, 46;
Elkins, 2005a: B9-B11; Lackey, 1989: 79). The case representing the social welfare approach was
India‟s „one hundred hour war‟ in Hyderabad (Talbot, 1949: 325-327). The cases involving a combination
of both strategies include the Netherlands in the Netherlands East Indies, France in Cameroun, and
Portugal in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique (Emerson, 1948: 61, 64-66, 68, 74-76; Moroney,
1989: 71; Howe, 1966: 355; Marcum, 1978: 177; Chabal, 1981: 83; Mendy, 2003: 57). Finally, I was
unable to discern any clear strategy in the cases of France in Morocco and Tunisia (Soustelle, 1956:
119-120; Hutchinson, 1972: Gershovich, 2004: 143), since French distraction with Indochina and Algeria
appeared to reduce French activities within those territories to little more than „muddling through‟ and
graduated concessions.
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significance in the counterinsurgency approach pursued provides additional support for
Hypothesis #3, and should serve as a cautionary tale for military units basing the
viability of their military campaigns upon choice of strategy.
As previously mentioned, an evaluation of the 17 cases contained within the
COW Extra-State Dataset for the period of 1945-1997 provides evidence that foreign
counterinsurgency campaigns falter when confronted with opposition from either the
United Nations or great powers/power blocs, and succeeds when such opposition is not
present: This is borne out by the fact that four of the five cases categorized as victories
for the foreign intervening power encountered no United Nations opposition, while all
but one of the twelve cases categorized as defeats did indeed encounter such
opposition (Appendices I, II, and III; Sarkees, 2000: 123-144; United Nations General
Assembly/Security Council Resolutions, 1946-2008; Gordge, 1949:

133, 136-138;

Talbot, 1949: 325-327; Campbell, 1968: 140-141, 153-154, 156, 160-161; Chen, 2006:
56). This data yields a negative correlation coefficient of 72% between the application
of United Nations pressure and occupation power victory, and provides significant
empirical support for Hypothesis #1 (Appendix VIII), which is the crux of my entire
argument.
D.

Potential for Further Research
While I believe that my theoretical model has provided valid confirmation of my

hypotheses, weaknesses do exist within that model. First, as noted by Gleditsch, the
COW Extra-State Dataset is limited and tends to include and exclude a number of
conflicts based upon ad hoc decisions, chronicling the American experience in Vietnam
from 1961 to 1975 under the COW Inter-State Dataset as a victory for the Socialist
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Republic of Vietnam rather than under the Extra-State Dataset as a defeat for the
United States against the Việt Cộng (Weede and Muller, 1998: 49-51; Gleditsch, 2004:
235, 245-246). Libicki, who coded the appendix database for insurgency outcomes in
RAND Corporation‟s 2008 study War by Other Means, implicitly disagrees with three of
the Extra-State Dataset‟s outcomes: the win by the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, the
win by POLISARIO guerillas in Western Sahara, and the win by Indonesian forces in
East Timor (Gampert and Gordon, 2008: 373-374). Mack notes the absence of four
major British counterinsurgency campaigns from both databases:

the 1944-1948

campaign against the Palmach, Lehi, Stern, and Irgun in Mandatory Palestine, the
1955-1960 campaign against the Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakoú Agónos in Cyprus, the
1963-1967 campaign against the National Liberation Front in Aden Colony and
Protectorate, and the 1963-1976 campaign against the Dhofar Liberation Front/Popular
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf in Oman (Mack, 1975: 175, 189).
I personally question the omissions of the Soviet campaigns against insurgents in
Hungary (1956) and the Mujihadin in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Vietnamese
campaign against the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodia
(1978-1989), and the Indian campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in
Sri Lanka (1987-1990), and suggest that the database be chronologically updated to
include the Israeli campaign against Hizb‟ullah insurgency in South Lebanon (19852000) (Chanda, 1989:

31; Krivosheev, ed., 1993:

397; Kaplan, 2001:

223-224;

Avraham, 2007: 64-65). Second, while United Nations pressure is easily validated
through statistics maintained within the United Nations Documentation Centre, the
precise nature of great power involvement is not always clear since little viable
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information is available regarding some of the more obscure conflicts. In some cases,
such involvement can only be determined or inferred by the use of essentially anecdotal
information, as precise statistics are either unavailable or being intentionally withheld
under terms of government classification. Third, a clear determination of strategy is, at
times, difficult to define, as evidenced by the six cases in which the strategy was listed
as either a mixture of both approaches or simply unclear (Appendix IV). Having said
that, the key argument of this dissertation – that international pressure from the United
Nations tends to make foreign counterinsurgency campaigns untenable – can certainly
be inferred, even on a coincidental basis, from statistics maintained within the United
Nations Documentation Centre placed alongside the conflict outcomes as found in the
COW Extra-State Dataset.
Potential for further research on this issue abounds. A deeper evaluation of the
remaining foreign counterinsurgency campaigns listed above might be conducted to
determine the viability of my arguments. Since international pressure tends to focus on
the basic legitimacy of these counterinsurgency campaigns, current operations in such
diverse locations as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Chechnya might be polled and further
evaluated to determine popular opinions regarding overall government legitimacy as an
indicator of the eventual success or failure of those operations. Given the positive
nature of the existing results against the three proffered hypotheses, one might expect
further validation of those hypotheses from extended testing and analysis.
More importantly, however, would be the possibility that, should this dissertation
be granted wider dissemination, military planners studying these cases might consider
employing more caution before recommending military responses to future political
188

issues. If my research has taught me anything, it is that few indigenous peoples react
positively to foreign military occupation, regardless of the stated motivation of the
occupiers.
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Appendix I Foreign Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 1945-1997 (COW Dataset)
Campaign
118
Netherlands East Indies, 1945-1946

COIN Strategy
Mixture of both

UN/Great Power Opposition
13 UNSC, 2 UNGA/US

French Indochina, 1946-1954

Cost-Benefit

None/China, USSR

Defeat

France in Madagascar, 1947-1948

Cost-Benefit

None/None

Victory

India in Hyderabad, 1948

Social Welfare

None/None

Victory

Social Welfare

None/None

Victory

Cost-Benefit

None/None

Victory

France in Tunisia, 1952-1954

Strategy unclear

2 UNGA/None

Defeat

United Kingdom in Kenya, 1952-1956

Cost-Benefit

1 UNGA/None

Defeat

France in Morocco, 1953-1956

Strategy unclear

3 UNGA/None

Defeat

France in Algeria, 1954-1962

Cost-Benefit

9 UNGA/None

Defeat

France in Cameroun, 1955-1960

Mixture of both

6 UNGA/None

Defeat

Mixture of both

20 UNSC, 31 UNGA/USSR

Defeat

South Africa in Namibia, 1975-1988

Cost-Benefit

114 UNSC, 150 UNGA

Indonesia in East Timor, 1975-1977

Cost-Benefit

12 UNSC, 24 UNGA/None

Morocco in Western Sahara, 1975-1983

Mixture of both

54 UNSC, 51 UNGA/OAU, NAM Defeat

United Kingdom in Malaya, 1948-1957
China in Tibet, 1950-1951

Portuguese Africa,

122

119

120

1961-1975

Outcome
Defeat

121

123

/USSR Defeat
124

Victory

118

This counterinsurgency campaign actually lasted into 1949 (Collins, 1950: 181-193).

119

The Malayan State of Emergency continued in effect until July 31, 1960 (Rahman, 1965: 661).

125

120

While China successfully annexed Tibet during 1950-1951, the actual Tibetan counterinsurgency
campaign took place during 1956-1974 with 3 UNGA resolutions (McGranahan, 2006: 103).
121

The claim of a British defeat is questionable, since the United Kingdom essentially defeated the Mau
Mau in 1956, and maintained sovereignty in Kenya until 1963 (Nissimi, 2006: 8, 9; Anderson, 2005: 3).
122

Portugal‟s campaigns in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique are considered as a unit due to the
United Nations‟ reference to them all under the heading of „territories under Portuguese administration.‟
123

United Nations‟ condemnations of South African administration of Namibia began with the first session
of the General Assembly in 1946, and the Security Council became involved during 1968; the actual
insurgency erupted during 1966 and only intensified after 1975.
124

The claim of an Indonesian victory is questionable, since Falintil‟s campaign continued, albeit at a
reduced scale, until Timor-Leste independence of May 20, 2002 (Philpott, 2007: 14).
125

The claim of a Moroccan defeat in Western Sahara is questionable, since Morocco continues to
occupy the territory (The World Factbook, 2007: 627).
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Appendix II United Nations Opposition to Foreign Counterinsurgency Campaigns
Campaign
South Africa in Namibia, 1975-1988

UN Opposition

Outcome

114 UNSC, 150 UNGA

Defeat

Morocco in Western Sahara, 1975-1983

54 UNSC, 51 UNGA

Defeat126

Portuguese Africa, 1961-1975

20 UNSC, 31 UNGA

Defeat

Indonesia in East Timor, 1975-1977

12 UNSC, 24 UNGA

Victory127

Netherlands East Indies, 1945-1946

13 UNSC, 2 UNGA

Defeat

France in Algeria, 1954-1962

9 UNGA

Defeat

France in Cameroun, 1955-1960

6 UNGA

Defeat

France in Morocco, 1953-1956

3 UNGA

Defeat

France in Tunisia, 1952-1954

2 UNGA

Defeat

United Kingdom in Kenya, 1952-1956

1 UNGA

Defeat128

French Indochina, 1946-1954

None

Defeat

France in Madagascar, 1947-1948

None

Victory

India in Hyderabad, 1948

None

Victory

United Kingdom in Malaya, 1948-1957

None

Victory

China in Tibet, 1950-1951

None

Victory129

126

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.

127

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this victory.

128

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.

China‟s 1959-1974 counterinsurgency campaign in Tibet was the subject of three General Assembly
resolutions, however.
129
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Appendix III Great Power Opposition to Foreign Counterinsurgency Campaigns
Campaign

Great Power Opposition

Netherlands East Indies, 1945-1946

Outcome

United States

Defeat

French Indochina, 1946-1954

USSR/China

Defeat

Portuguese Africa, 1961-1975

USSR

Defeat

USSR/Cuba

Defeat

Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya, Egypt

Defeat

South Africa in Namibia, 1975-1988
France in Algeria, 1954-1962
France in Tunisia, 1952-1954

Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya

Defeat

France in Morocco, 1953-1956

Jāmi „at ad-Duwal al-„Arabiyya

Defeat

OAU/NAM

Defeat130

United Kingdom in Kenya, 1952-1956

None

Defeat131

France in Cameroun, 1955-1960

None

Defeat

China in Tibet, 1950-1951

None132

Victory

Indonesia in East Timor, 1975-1977

None

Victory133

France in Madagascar, 1947-1948

None

Victory

India in Hyderabad, 1948

None

Victory

United Kingdom in Malaya, 1948-1957

None

Victory

Morocco in Western Sahara, 1975-1983

130

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.

131

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.

132

China‟s 1959-1974 counterinsurgency campaign in Tibet did indeed encounter great power resistance
in the form of United States aid to the insurgency; aid that was too limited and ill-defined to prevent
another Chinese victory, however
133

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this victory.
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Appendix IV Strategies Utilized in Foreign Counterinsurgency Campaigns
Campaign

Strategy Employed

Outcome

France in Madagascar, 1947-1948

Cost-Benefit

Victory

Indonesia in East Timor, 1975-1977

Cost-Benefit

Victory134

China in Tibet, 1950-1951

Cost-Benefit

Victory

French Indochina, 1946-1954

Cost-Benefit

Defeat

United Kingdom in Kenya, 1952-1956

Cost-Benefit

Defeat135

France in Algeria, 1954-1962

Cost-Benefit

Defeat

South Africa in Namibia, 1975-1988

Cost-Benefit

Defeat

Netherlands East Indies, 1945-1946

Mixture of Both

Defeat

France in Cameroun, 1955-1960

Mixture of Both

Defeat

Portuguese Africa, 1961-1975

Mixture of Both

Defeat

Morocco in Western Sahara, 1975-1983

Mixture of Both

Defeat136

France in Tunisia, 1952-1954

Strategy Unclear

Defeat

France in Morocco, 1953-1956

Strategy Unclear

Defeat

India in Hyderabad, 1948

Social Welfare

Victory

United Kingdom in Malaya, 1948-1957

Social Welfare

Victory

134

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this victory.

135

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.

136

See my notes under Table I regarding the determination of this defeat.
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Appendix V Comparison of Variables Impacting Four Case Studies
Resolutions Great Power Intervention for Insurgents

Strategy

Namibia

189

Wide-ranging Soviet Union, Cuba

W. Sahara

103

None; Western Support for Moroccan Claim

Mixed

3

Limited, Ill-defined United States

Cost-Benefit

None

None

Social Welfare

Tibet
Malaya

Cost-Benefit

Appendix VI Comparison of Foreign Counterinsurgency Campaigns

Failure
Row %
Column %
Expected Frequency

Success
Row %
Column %
Expected Frequency

Total
2

1816-1944

1945-1997

Total

13

12

25

52.0

48.0

100.0

14.29

70.59

23.15

21.1
78

3.9
5

83

93.98

6.02

100.0

85.71

29.41

76.85

69.9

13.1

91

17

= 25.52 (p<.000)
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108

Appendix VII Dissertation Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1: The higher the level of United Nations condemnation of foreign
counterinsurgency measures, the less successful will be those measures. Cases will be
chosen on the basis of the combined number of General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions pertaining to the insurgency, and success or failure will be judged on the
basis of COW Extra-State Dataset determinations.
Hypothesis #2: The higher the level of great power recognition and support of
the legitimacy of an insurgency, the less successful will be foreign counterinsurgency
measures. International recognition will be determined through primary and secondary
sources of insurgency recognition, and success or failure will be judged on the basis of
COW Extra-State Dataset determinations.
Hypothesis #3:

The employment of either the Social Welfare or the Cost-

Benefit approach to counterinsurgency operations will not be significant in determining
success in such operations. The nature of the strategy utilized will be determined on
the basis of primary and secondary sources detailing counterinsurgency practices, and
success or failure will be judged on the basis of COW Extra-State Dataset
determinations.
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Appendix VIII Correlation Between United Nations Pressure and Insurgent Victory
UN Pressure: 1=Yes, 0=No
Outcome: 1=Foreign Power Victory, 0=Insurgency Victory
Campaign

UN Pressure

Outcome

1. South Africa in Namibia, 1975-1988

1

0

2. Morocco in Western Sahara, 1975-1983

1

0

3. Portugal in Angola, 1961-1975

1

0

4. Portugal in Guinea-Bissau, 1962-1974

1

0

5. Portugal in Mozambique, 1964-1975

1

0

6. Indonesia in East Timor, 1975-1977

1

1

7. Netherlands East Indies, 1945-1946

1

0

8. France in Algeria, 1954-1962

1

0

9. France in Cameroun, 1955-1960

1

0

10. France in Morocco, 1953-1956

1

0

11. France in Tunisia, 1952-1954

1

0

12. United Kingdom in Kenya, 1952-1956

1

0

13. French Indochina, 1946-1954

0

0

14. France in Madagascar, 1947-1948

0

1

15. India in Hyderabad, 1948

0

1

16. United Kingdom in Malaya, 1948-1957

0

1

17. China in Tibet, 1950-1951

0

1

12
0.71

5
0.29

Sample Mean

17
1.0

Correlation Coefficient: -.72
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